A MUGHAL STATESMAN OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

KHAN-I-DAURAN

Mir Bakhshi of Muhammad Shah

1719-1739

by

ZAHIRUDDIN MALIK

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ISBN 0.210.40544.9

PRINTED IN INDIA
AT THE I.M.H. PRESS PRIVATE LIMITED, DELHI AND PUBLISHED FOR THE CENTRE OF ADVANCED STUDY, DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY BY P S JAYASINGHE, ASIA PUBLISHING HOUSE, LONDON

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PREFACE

THE STUDY of the life and career of Khan-i-Dauran, which this work attempts to present, is of the utmost importance for a proper understanding of the changing pattern of events and institutions during the first half of the eighteenth century. The period witnessed unmistakable decay in the strength and character of the Mughal Empire. The mainspring of political power passed into the grip of ministers and nobles to whom the later Mughals owed their throne. The central administration declined, government finances fell into disorder, and rivalries among court nobles became intense. These factors encouraged centrifugal forces which struggled hard to gain greater independence and higher status at the expense of the Empire which, in course of time, suffered all forms of civil strife and violence. Under these conditions, Khan-i-Dauran rose from the position of a petty *mansabdar* of 150 to the post of authority and patronage and continued to hold it unimpaired for two decades. He enjoyed the implicit confidence of the Emperor and, as the leader of Indian faction at the court, exercised influence on a large and dominant section of the nobility.

However, in personality and outlook, he stood in stark contrast to ministers who occupied the office of the *Mir Bakhshi* in the previous reigns. He lacked those qualities of dynamism, robustness and daring spirit of adventure which were the characteristic traits of his predecessors—Zulfiqar Khan and Ruh-ul-Lah Khan. The fact that he fought no major battle, except at Karnal where he lost his life, sharpens this contrast. He also did not show any keenness to improve civil or militray administration which was steadily becoming inefficient, loose and corrupt. Nevertheless, in the areas of policy-making and the conduct of administrative affairs, the impact of his role was deep.

The central idea of his policy with regard to domestic problems, arising from the threat of centrifugal forces to the imperial authority, was to arrive at a peaceful settlement. He advocated the reversal of the programme and methods pursued by Aurangzeb in dealing with the Marathas and Rajput chieftains. He suggested a reconciliation with these regional elements, on the plea that the mailed fist of the Empire was not so strong as to crush their rising power by force. Through Maharaja Jai Singh Swai, his close ally and the governor of Malwa, Khan-i-Dauran made serious endeavours to come to terms with the Marathas. But the policy of compromise, followed

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by the Emperor on their advice, failed to achieve its object. This gave a chance to his opponents—Qamr-ud-din Khan and Sa'adat Khan—to denounce the policy of peaceful settlement as a solution of the Maratha problem. Yet, he remained firm and consistent in his stand, and stuck to the ideal of a political adjustment between the Centre and the Poona government, which ultimately characterised their relations towards the last decade of Muhammad Shah's reign.

The evidence utilised to construct the life-history of this wise statesman of the eighteenth century is contemporary and varied. I have tried to set down the record of his career on the basis of this source material with complete detachment, leaving conclusions to be drawn by the individual reader. The chapters dealing with the crisis in the administrative system and the activities of the rival factions at the court provide broad perspective, leading to an impartial assessment of the influence exerted by Khan-i-Dauran's personality on the course of history during the period under discussion.

I am deeply indebted to my teachers, Professor Saiyid Nurul Hasan and Professor Khaliq Ahmad Nizami for their genuine and continued interest in the preparation of this work. While acknowledging their help and guidance, which were valuable and inspiring, the author takes full responsibility for such defects or errors as the book may contain.

May 11, 1972
Aligarh

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KHAN-I-DAURAN, THE MIR BAKHSHI OF MUHAMMAD SHAH

One of the most striking features of Mughal politics during the first half of the 18th century was the struggle for supremacy between the rulers and their ministers on the one hand, and the factional feuds among the nobles on the other. The ministers made a bold bid to assume control of the administrative functions of the central government, while the governors sought to set up their independent rule in the provinces. The nobles eagerly contested for the post of *wizarat* which appeared to them a covetous prize for services rendered to kings in their struggle for succession. These internal dissensions plunged the entire administration into confusion and the political atmosphere became surcharged with plots and counter-plots. The discipline in the army grew slack and royal treasury became depleted. The fate of Farrukh Siyar, however, served as a warning to his successors who became puppets in the hands of *wazirs*, *mir bakhshis* and other powerful nobles. The Mughal nobility' distracted by factional politics, failed to respond to the challenges of the situation. It suffered from intellectual weariness and loss of creative vigour. Shorn of inner strength, it could not stand the impact of external pressures.

All emperors, perhaps without exception, who ruled India after 'Alamgir, owed their accession to the support given by some minister or noble in their struggle for succession. The emperors recognized their military and diplomatic services by bestowing on them rewards in money and land, high ranks and key positions in the government. But the entry of these persons into the arena of imperial politics made members of the old ruling families indignant as they were a positive impediment to the realization of their ambitions. The newly elevated ministers and their partisans undertook to consolidate their gains and formed strong combination to meet the challenge of nobles who played no significant part in the succession-battles. Not contented with what they received in return of their services the new ministers sought their fortunes in wider spheres, and usurped as much sovereign powers as they could.

'Alamgir's successors were faced with no easy task to maintain balance among diveregent elements of nobility and, at the same time, make them work for exalting royal auhority. They were caught in the centre of a sort of tug-of-war, with hereditary servants pulling them towards their own side, and new wielders of power drawing them nearer

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to their fold. As the ministers went beyond the limits of power vested in them, the emperors were easily driven into the arms of favoured courtiers. In some cases, an emperor had to tempt and engage his loyal companions into hostile action against the 'upstarts' who assumed power in all matters of public administration.

The group politics between Zulfiqar Khan and Mun'im Khan entangeled Bahadur Shah also ; but he saved his position by appeasing both the sections of the ruling class. Zulfiqar Khan emerged supreme in the reign of Jahandar Shah and conducted state affairs unchallenged by any rival minister. Kokaltash Khan, however, evinced feelings of jealousy towards the *wazir*, and sought to undermine his influence. During the seven years rule of Farrukh Siyar, these trends of political behaviour grew strong. While Farrukh Siyar and the Saiyid brothers stood arrayed against each other, the other nobles were not slow to get themselves involved in these quarrels. They looked at this conflict as a chance to improve their prospects of self-aggrandisement. Most of the self-seeking nobles threw in their lot with one or the other group. This tangled maze of contending interests and interplay of political currents worsened the situation, from which none of the fighting groups could get out. The rift dangerously widened and culminated in the deposition and death of the master of the Mughal throne. The killing of the king abundantly demonstrated the triumph of ministers who, in years following the tragedy, took up the role of king-makers.

The weak and vacillating character of the kings largely contributed to the loss of their prestige. They lacked in political skill and dismally failed to use their executive powers against the opponents. Consequently, the nobles and minister captured power and obliged the monarch to take a back seat on the political stage. Round them centred events which ultimately shaped and controlled the political destiny of the country. The history of the period turns out to be the life-history of these men of affairs—their activities, their hopes and aims, and their failures and achievements. A detailed study of their lives and activities may enable one to look at the inner side of developments and interpret them in their true historical perspective.

Some of these historic figures, like Nizam-u'l-Mulk and Sa'adat Khan Burhan-u'l-Mulk, have already been dealt with exhaustively by distinguished scholars. But Samsam-ud-Daulah Khan-i-Dauran, a leading noble of the period, has not so far attracted the attention of a candid critic. He occupied a pivotal position in the central government. As *Mir Bakhshi*, which post he held till the time of his dealth, Khan-i-Dauran played a vital role in the formulation of imperial policies; he was also

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influential in the management of governmental affairs. Apart from being an important minister he was the leader of a section of the nobility. He chose to stay near the centre of power, and did not emulate the example of Nizam-u'l-Mulk or Sa'adat Khan who assumed independence in their respective spheres of influence.

The present study, based on original source-material, is an attempt to reconstruct his life and achievements, and make a critical analysis of the events in which he took part. Besides biographical details, an analysis of the problems of the central administraion and a discussion of the economic and social crisis of the period has been attempted. A discussion of the role of different nobles on the battle-field of Karnal has also been included. As regards utilizing chronicles, special attention has been paid to ascertaining the group-affiliation of a writer.

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CHAPTER—I

EARLY LIFE AND CAREER

His name was Khwaja 'Asim. He was born in the year 1672-73,[1] in Agra where his father Khwaja Qasim lived a life of retirement, after giving up his job in the army of Prince Akbar' (1657-1706) who had revolted against his father 'Alamgir in 1681. His ancestors had come from Badakhashan and settled in that city. They belonged to the *Naqshbandi silsilāh*.[2]

When Khwaja 'Asim grew to manhood, he along with his two brothers[3] went to the Deccan in search of employment. Prince Kam Bakhsh (1677-1709) took them in his service and appointed Khwaja 'Asim a *mansab*-dar of 150. Later on, they entered the service of Prince Muhammad 'Azim (1664-1712) second son of Muhammad Mu'azzam Shah 'Alam, and accompanied him to Bengal where 'Asim was appointed 'Ataliq of the Prince's son, Farrukh-Siyar'[4] (born September 11, 1683). In the last year of his reign, 'Alamgir called back his grandson from the government of the Eastern provinces. Leaving Farrukh Siyar at Patna, the Prince hastened to the Deccan via Agra. On his way he heard of 'Alamgir's death (March 3, 1707) but continued his march ; and at Agra he made vigorous military preparations for the impending war of succession between his father and 'Azam Shah (1653-1707).[5] Shah 'Alam also reached Agra on June 12,

1. In *Tarikh-i-Muhammadi*, the age of Khwaja 'Asim at the time of his death is recorded as 68 years. He died in 1151 H. (1738), and, therefore, the date of his birth can be fixed in 1083 H.

2. *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran*, Anonymous, Rotograph of Ms. in B.M. f. 51a. *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, Muhammad Ai Khan, Aligarh MS. p. 332. According to Ghulam Ali Khan, author of *'Imad-us-Sa'adat*, Nawal Kishore, p. 23, Khan-i-Dauran's ancestors first stayed in the Punjab ; after sometime they proceeded to Bengal, where they lived for a long time. Then they went to Agra and settled there. Khan-i-Dauran's father, Khwaja Qasim, was born in Agra.

3. Khwaja Qasim had five sons : Khwaja Anwar, Khwaja Baqar, Khwaja J'afar, Khwaja 'Asim, and Khwaja Muzaffar. Khwaja 'Asim and Khwaja Muzaffar were real brothers : the other three brothers were born to the second wife of Khwaja Qasim. The names of these five brothers given in *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah-wa-Khan-i-Dauran*, f. 33. are as follows :—Khwaja Ja'afar, Khwaja Anwar, Khwaja Muhtashim, Khwaja Mustaqim, and Khwaja Muqim.

4. *Risbala-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran*, pp. 51b, 52a, 53b.

5. Muhammad Bakhsh Ashub, author of *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, wirtes that it was at Agra where Khwaja 'Asim with his real brother Khwaja Muzaffar joined prince Muhammad 'Azim, p. 133.

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1707. He defeated 'Azam Shah at Jajau (June 20, 1707) and became the Emperor of Hindustan. From that time, Muhammad 'Azim, now made 'Azim-ush-Shan remained in the company of his father, Bahadur Shah. As Prince 'Azim-ush-Shan received reports that Khwaja 'Asim had taken complete hold over the mind of Farrukh Siyar, he ordered the Khwaja to return to the court at Lahore.[6] Here he served as the Prince's Lord Steward.[7]

After a reign of five years and nearly two months[8] Bahadur Shah died on the night of February 27, 1712, at Lahore. His death was followed by another war of succession among his sons, Mu'izuddin, 'Azim-ush-Shan, Rafi-ush-Shan and Jahan Shah. Mu'izuddin crushed all his brothers and crowned himself Emperor, with the title of Abul Fatah, Muhammad Mu'izuddin Jahandar Shah, on March 29, 1712.[9] The troops of 'Azim-ush-Shan dispersed and Khwaja 'Asim also ran away from Lahore to Agra.[10] Within a few months of his arrival at Agra the Khwaja learnt that Farrukh Siyar entertained ambitions to fight for the imperial throne. He proceeded to Patna to join the new claimant and assist him in his desperate undertaking. Farrukh Siyar received him kindly, bestowed upon him the title of Ashraf Khan and the post of the Superintendent of Privy Audience Chamber. For a short time he served as *Mir Atash*, the head of artillery.[11]

Farrukh Siyar enlisted the support of Hussain 'Ali Khan, and raised an army of 25,000 men. At the head of this force, he started from Patna

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6. *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran*, f. 61 a, b.
7. *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, p. 333.
8. *Later Mughals*. Irvine, Vol. I, p. 135.
9. *Farrukh Namah*, Shaikh Muhammad Mu'in, B.M.M.S. Aligarh Rotograph pp. 46-72.
10. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh-Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 134.
11. *Ma'asir-u'l-Umara*, Shah Nawaz Khan, Vol. I, p. 820 *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, p. 332. The author of *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran* records that in Allahabad Khwaja 'Asim met Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan and obtained from him pledges of succour for Farrukh Siyar, and also letters addressed to the younger brother Husain 'Ali Khan asking him to espouse the cause of the Prince (f. 635). Muhammad Qasim Aurangabadi, author of *Ahwal-ul-Khawaqin*, states that the Khwaja received *farman* from Farrukh Siyar to recruit troopers in Agra and come to attend his court at Patna (f. 5 ob). Mirza Muhammad, author of *'Ibrat Namah*, writes that Khwaja 'Asim had fled from Lahore and joined the Prince at Patna. There he played the role of a mediator between Farrukh Siyar and Husain 'Ali Khan as they were not on friendly terms, ff. 14, b, 15a. According to Nuruddin Faruqi, author of *Jahandar Namah*, B.M.Ms. Aligarh Rotograph, f. 42a, Ahmed Beg and Khwaja 'Asim entered into the service of Farrukh Siyar through the efforts of Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan. Yahya Khan says that Khwaja 'Asim, son of Khwaja Hashim, lived a life of poverty in Agra. He went to Bengal where 'Azim-ush-Shan employed him in his own government. One of 'Asim's brothers was already serving the Prince, and he helped him in securing the job. When 'Azim-ush-Shan proceeded towards Agra, 'Asim remained there in the service of Farrukh Siyar. *Tazkirat-u'l-Muluk*, f. 119b.

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on September 22, 1712, and on his way towards north, he was joined by Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan, Chhabela Ram Nagar, 'Ali Asghar Khan, Muhammad Khan Bangash and others. His ranks swelled to enormous proportions, and his treasury was filled with money brought by adherents and collection of taxes and loans. Jahandar Shah first sent his son 'Azuddin to thwart the march of advancing troops under the command of his rival. But the Prince effected his escape from the battlefield at Khwaja, abandoning soldiers to their fate and the camp equipage to pillage by the enemy.

On hearing the unhappy news of his son's flight, Jahandar Shah started from Delhi at the head of an army numbering approximately one lakh, and met Farrukh Siyar near Agra to decide the issue in an open contest on January 10, 1712. When hostilities commenced, Jahandar Shah's followers put up a stout fight against the enemy. Victory seemed to be within the grasp of Jahandar Shah, but Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan's attack on his camp from behind the rear turned the course of battle. The uproar and confusion produced by this sudden sally disheartened him and made his elephant out of control. He sought his safety in flight from the thick of the battle wishing to retrieve his fortunes by raising a fresh army either in the capital or in Multan where he had a considerable following. Seeing this, Zulfiqar Khan also left the field and moved to Delhi to confer with his father about the future course of action. In this battle of Khwaja 'Asim is reported to have played no conspicuous role. He along with Ahmad Beg, Muhammad Zafar and Mir Ghiyasuddin, escorted Farrukh Siyar and all the time remained in his attendance.[12] Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan and Saiyid Husain 'Ali Khan, on the other hand, impressed an unmistakable stamp of their intrepid courage, matchless valour, and great resourcefulness. Husain 'Ali Khan, in an hour of emergency, dismounted his elephant and fought on foot most gallantly ; he was wounded and fainted.[13]

12. *'Ibrat Namah*, Kamraj, f. 50a.

13. For a full contemporary account of Farrukh Siyar's activities in Patna, his march towards Allahabad and thence to Delhi, topographical details, every day events, appointments, the circumstances under which many adherents joined him, the battle of Agra, the appointments made after the victory, *Farrukh Siyar Namah* by Mir Muhammad Ahsan Ijad is extremely useful. Another significant work pertaining to these details is *'Ibrat Namah* by Miza Muhammad bin Mu'tamid Khan (Patna Ms). It lacks in topographical details and day to day events. But for the early history of Farrukhr-Siyar, description of Saiyid Brothers and other important personalities of the time, a critical account of events and circumstances leading to the conflict between the Empero and his ministers, rise of faction feuds, the tragedy that overtook him, *'Ibrat Namah* is the most important among all the known contemporary sources for the reign of Farrukh Siyar. Imay be helpful in interpreting the meaning and impact of events that took

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On February 12, 1713, Farrukh Siyar made his entry into Delhi and took possession of the royal palace.[14]

Farrukh Siyar, who owad a debt of gratitude to Saiyid Husain 'Ali Khan and Saiyid'Abdullah Khan for his victory over Jahandar Shah, bestowed on them the highest ranks and titles of the Empire, Abdullah Khan was made the *wazir* with the title of Nawab Qutbul Mulk, Yamin-ud-Daulah, Saiyid Abdullah Khan Bahadur, Zafar Jang, Sipah Salar Yar-i-Wafadar. The office of the first *bakhshi* went to Saiyid Husain 'Ali Khan, and the titles of 'Umdat-ul-Mulk, Amir-u'l-Umara Bahadur Firoz Jang, Sipah Salar were conferred upon him, Both of them received *mansabs* of 7,000/ 7,000 horse. Rich *jagirs* and magnificent villas of former Amirs in the capital were allotted to them.[15] Khwaja 'Asim received the title of Samsam-ud-Daulah Khan-i-Dauran, Bahadur Mansur Jang; he was appointed the superintendent of the Audience Hall and *bakhshi* of the personal troops or *walla shahi*. His *mansab* was fixed to 7,000/-6,000 horse.[16]

The acquisition of supreme power by the Saiyid Brothers excited jealously and kindled sparks of ill-will in the hearts of the Emperor's hereditary servants and favourities who were dreaming to obtain these posts for themselves. Of these Khwaja 'Asim and Mir Jumla[17] particularly felt disappointed at the limits set to their ambitions. They discovered

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place during this period. These two accounts should, of course, be supplemented by *'Ibrat Namah*, Kamraj bin Nain Singh; *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Khafi Khan; *Farrukh Namah*, Shaikh, M. Mu'in; *Mir'at--i-Waridat*; *and Ibrat Namah*, Muhammad Qasim Lahori.

14. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Bib. Ind. Cal. 1874, Part II, p. 728.

15. *Muntakhb-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, p. 728. *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghtiyah*, Hadi Khan Kamwar, Patna MS. f. 368, a, b.

16. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, p. 729; *Ma'asir-u'l-Umara*, Part I, p. 280. The author gives his *mansab* as 7,000/7,000. In *Ahwal-u'l-Khawaqin*, f. 51a. his *mansab* is given as 7,000/7,000. *Risalah Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i--Dauran*, f. 71b. The author puts his *mansab* as 8,000/8,000 two *aspah*, three *aspah*, and a *jagir* worth of 28 crore. *dams*. His titles were changed from time to time since he joined Farrukh Siyar. First he became Ashraf Khan, then Khan-i-Dauran, and finally Amir-u'l-Umara Samsamud-Daulah Bahadur Mansur Jung. In *Siyar-u'l-Muta'akhkhirin*, Ghulam Husain Tabatabi (Nawal Kishore Press) p. 394, his *mansab* is stated as 7,000/6,000, In *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus Muhammad Shah*, p. 135, his mansab is given as 7,000/7,000 horse. Kamraj bin Nain Singh puts his *mansab* 6,000/6,000. *'Ibrat Namah*, f. 54a.

17. His original name was 'Ubaidullah and he was born in Samarqand near about the year 1670-71. He came to India in the reign of 'Alamgir, and served as Qazi first in the Deccan and then in Patna. Then he came into contact with Prince 'Azim-ush-Shan and gained his favour. He was appointed by Farrukh Siyar the Superintendent of the Khawas, or attendants of *Ghusal Khana* (Privy Council Room); his titles were : Mu'tamid-u'l-Mulk, Mir Jumla, Khan-i-Khanan Bahadur, Muzaffar Jang. See for details : *Ma'asir-u'l-Umara*, Part III, 711.

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no way open to their rise to the highest posts so long as the ministers perched on the pinnacle of political power.[18] With the dogged energy they engaged themselves in plots to pull the Saiyids down from the exalted heights. Having no courage to cross swords with their rivals in the open field and having no regard for norms of integrity they resorted to guile, treachery and plots.[19] In the opinion of Mir Qasim Lahori, author of *'Ibrat Namah*, their prime aim was a clear-cut liquidation of their opponents ; mere dismissal from offices could in no way gratify their fervent longing for power.[20]

The Khwaja outwardly consorted with the minsiters but secretly pulled wires behind the scene. Day in and day out, he would go to the court and adroitely sow suspicion, which already had found its way into the Emperor's head, by false statements and imaginary tales. In league with Mir Jumla, he persuaded the Emperor to believe that their supremacy was a definite threat not only to his constituted authority but to peace and securty of the land. The Saiyid brothers held key posts in government; they usurped big mansions of former Amirs ; they possessed rich and easily-managed *jagirs*; they had the power to make civil and military appointments. The sooner this awful danger was nipped in the bud the stronger would be the position of the monarch.[21] Khwaja 'Asim and Mir Jumla suggested they should be financially and militarily strengthened to enable them meet the challenge of the Saiyid brothers. Either the ministers should give way of their own accord, or they should be crushed ruthlessly if they resisted. But open rupture was to be avoided at any rate; tact and diplomacy should be their methods to gain the cherished objective.[22]

In contemporary literature[23] Farrukh Siyar is revealed as pusillanimous and unscrupulous, one who could stoop to the lowest depths

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18. *Tarikh-i-Sultanat-i-Farrukh Siyar*, f. 61b.

19. *'Ibrat Namah*, Muhammad Mirza, f· 30b.

20. *Tarikh-i-Sultanat-i-Farrukh Siyar*, f. 2a.

21. *Tarikh-i-Sultanat-i-Farrukh Siyar*, f. 62a ; *'Ibrat Namah*, Mirza Muhammad f. 30b ; *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, Muhammad Shafi' Warid, Aligarh MS. p. 305.

22. *"Ibrat Namah*, Mirza Muhammad, f. 31a ; *Tarikh-i-Sultanate-i-Farrukh Siyar*, f. 62b.

23. The contemporary as well as non-contemporary writers are sharply divided in their estimates about the characters and motives of Farrukh Siyar and the Saiyids. It was a controversial issue of the day. Azad Bilgrami writes that after the fall of the Saiyids the people discussed their virtues and defects openly wherever they gathered and quarrelled among themselves. Historians, like Muhammad Bukhsh Ashub, Mir Muhammad Qasim Lahori, Muhammad Qasim Aurangabadi, author of Sahifah-i-Iqbal, either Mughal by origin or patronised by The Mughal leaders manifest bias against the Saiyids in their works ; while Rustam' Ali Khan, author of *Tarikh-i-Hindi*, Ghulam Husain Tabatabai,

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of sordidness both in taking revenge and showering royal favours. And the Saiyid brothers are denigrated as inordinately ambitious, arrogant and extremely eager to monopolise all power in their hands. These defects in their characters may construe to explain a type of process by which their mutual relations grew antagonistic and forces of conflict, far too powerful for their control, were set in motion. The spirt of self-defence and the fear of future dangers led the warring parties to indulge in acts which attained summit of vice and infamy. But the single largest factor that contributed to the rise of conflict was the passion to exercise power unchecked and defend it with all possible means. Farrukh Siyar wanted to wield his sovereign power questioned by no one among his ministers, while the Saiyid brothers asserted to dominate state administration without being answerable to the Emperor. Perhaps, Farrukh Siyar had thought to use these brothers as tools in his war against Jahandar Shah and replace them by his own favourites when he took the helm of the Empire into his hands. The Saiyids, on the other hand, were proud of their prodigious feats of resourcefulness and vitality by which they raised a destitute to the Mughal throne. They stubbornly refused to be bullied out of power; they became millstones round the Emperors' neck, ever on the look-out to throw him overboard. It was a bitter tussle for power between the ministers and the monarch seldom experienced in the past. It assumed such high dimensions as to engulf the entire empire in civil discord, faction feuds and political anarchy for nearly six years, and it ended in the defeat, deposition and death of the Mughul monarch at the hands of his ministers.

From the very outset differences arose on issues of appointments and distribution of spoils which embittered their relations and precluded every possibility for an honest reconciliation.[24] Khwaja 'Asim and other countries only added feul to the flames that long before were ablaze in Farrukh Siyar; they cleverly used the opportunity to play upon his deep

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Azad Bilgrami and others, have nothing but admiration for the Saiyids. Some writers praise the actions of the Saiyids in their conflict with Farrukh Siyar but when they deal their relations with the Mughals and Muhammad Shah they change their attitude and condemn the Saiyids. A somewhat balanced appraisal of events can be found in *'Ibrat Namah* of Mirza Muhammad, *Munawwar-u'l-Kalam* of Shiu Das and *Tazirat-u'l-Muluk* of *Yahya* Khan.

24. *Farrukh Siyar Namah*, f. 125a; *Tazkart-u'l-Muluk*, ff. 122, b, 123a; *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, p. 729, 30. See for a detailed account of the early relations of Farrukh Siyar and the Saiyid brothers, Medieval India Quarterly, Vol. ii, 1955.

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suspicions and superstitious fears[25] and prepare the ground for their own advancement. Their methods soon brought results. Khan-i-Dauran was raised in rank and status. His *wala shahi* troops were increased to 5,000 while his other relations obtained lucrative jobs in government.[26] But he only showed a lukewarm enthusiasm for the royal cause and performed no spectacular act for his master.[27]

The Saiyids were warriors of renown. Their valour and daring spirit won for them victories and evoked awe in the hearts of the people. Seekers of fortune looked on them for favour, refractory Rajas and other rebels needed their intervention, and the poor depended on their charity. They assembled a powerful army and amassed great treasures. Their grandeur and magnificence dimmed the lustre of Farrukh Siyar. The Emperor feared to be reduced to a mere puppet.[28] To all outward appearances it became painfully clear that Kyan-i-Dauran and other courtiers had no strength to enter upon an open contest with their formidable rivals and oust them from power which they arrogated to themselves. They, therefore, recommended that the office of *wizarat* should be wrested from the control of Saiyid 'Abdullah Qutubul Mulk and given to some faithful servant who, by employing all imperial resources at his disposal, would destroy the enemies root and branch."[29] But, when Khan-i-Dauran was asked to shoulder the responsibility, he only trembled. The post he coveted most

25. Farrukh Siyar was deeply superstitious. While he was in Patna some astrologers prophesied his accession to the throne. Believing them, it is said, he did not proceed further to support his father 'Azim-ush-Shan. He stayed on at Patna. This time also a prophecy was made that after Bahadur Shah's death his youngest descendants would reign and eventually they would be succeeded by a Saiyid. It got a wide circulation in the city. It throws light not only on Farrukh Siyar psychology but also on the designs of the Saiyids. Probably it might have been cooked by the Saiyid's opponents.

26. *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, p. 406 ; *'Ibrat Namah*, Muhammad Mirza, f. 31a.

27. He not only failed against the Saiyids but he could not suppress the Jat rebellion, too. The sturdy race of the Jats living under the very shadow of the imperial capital had for long been carrying devastation by committing highway robbery. Farrukh Siyar appointed Khan-i-Dauran governor of Agra by replacing Chhabela Ram Nagar with the avowed object to crush the power of the Jats. Khan-i-Dauran could not bring Churaman, their leader, to submission. He contented himself by making peace with him. Churaman came to attend the court and received the wardenship of the imperial highway from Barapullah to the river Chambal. But Churaman could not perform the duties of his new charge satisfactorily. He grew arrogant and haughty in his dealings with the fief holders and other officers of the government. *History of Aurangzeb*, Sarkar, Vol. IV, pp. 293-311, *History of Jats*, Qanungo, pp. 37-50 ; *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, p. 503 ; *'Ibrat Namah*, Muhammad Mirza ff. 64-65.

28. *'Ibrat Namah*, Muhammad Mirza, f. 33a.; *Ahwal-u'l-Khawaqin*, Muhammad Qasim Aurangabadi, f. 78a.

29. *'Ibrat Namah*, Muhammad Mirza, f. 32a.

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but the toil and peril it entailed unnerved him, a small man with big ambitions.[30]

Through the conciliatory efforts of Khwaja Ja'far,[31] a pious man and brother of Khan-i-Dauran, who was held in respect by the parties, a rapproachment was effected between the Saiyid brothers and the Emperor on the condition that both Mirr, Jumla and Husain 'Ali Khan should quit the court.[32] In the case of Khan-i-Dauran, his brother assured the Saiyids that he would not put their interests in jeopardy in future.[33] On November 19, 1714, Qutubul Mulk went to the place and seeing Mir Jumla and Khan-i-Dauran rebuked them in loud voice and severest language. "But the two cowards swallowed the bitter draught as if it had been composed of sugar and honey." They remained tight-lipped.[34] On April 4, 1715, Husain 'Ali Khan left Delhi for the Deccan after making Khan-i-Dauran his deputy in the court.[35] Khan-i-Dauran now enjoyed the confidence of the Emperor as well as of the Saiyids. The Emperor appointed him governor of Gujarat in 1716, and 'Abdul Hamid Khan was made his deputy.[36]

During the absence of Husain 'Ali Khan from the court, Farrukh Siyar again directed his efforts for the overthrow of the Saiyid brothers. He made plans to arrest and imprison Saiyid 'Abdulah. But Khan-i-Dauran, acting on the advice of his brother, Khwaja Ja'afar, took no active part in these hostile undertakings against the *wazir*. Perhaps he now realized

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30. *'Ibrat Namah*, Muhammad Mirza, f. 33a. Khan-i-Dauran suggested the name of Muhammad Amin Khan for the execution of the project. He argued that Amin Khan will succeed in overpowering the Saiyids with his Mughal troops. After their suppression he should be removed from the office and some other person of the Emperor's choice should be appointed. When Amin Khan learnt of this secret design, he refused to accept the offer.

31. Khawaja 'Ja'afar was the disciple of Shah Jalal. The author of *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran* lauds in his rhetoric style the piety and divine virtues of Ja'afar. But Muhammad Mirza, author of *'Ibrat Namah*, criticises him as wordly-minded and materialistic in his outlook. By reason of his relationship with Khan-i-Dauran, Khwaja Ja'afar was approached by large number of persons for securing jobs and *mansabs* in the government. He was a Sufi and belonged to Nqshbandhi silsilah, but inclined to Shi'aism. His son Khwaja Basit, attained great repute for his learning and divinity. These brothers of Khan-i-Dauran received pensions and worked in the government in different capacities. *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran*, f. 33 ; *'Ibrat Namah*, Muhammad Mirza, p. 63, a, b.

32. *Munawar-u'l-Kalam*, p. 8.
33. *'Ibrat Namah, Muhammad Mirza*, f. 34b.
34. *'Ibrat Namah*, Muhammad Mirza, f. 34b.
35. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, p. 742. *Munawaar-u'l-Kalam*, p. 8.
36. *Mir'at-i-Ahmadi*, 'Ali Muhammad Khan, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, 1927, Part II, p. 12.

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that Farrukh Siyar could not humble his ministers; his cause was lost, and the Saiyid brothers would remain at the helm of affairs. It may also be assumed that he feared lest the Saiyid brothers, in the event of their final triumph, should wreak vengeance upon him. Apart from this appraisal of the situation, Khan-i-Dauran lacked courage of convcition in perpetually adhering to the cause of the Emperor. In the words of Mirza Muhammad, "he vaingloriously spoke of his merits like bravery and loyalty, but possessed none."[37] Another factor of vital importance which drew Khan-i-Dauran away from the fold of Farrukh Siyar was the rise of Muhammad Murad Kashmiri.[38] Murad instigated the Emperor by bringing out charges of perfidy against Khan-i-Dauran who was clanderstinely aligned with Saiyid 'Abdullah and divulging secrets to him.[39]

Farrukh Siyar vented his wrath by twice sending poisoned food to Khan-i-Dauran in order to take his life. Khan-i-Dauran having learnt of his master's criminal intentions rebuked to his face in a most derogatory language. But the Emperor made no reply and became silent[40]. Khan-i-Dauran, thus alienated from Farrukh Siyar, united himself in a bond of friendship with the Saiyid brothers. He foiled two attempts of the Emperor for the arrest of Saiyid 'Abdullah, one in the audience hall, and the other in the course of an hunting expedition[41].

Farrukh Siyar, having failed to achieve his object against the Saiyids, now (1719) sought to reconcile them by increasing thier ranks and con-

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37. *'Ibrat Namah*, Muhammad Mirza, f. 33 a.

38. Muhammad Murad was a native of Kashmir. Through his friendship with Murad Kokaltash Khan, in the reign of Jahandar Shah, he received a *mqnsab* of 2,000. When Farrukh Siyar came to the throne, he gained the favour of Husain 'Ali Khan who got him promoted to the post of fourth Mir Tuzak. Now Farrukh Siyar raised Murad to a *mansab* of 7,000/7,000 horse with titles of Rusham-ud-Daulah 'Itaqad Khan Bahadur Farrukh Shahi. He received lakhs of rupees as reward from the Emperor. Farrukh Siyar entrused to him the task of destroying the power of the Saiyids. For details, *'Ibrat Namah*. Mirza Muhammad, ff. 77, 78, 79. *Mir'at-i-Waridat* p. 524 *Munawwar-u'l-Kalam*, p. 40,

39. *Later Mughals*, Vol. I, p. 342.

40. *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, p. 525.

41. Once the Emperor and Samsamud-Daulah Khan-i-Dauran made a plan to arrest S. 'Abdullah Qutubul Mulk. It was agreed that *Khan-i-Dauran* would cry 'Qul' at the time of the Saiyid's entrance into the audience Hall whereupon the armed attendants shall fall on the victim and seize him. But when the moment came, Khan-i-Dauran used the word 'Qur' and instead of armed attendants there emerged out all who were waiting for audience. *Munawwar-u'l-Kalam*, p. 42; *Tarikh-i-Bahadur* Shah (Anonymos) Aligarh Ms. fi. 16b., 17a. On another occasion Farrukh Siyar went out of the city for hunting. Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan was ordered to present himself there. Khan-i-Dauran informed the Saiyid of the Emperor's intentions. 'Abdullah Khan went there to pay his homage with a force of five hundred horsemen. The Emperor became frightened and could do nothing. *Later Mughals*, Part I, p. 355.

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ferring fresh honours. Their *mansabs* were raised from 7,000/7,000 to 8,000/8,000, of which 5,000 were *duaspa*[42]. In this atmosphere of friendship, several new appointments were made on the recommendation of the *wazir*. Khan-i-Dauran secured the governorship of Agra ; while Raja Ajit Singh replaced him in the province of Gujarat[43].

From this time onward, Khan-i-Dauran identified himself most conspicuously with the interests of the Saiyid brothers. This change-over to the side of the Saiyids helped Khan-i-Dauran to maintain his rank and status unassailed from any quarter after the deposition of Farrukh Siyar (Feb. 28, 1719). During the reigns of Rafii'-ud-darajat and Rafi'-ud-daulah he continued to be their ally and confident counseller.

Samsam-ud-Daulah Khan-i-Dauran held aloof from intrigues that were at foot in the first year of Muhammad Shah's reign for putting a stop to the rule of the king-makers[44]. Muhammad Amin Khan, the arch-conspirator, in close association with Sa'adat Khan, a Saiyid of Nishapur[45] and Haider Quli Khan, a Mughul, organised a scheme to get Husain 'Ali Khan assassinated by stratagem[46]. "All these three agreed upon assassinating and bound themselves together to effect their purpose and keep their

42. This conciliation took place in the last month of 1718. For details of developments which brought this change, *Later Mughals*, Vol. I pp. 356-365.

43. *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghtaiyah*, f. 376b. These appointments were made in the beginning of the year 1719. According to *Mir'at-i-i-Ahmadi*, Qutbul Mulk promised the governorship of Gujarat to Raja Ajit Singh at the time of Farrukh Siyar's deposition, but actual *farman* to this effect was issued after the accession of Rafi'-ud-Darajat (Feb. 27, 1719), *Mir'at-i-Ahmadi*, p. 21.

44. *Sharaf Namah-i-Muhammad Shah*, f. 92a. According to the writer of this work Khan-i-Dauran allied himself with Muhammad Amin Khan in the plot against the life of Husain 'Ali Khan.

بظاهر محمد امین خان رفیق بباطن بدل داشت فکر دقیق
حسین از غروری نکرده قیاس همی بود بے خدشه و بے هراس
محمد امین خان بمجرای شاه کمر بسته خاطر شدی هر پگاه
همه عمده‌ها را نموده رفیق بخود کر گرویده جمله فریق
چوشد خاندوران رفیتش بجان قوی گشت بازوی آن کامران
ظفرخان و حیدر قلی خان کمر به بستند همراه آن نامور

45. For his detailed biography see, *First Two Nawabs of Oudh*, Dr. A. L. Srivastava, Agra, 1954. pp. 1-20.

46. *Sahifah-i-Iqbal*, f. 4.

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designs secret to themselves[47]." In Mir Haider Beg Kashghari they found an assassin[48].

On the fateful mid-day of October 8, 1720 Husain 'Ali Khan was murdered at a place between Jinud and Biund about two kos to the east of Toda Bhon, a place 75 miles of Agra and 60 miles east of Jaipur, where Muhammad Shah with most of his leading nobles was encamped[49]. There arose a great tumult and uproar in the camp[50]. Round the private enclosure of the Emperor a fierce fighting ensured between the supporters of Muhammad Amin Khan and the Barha chiefs.[51]

Muhammad Amin Khan sent for Khan-i-Dauran and other nobles to come forward to his assistence. Khan-i-Dauran did not respond to his appeal.[52] However, the Mughals flung back the attacks delivered by Saiyid Ghulam 'Ali Khan, Saiyid Ghairat Khan, 'Izzat Khan and others.[53] When the Saiyid party was on the verge of annihilation and the Mughals stood at the threshold of victory, Khan-i-Dauran also belately rose to the occasion and with his followers joined Muhammad Amin Khan.[54] In their desperate attempts to enter the private enclosure of the Emperor, several Saiyid captains were put to sword; Husain 'Ali Khan's baggage and the treasures were pillaged recklessly by the Mughal soldiery.[55] Sa'adat Khan entered the harem and forcibly mounted the Emperor on Qamruddin Khan's elephant; Muhammad Amin Khan sat behind him in the *hauda*. They advanced forward and took a position at the entrance of a public market where thousands saw the severed head of Husain 'Ali Khan, fastened to the end of a long pole, with amazement and awe. At this sight, all signs of turbulence vanished and calm returned without delay.[56]

Muhammad Shah held a formal *darbar*. Muhammad Amin Khan was made the *Wazir* with a *mansab* of 8,000 zat, 8,000 *Sawar*, two *aspah*. Samsam-ud-Daulah Khan-i-Dauran secured the post of the *Mir Bakhshi*,

47. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, p. 903.
48. *Tarikh-i-'Ali*, (anonymous) Patna, MS. f. 69.
49. *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, p. 551; *Tarikh-i-Fathiyah*, Yusuf Muhammad Khan, Daftar-i-Diwani, Hyderabad Ms. f. 3; *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran*, f. 75b; *Shah Namah-i-Deccan*, pp. 126-127.
50. *Tazkirah-i-Shakir Khan*, Shakir Khan, (Patna Ms.), p. 21.
51. *Shah Namah Munawwar-u'l-Kalam*, p 106.
52. *Tarikh-i-Sultanat-i-Farrukh Siyar*, f. 108b.
53. *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, pp. 221-222.
54. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, p. 908.
55. *Hadiqat-u'l-'Alam*, Mir Abu Turab, Litho. Hyderabad, pp. 103-110.
56. *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghtaiyah*, f. 181b.; *Tarikh-i-Fathiyah*, f. 4a; *Sahifah-i-Iqbal*, f. 6b; *Ahwal-u'l-Khawaqin*, f. 176b.

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and the title of Amir-u'l-Umara with the rank of 8,000/8,000 bestowed on him. Sa'adat Khan received a *mansab* of 5,000/3,000 and the governorship of Agra with the privilege of beating kettle drums.[57]

It is clear that Khan-i-Dauran took no part in plots leading to the cold-blooded murder of Husain 'Ali Khan that ultimately spelled the downfall of the Saiyid oligarchy. He was even hesitant to play a bold hand for himself in the bloody fight following the commission of the deed. Sa'adat Khan, on the other hand, stood almost solidly in support of Muhammad Amin Khan and laboured long and earnestly for the success of his cause. He displayed his political and soldierly talents; and his resourceful and astute ways were commendable. What considerations moved Muhammad Amin Khan to recommend Khan-i-Dauran to the post of the First *Bakhshi* and inadequately recognise the claims of Sa'adat Khan for the services performed is difficult to say. The reason seems to be that whereas Sa'adat Khan was new immigrant and held an ordinary post of *faujdar* of a district, Bayana, Khan-i-Dauran had been the governor of two important provinces, Agra and Gujarat, and served as *Mir Bakhshi* of *Wala Shahi* troops[58]. He also acted deputy to Husain 'Ali Khan when he went to the Deccan.

The author of *Ma'asir-u'l Umara* records that Khan-i-Dauran became second *bakhshi* after the removal of Muhammad Amin Khan from his post in November, 1717[59]. But other contemporary writers do not support Shan Nawaz Khan. It is a fact that Muhammad Amin Khan had been dismissed from his office of the *second bakhshi* by Farrukh Siyar when he showed no readiness to march towards Malwa as the new Governor of that province. But the person installed in his place was one Islam Khan, son of late Asaf Khan, and not Khan-i-Dauran[60].

Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan Qutbul Mulk was at Sarai Chat, on his way from Kauroli to Delhi when news of the frightful tragedy were made known to him. Post-haste he rushed to Delhi, crowned prince Ibrahim, aged 23, son of Rafi'-ush-Shan, the new Emperor, and raised a large army of nearly

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57. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, p. 911; *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghtaiyah*, f. 128a, *Sahifah-i-Iqbal*, f. 8a, b; *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, p. 227; *Sharaf-Namah-iMuhammad Shah*, f. 94a.

محمد امین خان وفادار را شهنشه وزارت نموده عطا
بصمصام دوله زشه شد خطاب امیرالامیران عالم مآب

58. *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghtaiyah*—.Aligarh MS. f. 355a.
59. *Ma'asir-u'l-Umara*, Part I, pp. 820-21.
60. *'Ibrat Namah*, Mirza Muhammad f. 79b.

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90 thousand horsemen. He met Muhammad Shah for a decisive combat at Hasanpur[61]. According to the author of *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran*, Khan-i-Dauran advised Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan to refrain from having recourse to arms and execute a compromise with the Emperor[62]. He, however, paid no heed to his suggestion and, on November 13, 1720, plunged himself in the battle. 'Abdullah Khan fought gallantly, but suffered defeat at the hands of the imperialists. He was made captive and entrusted to the charge of Haider Quli Khan. Though Muhammad Amin Khan asked for his favour, he was opposed by Khan-i-Dauran[63]. In his official capacity as *Mir Bakhshi*, Khan-i-Dauran exerted himself but gave no evidence of personal prowess in the battle-field[64].

The defeat of Saiyd 'Abdullah Khan ended the supremacy of the Barha Saiyids who dominated the political scene of North India for an unbroken period of seven years. The Emperor Muhammad Shah now marched back to Delhi which he entered on November 22, 1720 ; and on November 25, a grand *darbar* was held in the Diwan-i-Khas, Muhammad Amin Khan, the *wazir*, and Khan-i-Dauran, the First *bakhshi*, paid homage and offered costly presents to their new master.[65] Muhammad Amin Khan did not live long to enjoy power which he had gained after working so assiduously. He died after three months in office, on January 27, 1721, and was buried in the premises of a school he had founded near the Ajmeri

61. *Munawwar-u'l-Kalam*, pp. 107-108 ; *Tarikh-i-Sultanat-i-Farrukh Siyar*, f. 112a ; *Sahifah-i-Iqbal*, f. 10b; *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghtaiyah*, ff. 186a. b, (187a ; *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, pp. 913-914 ; *Mir'rat-i-Waridat*. p. 556.

62. *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran*, f. 77b.

63. *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, pp. 243-48.

64. *Zafrah-i-Deccan*, Girdhari Lal, Asfia Ms., p. 70 ; *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran*, f. 88a. Muhammad Mir Raza Zulfiqar, author of *Sharaf Namah-i-Muhammad Shah*, has written the following verses in praise of the part played by Khan-i-Dauran in this battle, ff. 97b. 98a :

ز ثانے طرف خاندوران امیر بمیدان مردان رسیده دلیر
مقابل بفوج حسن ایستاده ز صمصام بکشاد قفل مراد
چو صمصام را در حمایل فگند . . . . . خصم را کرده بند
صف آرا است در رزم مردانه بفتح و ظفر گشت هم خانه
امیران همه پیش پیش هر طرف ستاده برزم عدو صف بصف

65. *Sahifah-i-Iqbal*, f. 222 ; *Shah Namah-i-Munawwar-u'l-Kalam*, p. 132.

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gate.[66] Mir Raza writes that Muhammad Shah was much aggrieved at the death of his *wazir*.[67]

Now Muhammad Shah faced the problem of choosing new *wazir* from among his faithful nobles. According to Yahya Khan, Muhammad Shah was inclined to make Khan-i-Dauran his prime minister. But the claims of Qamruddin Khan, son of Mugammad Amin Khan, could not be ignored. He argued that his deceased father received the high post as a result of his sacrifices and services he had made in enablng Muhammad Shah to get rid of the disloyal elements. As the right of inheritance, the post belonged to him. If, on account of young age, he was not considered suitable to the greatest official dignity, Nizam-u'l-Mulk, who destroyed the trouble-makers, should be honoured with this legitimate reward. The Emperor was pleased to agree with Qamruddin Khan and a *farman* was sent to the Nizam to come and assume the responsibilities of the grand *wazir*.[68] Muhammad Shafi' Warid records that Qamruddin Khan even threatened bloodshed if *wizarat* was given to a non-Mughal."[69] The author of *Tarikh-i-Fathiyah*, on the other hand, states that Nizam-u'l-Mulk was

66. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, p. 939.

67. *Sharaf Namah-i-Muhammad Shah*, f. 101a.

68. *Tazkirat-u'l-Muluk*, f. 131b. Irvine in *Later Mughlas*, Part II, p. 105, says that it was Khan-i-Dauran who, "unable to carry through his own appointment, persuaded Muhammad Shah to send for Nizam-u'l-Mulk from the Deccan." But the relevant passage of the text gives a different meaning.

بادشاه می خواست که صمصام‌الدوله خاندوران را وزیر کند ـ قمرالدین خان پسر محمد امین خان عرض نمود که پدر مرحوم غلام بجانبازی و جانثاری امر سلطنت از مخالفان نمک حرام مستوده بمنزل وزارت سر بلندی یافته بود ـ باوجود بودن من کے وارث این خدمت و خانه‌زاد مورثی این دود ماتم امر وزارت و زخانه دیگر سپردن از شایان عدالت بعید است ـ اگر این نمک پرورده را بموجب صغرسن اورا وزارت ندانند نظام‌الملک که بانی انداختن و رفع کردن بنیاد فساد اهل فتنه است ـ حق این پایه عالی مراد را است ـ تا بازی در قوم مغلیه که سر کرده معتبر است ـ سوای او بدیگری نه رسد ـ بادشاه این التماس دیرا پسندیده فرمان بطلب نظام مملکت صادر فرمود ـ

69. *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, p 611.

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previously promised *wizarat* if he strove to shake off the yoke under which the Mughal monarch groaned.[70]

There is no positive evidence to show how Khan-i-Dauran, in a short time, managed to rise in the estimatation and favour of Muhammad Shah to the degree that the Emperor himself manifested an agreeable disposition to his aspirations. It appears, however, that Muhammad Shah looked at Nizam-u'l-Mulk with apprehensions and regarded him too powerful to be controlled when invested with supreme power. But Khan-i-Dauran was his own creature who, in all possibilities, would not dictate him in the affairs of the government.

More than the suggestion of Qamuruddin Khan or his own previous promises, perhaps the pressure of the Mughal faction impelled Muhammad Shah to call the Nizam from the Deccan. It is obvious that the decision of the Emperor did not spring from the conviction that Nizam-u'l-Mulk, possessed of qualities of a statesman and administrator, would bring the Empire back to order and vitality.[71] His motive was expedient and calculated to flatter the pride of a group with whom now lay the power. With cautious prudence and shrewd commonsense Muhammad Shah handled a substantially identical situation that had vexed his predecessors. He did not try the experiment of appointing his own favourite the chief *Wa*zir and a man of proven abilities outside the fold of his old faithful servants the *Wakil-i-Mutlaq*. Indeed, the institution of *Wakil-i-*

70. *Tarikh-i-Fathiyah*, f. 9a.

71. *Sharaf Namah-i-Muhammad Shah*, ff. 101a, 126a. Mir Raza Zulfiqar extols the qualities of Nizam-u'l-Mulk in the following lines :

ز شه رفت نامه بسوی نظام طلب کرد اورا بصد احترام
بصد عزم و شان و بصد اقتدار بصد حشمت و شوکت و نامدار
ز ملک دکن زود تر آمده ز حکم شه بحر و بر آمده
شهنشاه را راز دار آمده بجان بنده یار و غمار آمده
نظام الملک سر سروران پزیرای حکمش همه سرکشان
چه پرسی ز اوصاف آن داد گر که از تیغ ملک دکهن کرده سر
مسلمان صفت صاحب خاتم است که بر انس و جان آمر وحاکم است
چو داود آمد شفاشت او که آهن شود موم در دست او
به تدبیر تسخیر کشور کند به تنها تنے کار لشکر کند

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Mutlaq had lost its practical value and was out of tune with the needs of the times ; neither Shah'Alam Bahadur Shah nor Farrukh Siyar could succeed in reviving it.

Khan-i-Dauran cherished the dream of securing *Wizarar* and he came within sight of it ; but Nizam-u'l-Mulk blocked the road to its realization. It evoked sentiments of rivalry against the Nizam and left a sore of a foiled ambition in the heart of Khan-i-Dauran. Also, the Emperor half-heartedly accepted him as new *Wazir* ; and, as such, he did not extend unequivocal support in carrying out successfully measures of reform that the latter wanted to introduce in central government. Besides these two factor, the revolutionary nature of his reforms, the intrigues of Koki Jiu and her associates, the arrangements he made in Malwa and Gujarat after the suppression of Haider Quli Khan[72] and defects in his own personality were other leading reasons responsible for the Nizam's dispute with the Emperor, his conflict with the courtiers and his final departure on December 7, 1723 from the capital to the Deccan.[73] The hand of Khan-i-Dauran is not visibly evident in the conspiracies and the organised campaign of vilification started by Haider Quli Khan, Koki-Jiu, Roshan-ud-Daulah, Shah 'Abdul Ghafur and Hafiz Khidmatgar Khan against the Nizam. But Ashub blames him for instigating Muhammad Shah to dismiss Nizam-u'l Mulk and appoint Mubraiz Khan[74] in his place. He further charges him with having been instrumental in urgnig the new governor to fight the Nizam and do away with him.[75]

Nizam-ul-Mulk, passing through Malwa, reached Aurangabad in the month of August, 1724. Before he could precipitate any crisis threatening the rule of Muhammad Shah, the governorship of the Deccan provinces

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72. *Shah Namah-i-Deccan*, p. 152. Also, Medieval India Quarterly, Vol. V, No. 1, pp. 129-130.

گرفته است ملک دکن را تمام بغیر از عطاے شهہ جم جاہ
همه ملک گجرات و هم مالوه گرفته است از شهہ بحرص و هوا
وزارت بر آنہا نموده مزید دگر چشم دارد ز حرص شدید

73. *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, Muhammad Sahfi Warid, p. 576.

74. His original name was Khwaja Muhammad Sadiq and he was a native of Balkh. He married the daughter of 'Inayatullah Khan Kashmiri. He first served as Bakhshi under Kam Bakhsh. In 1710 he was promoted to the government of Ahmadabad. In the reign of Farrukh Siyar he was transferred to the province of Hyderabad in the Deccan, and he received the titles of 'Imad-u'l-Mulk, Mubariz Khan Bahadur, Hizbar Jang. See for details : *Ma'asir-u'l-Umara*. Text, III, pp. 729-746.

75. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhmammad-Shah*, p. 161.

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was conferred on Prince Shahryar, aged only few months, and Mubariz Khan was appointed to act as his deputy. A *farman* to that effect was handed over to his son, 'Abdul Ma'bud Khan in Delhi, just after a short time the Prince died and Mubariz Khan was made the governor of the Deccan.[76]

A sum of 5 lakhs of rupees was advanced to Mubariz Khan from the central treasury through Hafiz Khitmadgar Khan and on the security of Khan-i-Dauran to Ma'bud Khan who was to send the money to his father. Several lakhs of rupees from the revenues of the province were also provided for the new governor to finance his army which was to fight against the Nizam, now declared a rebel.[77] On October 11, 1724, a fierce battle was fought between the armies of Mubariz Khan and Nizam u'l Mulk at Shakarkhera. Mubariz Khan with his two sons Asad Khan and Mas'ud Khan was killed. The Nizam thus became the unquestioned master of the Deccan.[78]

The chroniclers of the day state that after the departure of Nizam-u'l-Mulk, his son Ghazi-ud-din Khan, whom he had left as his deputy, was removed and Qamrud-din Khan received the charge of the office of *Wizarat*. But they do not record the circumstances under which this appointment took place. Nizam-u'l-Mulk did not show any desire to retain the prime ministership. He preferred the possession of the Deccan to *Wizarat*. In the absence of any evidence, it may only be guessed that Muhammad Shah found in Qamuruddin Khan a trusted and confident servant, less aggressive and resourceful to monopolise power and dominate him. He was the leader of the Mughal group in the capital. Pleasure-loving and sluggish, he was far more suited to the prevailing atmosphere of gaiety at the court than the austere and hard-working Nizam-u'l-Mulk At this time Khan-i-Dauran was not considered for *Wizarat* for his party position seemed to be weaker than that of Qamruddin Khan. Khan-i-Dauran's differences with Koki Jiu also appear to have weakened his case. Khan-i-Dauran recommended certain *jagirs* and *mahals* to be assigned to some *mansabdars*. But these plots were already given to the brothers of Koki-Jiu. Unable to get the land resumed, the Amir-u'l-Umar intended to leave the capital on the pretext of hunting. When His Majesty learnt of this development, he expressed his desire to accompany the *Mir Bakhshi*. He was later on appeased and satisfied[79].

76. *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, p. 577.
77. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 101.
78. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, p. 953, 960; *Ahwal-u'l-Khawaqin*, I. 192b; *Ma'asir-i'l-Umara*, Part III, p. 741. 668.
79. *Mir'at-u'l-Haqaiq*, A'itmad Ali Khan, Badleian MS. Sitamau Rotograph, f. 92a.

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CHAPTER—II

CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION—PROBLEMS AND READJUSTMENTS

Wizarat under Bahadur Shah and Jahandar Shah

At this point of discussion it will not be out of place to give a brief historical account of the process of decline in the central administration and the growth of rival factions at the Mughal court. In the light of this discussion the policy and work of Khan-i-Dauran, the *Mir Bakhshi*, can better be evaluated. He made a determining influence on the course of events in the coming years.

Recently the Empire passed through a great political crisis which threatened to disintegrate it and disrupt the people. Within little more than a decade after 'Alamgir's death seven severe battles for imperial succession were fought in which princes, nobles and large number of soldiers perished, treasures were wasted and the whole administrative machinery was upset. The country, further distracted by revolts of the Rajputs, Jats, Sikhs and the Maratha inroads, presented a deplorable state of affairs. Monarchy commanded little authority and law lost its hold on the people. The fundamental evils that had crept in the central administration during the last decades of 'Alamgir's reign[80] were aggravated by the weak character of the later Mughals and the mutual jealousies of the ministers.

The first administrative problem, Bahadur Shah was called upon to tackle, related to the appointment of some qualified and trusted officer to the post of *Wizarat*, Bahadur Shah, before he left Lahore on May 5, 1707, had promised Mun'im Khan, to make him the chief minister[81]. This noble served Shah 'Alam as *Diwan* and acted as his deputy in Lahore[82]. The *faujdari* of Jammu was also given to him. He held the *rank* 1,500 with 1,000 horse.[83] Mun'im Khan managed the affairs of the government efficiently. Shah 'Alam had employed large number of troops and round him gathered numerous unworthy favourities. The financial resources

80. *Aurangzeb*, J. N. Sarkar, Calcutta, 1924, Vol. V, pp. 447-452, 457-458.
81. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, p. 574.
82. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, p. 573.
83. *Ma'asir-u'l-Umara*, Persian text, II, p. 668.

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were inadequate to meet the expenses of the troops and demands of the courtiers. Mun'im Khan reduced the size of the Prince's army and took good care that soldiers were paid regularly.[84] By his organizing skill and military ability he earned the Prince's high opinion and confidence, Shah 'Alam increased his *rank* to 4,000/2,000 and conferred on him the title of Khan-i-Zaman, with a gift of *tagh* and Kettle-drums.[85]

When news of 'Alamgir's death reached Mun'im Khan at Lahore, he made preparations on a large scale by gathering necessary equipments for the coming war of succession.[86] He exerted vigorously in the battle of Jaju and gave further proof of his loyalty and devotion to the cause of Bahadur Shah.[87] The new Emperor of India embraced the wounded warrior and remarked, "All I have won is due to your exertions."[88]

Mun'im Khan, however did not belong to the Upper strata of the ruling class. Nor did he command leadership of any group in the nobility. His family status was also not so high as compared with the top personalities like Asad Khan[89] and Khan Firoz Jang.[90] Asad Khan, on the other hand, enjoyed all these advantages. Not only he was related to the royal family, he also exercised considerable influence in the group of Irani nobles. Besides, he had behind him a long and varied experience of civil and military administration. Members of the royal family like Jahan Shah and the Begum supported him in his claims of the office of *wizarat* which he occupied in the reign of 'Alamgir[91]. He is further reported to have been recommended by 'Alamgir for this post in his will.[92]

Bahadur Shah set aside these special qualifications possessed by Asad Khan and decided to favour Mun'im Khan. On June 19, 1707, Mun'im Khan was formally appointed *wazir* with the *mansab* of 7,000/7,000, *duaspah*, *sihaspah*, and the title of Khan-i-Khanan Bahadur Zafar Jang. He received a grant of one crore of rupees in cash, and one crore in Kind.[93] "No officer since the time of Timur had obtained such a bounty."[94] Thus

84. *Tarikh-i-Iradat Khan*, Iradat Khan, Aligarh, MS. ff. 51b, 52a.
85. *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghtaiya*, f. 332b.
86. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, p. 573.
87. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Jag jivan Das, B.M.M. Aligarh Potograph, f. 45a.
88. *'Ibrat Namah, Kamraj*, f. 34a.
89. For biographical details, *Ma'asir-u'l-Umara*, Text Vol. I, pp. 310-321.
90. For his life and political career, Nizam-u'l-Mulk Asaf Jah, I.Dr. Yusuf Husain Khan, Mangalore, 1936. pp. 7-22.
91. *Tarikh-i-Shakir Khani, Shakir Khan*, B.M.Ms. *Aligarh* Rotograph, f. 51a.
92. *Niwishta-i-Wakil Diyanat Khan*, Asafia Lib. MS. My own transcript copy. p. 17.
93. *Tarikh-i-Bahadur Shah*, Anonymous, Aligarh Ms. f. 2.
94. *Ma'asir-u'l-Umara*, Persian Text, III, p. 672, English Translation, Vol. II, p. 296.

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long proved-fidelity of a noble in the service of the Emperor, no matter his previous rank in the government, became the sole criteria for the reward of *wizarat*.

Nevertheless, Asad Khan was a factor to be reckoned with, and his claims, based on noble lineage, great family ties and past services to the state, could not be discarded. In order to accommodate him, a way out of impasse was to be found. The Emperor appointed him *wakil-i-Mutlaq*, a position superior to that of the *wazir* held by Asaf Khan in the days of Shah Jahan.[95] Asad Khan acquiesced in the arrangement ; but he chafed at the loss of *wizarat* which alone could ensure him to regain supreme control of the government. Undisturbed enjoyment of power being his objective, Asad Khan contrived to get the office of *wakil-i-Mutlaq* restored to its former ascendancy. He sent a long list of privileges and powers, exercised by late Asaf Khan, to the Emperor and requested to confer the same on him.[96] Bahadur Shah accepted all his demands except the *rank* of 9,000/9,000 and the right to sit in *Diwan-i-'Am*. In his reply to the noble's petition, Bahadur Shah argued that these special privileges enjoyed by Asaf Khan were due to his relationship with Shah Jahan.[97] Asad Khan was raised to a *mansab* of 8,000/8,000 with titles of Nizam-u'l-Mulk, Asaf-ud-Daulah. He also became the governor of Lahore.[98]

This artificial adjustment failed to settle the problem; on the contrary, it gave rise to fresh complications. Asad Khan signed all *sanads* and *parwanas* and put his own seal on them. Reports from provinces were made available to him. A copy of every document received by the chief *Diwan* was submitted in the office of *Wakil-i-Mutlaq*. He could see His Majesty at any time and discuss matters of importance with him. Asad Khan was also the keeper of Royal Seal. He enjoyed the privilege to beat his drums next after those of the Princes.[99] When Asad Khan held his office, Mun'im Khan had to wait upon him and obtain his signatures to papers as other ministers did.[100]

The *Wazir* now stood at par with other ministers. The sole control of administration inevitably passed on to *Wakil-i-Mutlaq*. Mun'im Khan found himself out of harmony with Asad Khan. He was loath to function as subordinate to an official who had played no conspicuous role in the

96. *'Ibrat Namah*, Kamraj, f. 35a.
96. *Tarikh-i-Shakir Khani*, ff. 53b. 54a, b ; For details, *Later Mughals*, Vol. I, p. 38. Irvine has fully analysed this petition of Asad Khan.
97. *Tarikh-i-Shakir Khani*, ff. 56, 57.
98. *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghtaiya*, f. 334a.
99. *Tarikh-i-Shakir Khani*, ff. 56, 57.
100. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, p. 601.

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civil war. Again a new difficulty confronted Bahadur Shah. This he sought to solve by appointing Zulfiqar Khan deputy to his father. Asad Khan was allowed to retire and pass his old age in peace and rest, free from strains of public life. But Zulfiqar Khan exercised no such powers as had been conferred on Asad Khan. He only kept the seal of Asaf-ud-Daulah, which was placed on revenue and civil *parwanas* and *sanads*[101].

By this readjustment the position of the *wazir* as wielder of real executive authority was re-established. The institution of *Wakil-i-Mutlaq*, which the Emperor attempted to revive, became defunct. Bahadur Shah went too far in his efforts at maintaining Mun'im Khan's prestige and making him the motive power of the administrative machinery. He showed utter want of magnanimity towards Asad Khan whom he first exalted to a status of pre-eminence and then superceded him by his own favourite on the pretext of old age. He took up the stand that those, who did not strive to win for him the Mughal throne, forfeited the claim to keep the reins of supreme power in their grip. A well-marked distinction between a noble who fought in the cause of the Emperor and the other who could not rise to the occasion was plainly drawn. This set a bad precedence to be followed by his successors like Jahandar Shah, Farrukh Siyar and Muhammad Shah. Besides, the ablest was deprived of an opportunity to serve the state and contribute to improving the administrative standards. Frictions among nobles grew more pronounced and serious breach between Zulfiqar Khan and Mun'im Khan was caused.

Bahadur Shah, having placed implicit trust in Mun'im Khan, gave him free hand and wide scope in the routine work of administration. He consulted the chief minister on different issues and paid due regard to his views.[102] He did not encourage other ministers and nobles to weaken the *wazir's* influence by means of subterranean intrigues. Mun'im Khan, on his part, understood the limits of his strength and ambition. His rise to supremacy was entirely due to the firm attitude the Emperor took in the face of stiff opposition. And for his stay in office he relied mainly on the personal affection of the patron. Moreover, the Princes, constantly seeking to gain control of state affairs, proved indirectly a great check upon the *wazir*.[103] He had to attend to every Prince and act in conformity with his wishes. In order to preserve his own interests, he took sides in mutual conflicts among the Emperor's sons.[104] With such a master on the throne, and

101. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, p. 602.
102. *Tarikh-i-Iradat Khan*, ff. 68b, 74b, 77b.
103. *Tarikh-i-Iradat Khan*, f. 78a.
104. *Tarikh-i-Iradat Khan*, f. 78b.

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intrigunig Princes around him, Mun'im Khan had little chance to assert his independence and work for self-aggrandisement. In the worlds of Iradat Khan, "He thought it fortunate to steer his vessel safe through such four great seas."[105] He did not venture to dominate the king or thwart his will. But he was decidedly a power behind the throne if not above it.

Restrained and dignified, and never given to arrogance, Mun'im Khan was moderate in his attitude towards people and solved their problems with care and consideration.[106] To this he added the qualities of hard work, efficiency and justice, which secured public confidence in the government.[107] "He had appointed *sazawars* to ensure that, during hours of office, papers of applicants should not remain unsigned till the following day."[108] He relieved the *mansabdars* of the burden of maintaining the animals by ordering that such a demand should be properly assessed and deducted in *dams* at the time of assignment.[109] He purchased waste lands and took keen interest in their development.[110] Finally, his poetic talents and bent for mysticism increased greatly to his reputation. He composed verses and wrote a book on Sufism under the title of *Ilh-amat-i-Mun'imi*.[111] "He always preferred the good interests of the state to his personal ends. Whatever he uttered and did was based on the goodness of the state."[112]

In December 1710 Mun'im Khan, humiliated by the reproaches of Bahadur Shah at his failure to seize Banda, died.[113] His death furnished an opportunity which the big nobles seized to press their individual claims for the post of *wizarat*. Zulfiqar Khan represented that his father, Asad Khan, should now be made chief minister while he would himself continue to be the *Mir Bakhshi* and as well governor of the South. The Emperor objected to his request on the ground that concentration of highest executive powers in one family was fraught with incalculable dangers to the interests of the Crown.[114] Mahabat Khan, son of Mun'im Khan and third *bakhshi*, also came forward as contender for *wizarat*, and he brought the influence of Prince 'Azim-ush-shan to bear upon the king. But Bahadur Shah turned down the Prince's recommendation because his protege lacked

105. *Tarikh-i-Iradat Khan*, f. 78b.
106. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, pp. 675, 677;
107. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, p. 676.
108. *Ma'asir-u'l-Umara*, p. 298.
109. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, p. 602.
110. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, p. 675.
111. *Ma'asir-u'l-Umara*, p. 299.
112. *Tarikh-i-Iradat Khan*, f. 57b.
113. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, pp. 677, 678.
114. *Tarikh-i-Iradat Khan*, f. 84a.

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necessary qualifications for the post.[115] He was faced with a complex task to accomplish. With a view to conciliate both the aspirants and create a feeling of harmony among nobles, the Emperor offered Zulfiqar Khan, the chief ministership and Mahabat Khan, the *subedari* of the Deccan. However, Zulfiqar Khan refused either to work as *wazir* in the life-time of his father or to give up hold over the South.[116] This intransigent attitude of Amir-u'l Umara produced another intricate problem which the Mughal ruler attempted to resolve by casting the coveted post into abeyance. He appointed Hidayatullah Khan chief *Diwan* who was to sign and seal royal orders[117]. The real control of administration rested with 'Azim-ush-Shan[118], now most influential among his brothers at the imperial court[119]

Bahadur Shah was disillusioned with most of his nobles whom he found either unfit for the job or actuated with grasping tendencies. They wanted to draw the reins of power into their own hands and reduce the monarch to a mere figurehead. The Emperor decided to direct the destiny of the Mughal Empire undistrubed, without delegating civil and military powers to Asad Khan and his son. The appointment of chief *Diwan* instead of *Wazir* frustrated Zulfiqar Khan in his hopes and held other nobles in proper restraint.

His successors could have employed this device as a counter-measure to the moves and machinations of over-ambitious Amirs. But, Timurid Princes, swayed by strong passions of ruling the country single handed, became mere pawns in the complicated intrigues which the big officials formed for usurping sovereign authority. When usual succession disputes arose in the royal family, powerful nobles excited hopes of success in the heart of each contestant and, in return of their commitments, obtained assurances of securing posts of power. With imperial crown dangling around him, the Prince bowed to whatever a noble demanded without taking into account his merits. Thus propped on the throne by the strong hands of nobles, the later Mughals found themselves helpless to curb their might and menace.

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115. *Later Mughals*, Vol. I, p. 127.

116. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, p. 678.

117. *Tazkirat-u'l-Muluk*, f. 11b. Hidayatullah Khan was the son of 'Inayatullah Khan Kashmiri, *Khan-saman* and *Diwan* of *Khalia* and *Tan*. *Tazkirat-us-salatin-i-chaghtaiya*, Aligarh Ms. f. 307b. In the times of Jahandarshah he became *Khansaman*, received the *mansab* of 5,000/5,000 and the title of Sa'adullah Khan. *Jahandar Namah*, f. 34b. During the reign of Farrukh Siyar, he was arrested and his properties were confiscated. *Tazkirat-ussalatin-i-chaghtaiya*. f. 34a. Later on he was executed. *Waqa'it-i-Kashmir*, 'Azam Khan, Aligarh, Ms. f. 200b.

118. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, p. 679.

119. *Tarikh-i-Iradat Khan*, f. 80, a, b.

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After the death of Bahadur Shah, Zulfiqar Khan renewed his efforts to assume supreme leadership in the government. He approached 'Azim-ush-Shan and offered to fight under his banner in the coming fratricidal war. But his overtures were curtly rejected, causing humiliation to the Amir-u'l-Umara.[120] Hatred against 'Azim-ush-Shah already rankled in his mind ; this present pique exasperated him completely.[121] The Amir-u'l-Umara resolved to avenge the insult and vindicate his honour.[122] He paid homage to Jahandar Shah and revived his spirits to meet the crisis with courage and confidence[123]. Jahandar Shah promised to make him *wazir* after ascending the throne[124].

The astute noble persuaded Jahan Shah and Rafi'-ush-shan to enter into military pact with Jahandar Shah against the common foe, 'Azim-ush-shan[125]. It was settled among the three brothers, apart from other conditions relating to the division of the Empire and distribution of treasury, that the post of *wizarat* would be given to Zulfiqar Khan[126]. The alliance was ostensibly designed to crush the power of 'Azim-ush-shan ; but, in reality, it was to deceive Jahan Shah and Rafi'-ush-shan, and prevent them from being united against Jahandar Shah.[127]. For long Zulfiqar khan had ranged himself on the side of Jahandar Shah, and conspired to strengthen his cause against all other contenders for the crown[128]. He hoped to dominate the Prince who, given to comforts of life, was incapable to pay full attention to the complicated problems of administration[129].

Zulfiqar Khan advanced on his determined course and carried the scheme to final success. His diplomatic skill and matchless valour[130] enabled Jahandar Shah to triumph over his rivals and ultimately win the Mughal throne. 'Azim-ush-shan was defeated and killed on the battle-filed, and the same fate overtook Jahan Shah and Rafi'-ush-Shan[131]. Zulfiqar

120. *Tarikh-i-Iradat Khan*, f. 85a.
121. *Ibrat Namah*, Kamraj, f. 45a.
122. *Tarikh-i-Iradat Khan*, f. 85a.
123. *Farrukh Namah*, Shaikh Muhammad Mu'in f. 9a.
124. *Farrukh Namah*, f. 11a.
125. *Jahandar Namah*, Nuruddin Faruqi, f. 12b.
126. *'Ibrat Namah*, Kamraj, f. 45a. For details, *Later Mughals*, Vol. I, p. 161.
127. *Farrukh Namah*. ff. 12-16. According to Khafi Khan negotiations for settling the dispute of succession peacefully were started among the four Princes just after the death of Bahadur Shah. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, p. 685. Muruddin Faruqi writes that it was Raja Gujar Mal Saksena who persuaded Jahan Shah to join Jahandar Shah against 'Azim-ush-shan. *Jahandar Namah*, f. 10a.
128. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, p. 685.
129. *Farrukh Namah*, f. 11a.
130. *Jahandar Namah*, ff. 12a, 13b, 14, 18a, 20b, 28a.
131. *'Ibrat Namah*, Kamraj, ff. 45b. 56a.

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Khan gathered rich fruits of victory. He acquired immense wealth[132], increase in the *rank*[133], prize post of *wizarat*[134], and, above all, gratitude of the king[135]. Asad khan continued in the office of *wakil-i-Mutlaq*, and his *mansab* was raised to 10,000/10,000[136].

However, this triumph was dearly purchased at a terrible cost of state resources. The royal family was also badly shaken. Besides, war exposed the inability of the Mughal Princes to direct their own destiny and withstand threats of blackmial of unscrupulous nobles. Probably the issue of succession might have been settled at this moment, if the terms of contract were fulfilled by Zulfiqar Khan of his master. Jahan Shah and Raf'i-ush-shan had pinned their faith on the alliance, and relied on the solemn promises of the *Amir-u'l-Umara*. It seems these two Princes could be satisfied with their lot, had the kingdom been divided and spoils distributed in accordance with terms agreed upon by the allies. But, once the dread of 'Azim-ush-shan was over, Zulfiqar Khan broke the contract most abashedly.[137] His idea of partition had sprung from the sole motive of achieving for himself greater status and independence in the government.

Nevertheless, his long-wished desire to monopolise civil and military powers could not be fulfilled ; and ambition to exercise absolute control over the Empror remained far from being gratified. In pursuit of these ends Zulfiqar Khan confronted resistance of Kokaltash khan and Lal kunwar, too strong to be outwitted by the crafty *wazir*. Kokaltash, foster-brother of Jahandar Shah, his old companion and adviser, became *Mir Bakhshi* with the title of Khan Jahan ; his other relations were likewise honoured and promoted to posts of authority.[138] Jahandar Shah, long before he became the Emperor, had assured Kokaltash to appoint him *wazir*.[139] But

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132. *Jahandar Namah*, ff. 24, 25a.

133. *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, p. 446, He had the *rank* of 8,000/8,000.

134. *Farrukh Namah*, f. 74a.

135. *'Ibrat Namah*—Kamraj, 46a. "Jahandar Shah possessed no strength to fight against 'Azim-ush-shan ; he would feel fortunate if allowed to keep only one city under his control." *Tazkirat-u'l-Muluk*, f. 117a.

136. *Farrukh Namah*, 74a. According to Yahya Khan, his *mansab* was 12,000/12,000. *Tazkirat-u'l-Muluk*, f. 118b.

137. *Jahandar Namah*, ff. 24; 25. *Tazikrat-u'l-Muluk*, f. 117b.

138. *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, p. 446 ; *Jahandar Namah*, f. 35a.

139. *'Ibrat Namah*, Muhammad Mirza, f. 13b ; *Jahandar Namah*, f. 34a.

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unavoidable circumstances compelled Jahandar Shah to go back on his words.[140]

Despaired at the loss of opportunity, the king's old favourite grew hostile towards Zulfiqar Khan. He opposed the *wazir* in every plan and policy, and put obstacles in his administrative work. He formed a party of his own, and openly intrigued to undermine the influence of the rival. Those who had suffered at the hands of Zulfiqar Khan gathered round him[141]. He instigated the Emperor that the *wazir* "entertained designs too ambitious for a subject ; he was conspiring to bring out another Prince and raise him on the throne"[142]. Their relentless animosity stirred up quarrals among nobles, preventing them from attending fully to their duties[143]. When news of Farrukh Siyar's march reached imperial headquarters, Prince 'Az-zuddin was chosen to lead the army against the rebel. The supreme command was put in charge of Khwaja Husain Khan-i-Dauran, second *Bakhshi*, who possessed no military experience. The reason for this choice, according to Hadi Khan Kamwar, was that big nobles, Zulfiqar Khan and Kokaltash Khan, refused to accompany the Prince and leave the court, out of fear against each other. Their mutual suspicions and jealouises contributed to the success of Farrukh Siyar[144].

Another rival, who thwarted Zulfiqar Khan's designs for further access to power, was Lal Kunwar[145]. She held over-shadowing dominance over the Emperor's mind, and influenced him greatly in matters of appointments and grant of titles. She herself was honoured with the title of Imtiyaz

140. *Tarikh-i-Farah Bakhsh*, Aligarh Ms. f. 172a.

کوکلتاش از مدت چهل سال با سلطان مواعید وزارت را واثق
ساخته منتظر وقت بود - از وقوع این واقعه غیبی جهت وزارت
شب و روز چون مار بر خود می پیچید - و در کمین انتظار
می بود ..... ازان جا که حقوق تصرف خزائن در کمام
تسهیدستی و جان نثاری در عین بیکسی از نصرت جنگ بوقوع
آمده .....

141. *'Ibrat Namah*, Kamraj, f. 46b ; *History of Deccan*, Scott. J. Vol. II, Part. IV, p. 84.

142. *History of Deccan*. Scott. J. Vol. II, Part IV, p. 84.

143. *Mir'at-i-Waridat*. p. 454.

144. *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghtaiya*, f. 365b.

145. She was a dancing girl who became the favourite concubine of Jahandar Shah before his accession to the throne. She was the daughter of Khasuasiyat Khan, a descendant of Mian Tan Sen. *Hadiqat-u'l-Aqalim*, Murtaza Husain, Nawal Kishore, p. 131.

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Mahal[146]; and "two crores of rupees annually were settled for the household expenses of the mistress only, exclusive of her clothes and jewels[147]". Her relations received indulgent attention at the hands of Jahandar Shah. They were promoted to *mansabs* of 4 and 5 thousands ; elephants, drums, costly *khilats* and jewels were liberally awarded to them[148]. One of her brothers, Na'imat Khan, was appointed *subedar* of Multan ; although his appointment was cancelled after few days on the objection of Zulfiqar Khan[149]. For acquiring jobs and other concessions in the government, large number of people bought their recommendations at handsome bribes[150]. According to Nuruddin Farqui, Sarbuland Khan obtained the governorship of Gujarat by using the influence of these favourites.[151] Crowds of people thronged the gates of their houses, and it was difficult to pass through streets where they resided.[152] Opulent and influential, Lal Kunwar's relations caused distress and suffering to the poor and helpless.[153] Old and dignified nobility looked at them with scorn.[154] "Emperor's prestige was undermined, and awe for him vanished from hearts of the people."[155]

It does not construe to imply that Zulfiqar Khan was relegated to a secondary position. He continued to enjoy full confidence of Jahandar Shah, and wield power in the government. In matters of high policy, transfers and appointments of officials, and grant of *jagirs*, his hold was permanent and secure.[156] He is reported to have abolished *Jiziyah*, and in dealing with Rajput chieftains and Marathas he followed a conciliatory policy.[157] Hadi Khan Kamwar states that Zulfiqar Khan and Kokaltash had no work but to distribute jobs and *jagirs* among their relations and friends, and amass for themselves vast sums of money.[158] The Emperor being

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146. *'Ibrat Namah*, Kamraj, f. 46a.
147. *History of Deccan*, Scott, J. Vol. II, Part IV, p. 81.
148. *Farrukh Namah*, f. 74. Her brothers received titles of Na'imat Khan, Namdar Khan, Khanzad Khan, *Tazkirat-us-salatin-i-Chaghtaiya*, f. 365a.
149. *Jahandar Namah*, ff. 37a, 38a. Khafi Khan adds another name of her brother, Khush-hal-Khan, who was appointed governor of Agra, with a *mansab* of 5,000/3,000. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*. Part II, p. 689.
150. *History of Deccan*, Scott. J. Vol. II, Part IV, p. 82.
151. *Jahandar Namah*, f. 38a ;
152. *History of Deccan*, Scott. J. Vol. II, Part IV p. 82.
153. *Jahandar Namah*, f. 38b ; *'Ibrat Namah*, f. 46b.
154. *Siyar-u'l-Muta'akhkhirin*, Part II, p. 386.
155. *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghtaiya*, f. 265b.
156 *Jahandar Namah*, f. 35a, b.
157. For details see, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court*, Chandra S. pp. 74-76.
158. *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghtaiya*, f. 365b. Iradat Khan, on the other hand, holds Zulfiqar Khan exclusively responsible for these mistakes. Zulfiqar disliked Iradat Khan for his friendship with Mun'im Khan, and his sympathies for 'Azim-ush-Shan. Later on, however, a reconciliation took place between the two. Zulfiqar Khan also

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immersed in wanton pleasures,[159] other officials also became corrupt and indolent ; they did not care a straw for either the people or their assignments in the administration.[160] Both the *Amir-u'l-Umara* and the *wazir* turned to be pleasure-loving aristocrats ; the common people were not looked after, their complaints went unheeded.[161] Zulfiqar Khan left the business of his department to his secretary Raja Sabha Chand who was harsh in temper[162]. In treating the vanquished Zulfiqar Khan countenanced the spirit of vindictiveness. The servants and companions of Jahan Shah and Raf'i-ush-shan tried to seek Zulfiqar's indulgence for re-employment in the Mughal government, but their request were rejected by the *wazir*. At least two or three hundred persons headed by Mir Ishaq, Khwaja Fakhruddin and Khwaja Lutfullah proceeded in search of jobs towards Bihar and Bengal.[163]

Farrukh Siyar's Efforts To Reverse The Process :

Farrukh Siyar appointed 'Abdullah Khan, the *Wazir* and his brother Husain 'Ali Khan, the *Mir Bakhshi*. He, thus, concentrated civil and military powers in one family, a course, though considered inevitable, was fraught with foreseen perils, and which Bahadur Shah had avoided to adopt. Even in the reign of Jahandar Shah, these highest posts were awarded to persons of different family groups. Constant internal struggle between Zulfiqar Khan and Kokaltash indirectly contributed to strengthening the hands of the king. Farrukh Siyar, by combining the two offices in one family, denied to himself the opportunity of playing the *wazir* and the *Mir Bakhshi* off against each other. His failure to take advantage of dissensions

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procured Emperor's pardon for him. But Jahandar Shah totally refused to provide any job for him. "But, His Majesty observed, that though he forgave, he would not on any account employ me in his service", p. 86. After reconciliation, relations between the *wazir* and Iradat Khan remained cordial. The author says, "I, now and then unavoidably paid a visit to the *Amir-u'l-Umara* (Zulfiqar), who would frequently ask my advice in public affairs, which I gave him to the extent of my understanding," p. 86. In view of this cordiality, Iradat Khan's account does not seem prejudiced, although it differs from that of Kamwar, so far as distribution of *jagirs* and jobs to friends and relations is concerned. He writes, "He took enormous emoluments and revenues for himself, while he disposed of money to others with a hand so sparing that even his own creatures felt severe poverty with empty titles, for he never allowed *jagirs* to any." *History of Deccan*, Scott. J. Vol. II, Part IV, p. 84.

159. *'Ibrat Namah*, Kamraj, f. 46b ; *Farrukh Namah*, f. 74a ; *Tazkirat-u'l-Muluk* f. 119a.

160. *Jahandar Namah*, f. 38b.

161. *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghtiya*. f. 365b.

162. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, p. 691.

163. *Jahandar Namah*, f. 35b.

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among other nobles further isolated him in the interwoven tangle of plots and counter-plots.

When Farrukh Siyar occupied the throne, he wanted 'Abdullah Khan to hold the office of *Wakil-i-Mutlaq*, because he had already reserved *wizarat* for Ahmed Beg, his old companion and favourite.[164] 'Abdullah Khan pointed out that the post offered to him was devoid of authority, and did not exist in actual practice. It was, therefore, an inadequate reward for services rendered by him in the Emperor's cause. With a desire to keep 'Abdullah Khan satisfied, the Emperor changed his mind and appointed him *wazir*.[165]

'Abdullah Khan, having snatched the supreme prize, sought to assume a firm position in the government. He appointed Lutfullah Khan Sadiq, the *Diwan-i-Khalisah*, and Saiyid Amjad Khan the *Sadar-us-Sadur* ; while Farrukh Siyar gave these posts to Chhabela Ram Nagar and Afzal Khan respectively. The *wazir's* conduct in making such important assignments was approved neither by the Emperor nor by his courtiers. Mir Jumla argued that a *wazir*, although invested with high powers, was not entitled to appoint persons of his liking to posts of *Diwan* and *Sadarat* without the Emperor's previous consent. The *wazir* asserted that, if at this stage appointments made by him were not confirmed, he, in future, could not exercise powers of his office. At length, they composed their differences and came to a compromise. Lutfullah Khan secured the post of *Diwan-i-Khalisah*, and Afzal Khan became *Saddar-us-Sadur* : while *subedari* of Agra was bestowed on Chhabela Ram Nagar.[166]

It is reasonably evident from the above facts that Farrukh Siyar did not like 'Abdullah Khan to be in the office of *wizarat* ; and he would not allow him to enjoy an independent exercise of power in matters of appointments and other executive functions of the State. The *wazir*, conscious of his distinct position, was determined to guard stubbornly his areas of authority and keep the reins of administration into his own hands. But the Emperor at this stage could not afford to break relations with him. He knew that so long as his brother held the office of the *Mir Bakhshi*, 'Abdullah Khan would not be compelled to surrender his interests and step down from

164. Ahmed Beg was the foster brother of Jahandar Shah, but he left the court in disgust and proceeded to Bengal where he got service under Farrukh Siyar. He later on became *darogah* of artillery, and titles of Ghazi-ud-din Khan Ghalib Jang were conferred on him. In Patna, Ahmed Beg collected a considerable force for the Prince and worked for his new master's success with devotion and vigour. For details : *'Ibrat Namah*, Mirza Muhammad, f. 14b ; *Jahandar Namah*, f. 42a.

165. *Tazkirat-u'l-Muluk*, ff. 119b, 122a.

166. *Farrukh Siyar Namah*, f. 125a ; *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, p. 729-30 *'Ibrat-Namah*, Kamraj, 53b, 54a.

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the post of *wizarat*. He, therefore, decided to have recourse to undercover dealings by which he might get the *wazir* or the *Mir Bakhshi* killed[167]

Husain 'Ali Khan's campaign against Ajit Singh in March, 1714, only a year after accession, afforded the Emperor a good opportunity for the realization of his designs. He urged the Raja to do away with Husain 'Ali[168]; and in Delhi, he tried to divest the *wazir* of his powers. He put the royal seal in charge of Mir Jumla, and permitted him to appoint persons to administrative offices without referring to the *wazir*. He openly announced that "the word and seal of Mir Jumla are the word and seal of Farrukh Siyar."[169] 'Abdullah Khan expressed his resentment by stopping to attend the court.[170] He took up necessary measures in the direction of his self-defence.[171] The Emperor again planned to take away the life of Husain 'Ali Khan by treacherous means when the latter went to His Majesty to present a gift on the birth of his child.[172] On another occasion, he ordered Islam Khan to blow the house of the *Mir-Bakhshi* by putting a canon on it.[173]

The Saiyid brothers seemed willing to give up their offices and retire to their own home towns. They even asked His Majesty to send them to some distant place like Balkh for making new conquests, or allow them migrate to Mecca.[174] The Emperor could accept any of these proposals and get himself relieved of the nightmare that was constantly oppressing him. But he aimed nothing less than their complete extermination and

167. *'Ibrat Namah*, Mirza Muhammad, ff. 30, 31.
168. *Mir'at-i-waridat*, p. 509.
169. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, p. 739.
170. *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghtaiya*, f. 369a.
171. *'Ibrat Namah*, Kamraj, f. 56a.
172. *'Ibrat Namah*, Mirza Muhammad, f. 32a.
173. *Ahwal-u'l-Khawaqin*, f. 88a.

چنانچه روز میر جمله بموجب ارشاد اقدس با اسلام خان رومی
بگفت که چند توپ کلان را امشب بر حویلی امیرالامرا سر
بدهد تاکه در آنی هستی انهدام پذیرد -

174. *'Ibrat Namah*, Kamraj, ff. 56b, 57a ; *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, p. 741. Muhammad Qasim Aurangabadi states that 'Abdullah Khan and the *Amir-u'l-Umara* consulted their brothers and relations about the measures to be taken against the increasing opposition of Farrukh Siyar. Saiyid Khan Jahan, their uncle, advised both the brothers to resign from the posts of *Wizarat* and *Mir Bakhshi*, and accept the *subedari* of Bengal and the Deccan respectively. They could argue, Khan Jahan added, that as the Emperor did not like their presence in the court, they could not hold such important offices of the government. Being men of sword, they were unable to discharge the duties of *Wizarat*

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that he wanted to accomplish by artific instead of a decisive trial of strength in the open contest.[175] Perhaps he dreaded that the Saiyid brothers, if turned out from the court with grace and accord, might champion the cause of a new Prince. Lacking courage and confidence, he felt himself unable to face such a dangerous situation that could arise from the removal of the influential ministers.[176]

The Emperor undertook several hunting expeditions to sweep down upon the *wazir*[177]; a net of intrigues was woven to cut his head off in the court or at 'Idgah.[178] To bring his project to a successful conclusion, he sought the assistance of big nobles like Nizam-u'l-Mulk, Sarbuland Khan and Muhammad Amin Khan.[179] Each of them cherished the hope of receiving the key post of *wizarat* in return of his unreserved support.[180] But all of them were disillusioned and shocked to find that Farrukh Siyar had reserved the coveted reward for Murad Kashmiri after 'Abdullah Khan was thrown out of office.[181] This preference for Murad to other able

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and *Mir Bakhshi*. The Emperor was free to appoint any deserving persons to these high posts. 'Abdullah Khan agreed with his uncle but pointed out that their offer would be misinterpreted by the Emperor's favourites. They would suggest to the Emperor that the Saiyid brothers were contemplating to take possession of these two provinces. Away from the court and fully established at their new headquarters, they would become more arrogant and over-weeing than what they were at present. The Emperor was suspicious of them and would not accept such a suggestion. *Ahwal-u'l-Khawaqin*, ff. 93b, 94.

175. *'Ibrat Namah*, Mirza Muhammad f. 32a ; *'Ibrat Namah*, Kamraj—f. 5a7.

در ظاهر عنایات از تعداد افزون می نمودند و در بطون تشنه خون آن بے گناهان فدویت مشحون می بودند ـ

Tazkirat-u'l-Muluk f. 123a.

در ظاهر الطاف و مهربانی مبذول میداشت و در باطن بفکر هلاکت ایشان می بود ـ خواستند که از سو تدبیر قتل و اسیر سازند ـ

176. *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, p. 507 ; *'Ibrat Namah*, Mirza Muhammad, f. 32a.

177. *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-Chaghtaiya* ff. 369a, 384a ; *'Ibrat Namah*, Mirza Muhammad, f. 35b.

178. *'Ibrat Namah*, Kamraj, f. 56b ; *'Ibrat Namah*, Mirza Muhammad, f. 95b. *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-Chaghtaiya*, f. 386a.

179. *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-Chaghtaiya*, f. 385b ; *Shah Namah-i-Munawwar-u'l-Kalam*, p. 45.

180. *'Ibrat Namah*, Mirza Muhammad, ff. 94, 111.

181. Mirza Muhammad writes that one day Mubariz-u'l-Mulk asked Farrukh Siyar that since the Emperor was determined to suppress the Saiyid brothers, on whom he would bestow the office of *wizarat*. The simple-hearted Emperor replied, "On A'itqad Khan, and on no one else." *Ibrat Namah*, f. 95a. But the author of *Shah Namah-i-Deccan* gives

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nobles tends to explain his keeness to have a submissive *wazir* who could not force him to abdicate royal authority. He apprehended that these nobles, like 'Abdullah Khan, would claim a large measure of freedom of choice and action in the discharge of their duties and pursue a firm and bold course in the assertion of their privileges.

Farrukh Siyar recognized the dangers inherent in appointing such a noble to be *wazir* who helped the king rise to sovereignty. He was apparently not ready to walk in the way of Bahadur Shah or Jahandar Shah who, having fully paid the debt of gratitude to Mun'im Khan and Zulfiqar Khan, allowed them to enjoy power undisturbed and maintained their positions in spite of the pressure of opposing factions. For him the issue at stake was how to keep leading nobles away from the centre of power after exploiting their strength and resources in the war of succession. To reverse the process by which former *wazirs* made rapid strides in promoting their self-interests, Farrukh Siyar first tried to confer *wizarat* on Ahmed Beg and now he gave precedence to Murad over other experienced and capable nobles. But this departure from the policy of his immediate predecessors paved the way for his tragic end.

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a different account. He states that Nizam-Mu'l-Mulk wanted to have forty lakhs of rupees for expenses besides *wizarat*, and Mubariz-u'l-Mulk demanded 5 lakhs of rupees besides the office of *Mir Bakhshi* and the governorship of the Deccan. Farrukh Siyar accepted these demands. But on the non-payment of money the agreement broke down. *Shah Namah-i-Deccan*, p. 103.

بخلوت طلب کرد داد این خبر — که از ترس آن بود خسته جگر
نمود عرض میر جهان آشکار — که اے شاه شاهان والا تبار
چو فردا نشین بدیوان خاص — مرا از وزارت به بخش اختصاص
عطا کن دگر بهر خرج سپاه — چهل لکھ زر نقد بی اشتباه
ازان بعد نواب دین سر بلند — نمود عرض که اے خسروے ارجمند
عطا کن مرا میر بخشے گیری — دکھن را دگر سر بسر بسروری
نمودار چه شه از اجابت قبول — در آن وقت عرض دو میر مخول
دل بعد چندی که بر آن قرار — زر از بادشه خواستند آشکار

... ...

نزدیک من نیست یکدام زر — که مانده خزانه تهی سربسر

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Partly because of the breach of faith by those to whom he confided his secrets.[182] but mainly for the want of force of character[183]. Farrukh Siyar could not succeed in his desperate and ill-omened enterprises. After the collapse of each attempt aimed at the destruction of these ministers, the Emperor went out of his way to settle outstanding disputes with them.[184] On nearly all such occasions he submitted to their claims to further access of power.[185] But every rapprochement was curiously followed by the renewal of intrigues.[186] These conciliations he used as mere subterfuge to

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Mirza Muhammad also says that Farrukh Siyar asked Nizam-u'l-Mulk not to disclose the secret till one of the royal faithful servants put 'Abdullah Khan to death. *'Ibrat Namah*, f. 101b.

بسیار مغول و اهمه بود و میخواست که تا وقتی که نهال حیات
قطب الملک بجلادت یکے از فدویان جان نثار از پا در آید
قصد بادشاه هرگز هیچکس ظاهر نباشد ـ

182. 'Abdullah Khan had his own men in the palace to inform him of the Emperor's intentions and plans. Besides these spies, Khan-i-Dauran, Sarbuland Khan and other nobles played the role of reporters from time to time. Whenever the Emperor went outside the city, rumours at once spread that the Emperor was preparing to crush the *wazir*. *Mir'at-i-waridat*, p. 511 ; *Munawwar-u'l-Kalam*, pp. 62-63 ; *Ahwal-u'l-Khawaqin*, f. 93a.

183. *Tarikh-i-Sultanat-i-Farrukh Siyar*, f. 66b.

184. In order to appease the *wazir*, and his brother, Farrukh Siyar himself went to see them to their houses several times. There he stayed, took meals and bestowed gifts on them : and on one occasion he placed his turban on the head of *Amir-u'l-Umara*. Even his mother visited them and tried to resolve the clash. *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, p. 506 ; *Munawwar-u'l-kalam* p. 48 ; *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghtaiya*. ff. 369, 375.

185. Before his departure to the Deccan, April 4, 1715, Husain 'Ali Khan demanded that his troops should take charge of the palace gates. This was conceded by the Emperor. Husain 'Ali Khan was empowered to appoint and transfer officials and commanders of forts in that region. He also got royal seal to confirm these appointments without waiting for sanction from the imperial court, *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*. Part II, p. 741. On the occasion of compromise reached on Sept. 21, 1718, the country of Bikaner was conferred on Raja Ajit Singh as recommended by 'Abdullah Khan. *Later Mughals*, Vol. I, p. 351. On the suggestion of the *wazir*, the titles of Mir Jumla were restored, and he was pardoned in 1718. *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghtaiya*, f. 38a. When the Emperor heard of Husain 'Ali's approach towards the North, he began to shower favours on 'Abdullah Khan, and asked him to urge his brother to stay there or go somewhere else. In this state of helplessness he yielded to whatever was demanded by the *Wazir*. For example, on his recommendation, Sarbuland Khan and Nizam-u'l-Mulk were appointed governors of Kabul and Malwa respectively. Several new appointments and transfers, already discussed, were made at this critical juncture, January, 1719, only to please the *wazir*. *'Ibrat Namah*, Mirza Muhammad, ff. 162b, 110 ; *Munawwar-u'l-Kalam* pp. 56, 59 ; *'Ibrat Namah*, Kamraj, ff. 66-68.

186. For instance by the compromise of 1715 it was settled that Mir Jumla would proceed to Bihar, while Husain 'Ali Khan would govern the province of the Deccan him-

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cover a next step in his avowed programme. The treacherous technique, employed ceaselessly against the ministers, exposed him to scandal, and dealt a severe blow to imperial dignity. It evoked misgivings and alarm in quarters of all the nobles.[187] When the Saiyid brothers showed their high cards, no strong section of the nobility, with the exception of few individuals, came up to save his sinking ship.[188]

The deposition and death of Farrukh Siyar was the most momentous event which established the ascendancy of nobles, and foreshadowed an era of political tensions and administrative chaos. The reigns of Raf'i-ud-Darjat and Raf'i-ud-Daulah reduced the monarchy to mockery. They were only shadowy figures, all powers having passed into the hands of the

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self. But when Husain 'Ali Khan arrived in the Deccan, he found Daud Khan making preparations to contest an engagement with him. Daud Khan had been instructed by a royal *farmon* to fight with the *subedar* and kill him in the battle. *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, p. 517.

187. *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghtaiya*, f. 386b; *'Ibrat Namah*, Mirza Muhammad, f. 111b; *Shah Namah-i-Deccan*, p. 104.

اگر صبح بر جنگ دادی قرار بشب صلح را می نمود اختیار

امیران ازین بے ثباتی شاہ فتادند در حیرت اشتباہ

188. When his doom marched on, Raja Jai Singh tried to rekindle in Farrukh Siyar the true Timuride war-like ardour. He induced the Emperor to take the field in person and launch an attack on his enemies. The Raja assured His Majesty that the offensive would arouse fervid loyalty among the nobles and make them rally around his throne. But Farrukh Siyar was hesitant to play the great stake and gamble his crown. Probably he imagined that by surrendering sovereign powers he would be able to overcome the crisis and effect a compromise with the Saiyid brothers as he had done in similar situations in the past. Dominated by an intense desire to take hold of Mu'in-ud-din Husain, the so-called son of Prince Akbar, Farrukh Siyar handed over the charge of his fort and palace to the Marha ministers. At one time he was ready to come out of the fort and encamp outside the city. But on-assurance given by 'Abdullah Khan that next morning the Prince in question would be placed under his custody the Emperor changed his mind and remained inside the fort. *Munawwar-u'l-Kalam*, pp. 58, 61. Other nobles who adhered to his cause to the last were Ahmed Beg, Murad Kashmiri, Islam Khan, Mukhlis Khan, Munim Khan, Saiyid Salabat Khan and Saifullah Khan Bakhshi, Contemporary evidence tends to suggest that public opinion did not approve the infirm policies of Farrukh Siyar; people observed with grave concern these tensions which inevitably caused much dislocations in the administration. Public opinion turned against the Saiyid brothers only after the capture and murder of the king. The way in which members of royal family were treated provoked an outburst of anger. This change in the attitude of nobles and general public towards the king-makers is reflected in the contemporary chronicles. *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, p. 511; *Munawwar-u'l-Kalam*, pp. 62-63; *'Ibrat Namah*, Mirza Mohammad, ff. 103a, 114-118; *Tarikh-i-Sultamat-i-Farrukh Siar*, ff. 73-75.

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king makers.[189] Farrukh Siyar's prime example became the object lesson for future kings. Now, none of his successors could safely defy the wishes of those who enthroned him. Any effort to challenge the growing might of such nobles involved the danger to his security. For the safety of his crown, the Mughal monarch was forced to revert back to the course adopted by Bahadur Shah and Jahandar Shah This consideration, apart from other basic factors, may account for the. dependence of the kings to nobles, their helplessness to put a brake on ministers' activities for obtaining supreme power and their utter incompetence to tackle the crisis that was brewing everywhere in the Empire.

From the very outset, 'Abdullah Khan had to encounter continuous hostility of the Emperor. Whenever their differences took a serious turn, or some plot was hatched against his life, the *wazir* ceased to go to the court and abandon the routine office work. He collected a suitable force and fortified his villa to meet any eventuality.[190] For a period of four or five months he would not hold his office and sign the papers. During such intervals, all administrative buisness came to standstill causing hardship to the people. 'Inayatullah Khan, new *Diwan of Khalisah* and *Tan*, persuaded 'Abdullah Khan to attend to the work of his office once or twice a week.[191]

The Emperor himself spent several months outside the city in hunting and trying to give practical shape to his plans against the *wazir*.[192] The factions, ranged on either side, were frantically engaged in defeating

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189. Sharaf *Namah-i-Muhammad Shah*, f. 85 a.

بدفتر چنین نقس زد نقش بند بفرخ سیر چون رسیده گزند
همه سلطنت گشت بے پا و سر شده رنگ آفاق نوع دیگر
نماند انتظامی بعالم درون شده کار جمله جهان و اژ گون
ازان ماجرا گشت عالم خراب شده ریش گردون ز خجلت خطاب
نشاندند بر تخت شاه جهان سلاطین از بهر نام و نشان

190. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, pp. 741, 770; *Tazkirat-u'l-Mulk*, f. 123b.

و در امور بادشاهی و در کارهائے وزارت تغافل میکرد و نوکران بسیار نگاہ داشت ۔

'Ibrat Namah, Kmraj, f. 62b.

191. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, p. 775.
192. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, p. 771.

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each other's machinations ; their respective offices having no interest or meaning for them. Frequent appointments and dismissals of high officials based on group considerations, setting up of incompetent favourities as competitors against the Saiyid brothers and indiscreet attempts to win over rebels of the crown, complicated the political situation and made confusion more confounded in central administration. "The strict rules and regulations for business in all departments were neglected." These conditions resulted in lowering the prestige of the government and fostering strife in the society.

'Abdullah Khan delegated his responsibilities to Raja Ratan Chand,[193] his *Diwan* and a *mansabdar* of 5,000.[194] Ratan Chand proved to be an effective instrument for furthering the cause of *wazir*'s faction and building up his strength. In matters of appointments and promotions, he favoured only personal and political friends of 'Abdullah Khan or those who promised to promote his interests. Courageous and assertive, he interferred in the working of *Khalisah* and *Tan*.[195] The money he collected by unfair means augmented financial resources of the minister and helped him gain a greater status of independence. Through these efforts of his *Diwan*, 'Abdullah Khan won the sympathies of a large section of *mansabdars*, government servants and those who acquired land in *Ijarah*. This partisan attitude of Ratan Chand was resented by those deprived of economic benefits. At the same time it gravely affronted the Emperor and his courtiers.[196] Ratan Chand held his office in his own house where big *Amirs* were obliged to go in connection with their work.[197]

Besides his engrossment in group politics which prevented 'Abdullah Khan from performing official duties properly, he was not a trained administrator, capable to bring back corrupt administration on the road of efficiency and discipline. Always too busy with the sword, he could find no opportunity to acquire experience in civil and financial administration of the state.[198] His appointment to the post of *wizarat* was regarded as a unique change introduced in the Mughal bureaucratic traditions. No Saiyid of Barha ever became *Diwan* during the reigns of Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb.[199] The Saiyids of Barha generally served as *faujdars*

193. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, pp. 692, 713.
194. *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghtaiya*, f. 370a.
195. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, p. 739.
196. *'Ibrat Namah*, Mirza Muhammad, f. 70 ; *Shah Namah-i-Munawwar-i 'l-Kalam*, pp. 41, 42 ; *Tazkirat-u'l-Muluk*, f. 123b.
197. *Mir'at-ul-Haqaiq*, f. 163b.
198. *Tarikh-i-'Ali*, f. 49a.
199. *Ma'sir-i-Nizami*, p. 27.

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or *nazims* in Rajputana and other places where they could adequately meet military needs of the government.[200] Their rise to power became a source of irritation to the old traditional ruling class which now saw little chance of advancement to the highest posts. The *wazir* was endowed with virtues of boldness and generosity, but he lacked zeal for public service and desisted the drudgery of office work.[201] He had no vision to give a new sense of value to the administration by extripating two great monstrous evils of the day, *Ijarah* and large scale assignments of *Khalisah* lands.

—Wizarat of Muhammad Amin Khan

With the fall of the Saiyid oligarchy passed away the terror which had held Muhammad Shah in awe. He relieved himself of a menace, but only to bow beneath the stiff supervision of Muhammad Amin Khan. His deliverer was a man of stern stuff ; no more liberal than Husain 'Ali Khan in according him the freedom to exercise his sovereign powers in the fullest way. Beyond regaining private liberty, which was denied to him in the recent past, Muhammad Shah could not boast of an independent imperial existence for himself. Young and inexperienced, the new Empreor had to get settle down, to feel the weight of problems and understand forms of civil business. The author of *Sahifah-i-Iqbal* informs us that he passed first few months in enjoying the pomp of triumph, and restoring the palace to its former grandeur.[202] Recently the Mughal throne was polluted in royal blood ; its sanctity was violated and majesty dishonoured. Muhammad Shah had to proceed with a steady temper and good faith. He relinquished the cares of government to his *wazir* whose stern behaviour and efficiency in handling the state-business inspired a spirit of obedience among the people. The secretaries of his departments, as Shiu Das puts it, trembled while they presented papers to him.[203] Yusif Muhammad Khan, author of *Tarikh-i-Fathiyah*, states that Muhammad Amin Khan, during the days of his *wizarat*, was alive to the interests of the people. He satisfied every applicant by his just and prompt action. In the transaction of business he did not rely on clerks, officers and secretaries but chose to go through the papers and issue orders himself.[204] Strangly enough, as Warid says, he made no distinction between the Saiyids and non-Saiyids in matters of law and justice. But in matters of state employment and

200. *Tarikh-i-'Ali*, 4. 31b.
201. *Tazkirat-u'l-Muluk*, f. 123b.
202. *Sahifa-i-Iqbal*, f. 29 ; *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, p. 938.
203. *Munawwar-u'l-Kalam*, p. 130.
204. *Tarikh-i-Fathiyah*, f. 132a.

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grant of *jagirs* the Saiyids were not well treated like the Mughals,[205] According to Yahya Khan, the glamour and dignity that marked the reign of 'Alamgir, would have returned and its regulations re-established, had Muhammad Amin Khan lived long.[206] In spite of the *Wazir's* unbridled powers, it should not be construed that Muhammad Shah was only a figure-head without authority to take decision on basic policies and important appointments. The stand he took in respect of the abolition of *jiziya* and a tolerable solution he provided to settle the issue, demonstrated the fact that he possessed the general over-riding authority.[207]

205. *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, p. 568.

206. *Tazkirat-u'l-Muluk*, f. 131a.

207. Raja Girdhar Bahadur and Raja Jai Singh made representation for the abolition of *Jiziya*. Muhammad Shah was aggreable to accept their request. But Muhammad Amin Khan opposed it. At length, the Emperor abolished the tax pronouncing that the levy of the tax had been only put off till the economic condition of the people become better. *Munawwar-u'l-Kalam*, pp. 131-132; *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, p. 936.

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CHAPTER—III

CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER, 1707—1725.

Owing to political disorders, malpractices of officers, faction-feuds among nobles and weak character of monarchs, the central administration declined and began to crumble down. The reckless assignments and unprecedented increase in the number of *mansabdars* resulted in a throughly alarming crisis of the *Jagirdari* system. Cultivation suffered, prices soared up, salaries of the soldiers fell into arrears, and unemployment increased. The whole structure of economic organization was on the brink of collapse and financial stability of the government was totally shattered.

Aurangzeb, forced by circumstances of war in the Deccan, increased the size of his armies. He recruited a large number of *mansabdars* and gave them *jagirs* out of all proportion to the available land. The lands to be assigned were limited while the number of *mansabdars* grew indefinitely. His successor, Bahadur Shah accentuated the process by assigning lands at an extraordinary high level, without taking into account the origin and ability of landgrabbers and heedless to the availability of *jagirs*. With a view to make the public "forget the excellencies and great qualities of Aurangzeb" and that "these were absorbed in the bounties of his successor" Bahadur Shah bestowed favours on all sorts of persons, "whether among the learned or the eloquent, the noble or the ignoble"[208]. A large number of Muslims and Hindus obtained titles of Khan and Rai, grant of *mansab* and lucrative posts in the government.[209] He rejected the application of none of the job-seekers and increased the rank of government officers three times and four times, far in excess of what they formerly possessed.[210] He lavishly distributed valuable gifts on Princes, officers and followers. Each of his four sons held a *mansab* of 30,000/20,000, a trend which was inconsistent with past traditions.[211] Husain 'Ali Khan, son of 'Abdullah Khan, who had a *mansab* of 1,000/500 was raised to 3,000/2,000. 'Inayat Khan son of Lutfullah Khan got the rank of 4,000/3,000.[212] Amir Khan was raised to 4,000/4,000.[213]

208. *Tarikh-i-Iradat Khan*, f. 55a; *History of the Deccan*, J. Scott, Part, IV, p. 48.
209. *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghtaiya*, f. 307b.
210. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, pp. 601, 627.
211. *'Ibrat Namah*, Kamraj, f. 34b.
212. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, p. 575.
213. *'Ibrat Namah*, Kamraj, f. 35b.

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The Emperor granted a patch of land to a person as *madad-i-ma'ash* in the district of Barielly. The revenue officers reported His Majesty that the area parcelled out by him belonged to the *Khalisah*, and requested that some other land should be assigned to the applicant. The Emperor ordered that half of the plot in that particular area of the *Khalisah* was to be given out to him.[214] The old practice that one and the same title should not be given to two persons was abandoned. Likewise the grants of *mansabs, naubat, naqqarah* and other gifts were no longer regulated by the rank and dignity of the recipient.[215] The author of *Hadiqat-ul-Aqalim* states that Bahadur Shah had collected a large army, and he squandered treasures left by 'Alamgir'. There was a considerable number of *Umara* who could not acquire *jagirs* and receive salaries. To overcome the acute shortage of land and enlarge the range of income, Mun'im Khan suggested that hereditary states of Rajput chiefs in Rajputana should be seized and distributed among such *Amirs*.[216] Another suggestion put forward was that *jagirs* in Bijapur and Hyderabad should be resumed and later on assigned to the new claimants.[217] Bahadur Shah failed to cope with the rise in the number of government servants seeking *jagirs* for their pay. The gap between the assignment and the availability of land became impassable. Non-payment of salaries of the soldiers was the direct result of this condition. According to one version the soldiers were not paid for about forty months. By the growing magnitude of their financial difficulties, the mass of people, Hindus and Muslims, were greatly distressed.[218]

The burdens of his prodigious liberality fell heavily on the government treasury and caused considerable overstrain on the state economic resources. The authorities, incharge of Revenue Department, showed full awareness to this problem and made strenuous efforts to check the malady. Ikhlas Khan, the *'Arz-i-Mukarar*, reputed for his strictness and honesty, warned the *wazir* of this critical stituation. He pointed out if *jagirs, mansabs* and rewards were continued to be given so thoughtlessly by His Majesty to a long and unbroken line of newcomers, the government servants, having

214. *Tarikh-i-Hindi*, p. 425.
215. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, p. 628.
216. *Hadiqat-u'l Aqalim*, p. 127.
217. *'Ibrat Namah*, Kamraj, f. 36a.
218. *'Ibrat Namah*, Kamraj, f. 41a.

طلب تنخواه سپاه بچهل ماه کشید و عالمی از عدم قوت لایموت تلف گردید - ازین رو اکثر زمره هنود و مسلمین بی مزه و اندوه گین می ماندند -

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their names and titles, would become unemployed, receiving no money out of their income. He emphasised the necessity of reform in the pattern of recruitment, promotion, grant of rewards and other such related matters. A proper investigation into the origin, merits and character of the candidate should be made before his application was forwarded by the *wazir* for sanction of the Emperor. Mun'im Khan coldly responded to the idea of restoring stability in the assignment system. He was apprehensive about the popular reaction to any serious attempt which was to undermine the prospects of employment. Ikhlas Khan, also afraid of public resentment, could not execute his plan of reform. He resigned.[219]

In his place Musta'id Khan alias Muhammad Saqi was appointed. Mun'im Khan asked the *'Arz-i-Mukrar* to reascertain whether the new *mansabdar* was capable for the government service; how did he manage to secure the *mansab* and promotion. No one should get an increase in his rank before time and out of proportion to the importance of offic he held. After making this enquiry, which would naturally take time the *'Arz-i-Mukrar* should certify the application for appointments, promotions and rewards. But this arrangement did not find favour with the Emperor and those accustomed to acquire splendid *jagirs* by irregular methods. These persons could hardly be brought under the rules of discipline. The members of royal family, including the two queens, Mhhr Parwar and Ummat-al-Habib, got their applications signed by the Emperor without waiting for investigation and approval by Musta'id Khan.[220] Thus plans of reform, aimed at the elimination of favouritism, careful selection of *mansabdars* and strict adherence to procedure, could not be put into effect. No check was put on the violation of regulations ; the revenue officers and other civil authorities worked in a way they considered desirable.

The disintegration of *jagirdari* system presented a threat to the Mughal government, and Farrukh Siyar was faced with a real crisis. The scramble for land was frantic. But no area of land seemed to be extant to be assigned to numerous *mansabdars*, as *Khalisah* and *paibaqi mahals* had already been scooped up by big nobles, their underlings and the king's favourites. Farrukh Siyar, on the suggestion of Lutfullah Khan Sadiq, decided to give salaries to the *mansabdars* instead of *jagirs*. He ordered that royal *mansabdars* of 200 to 900, and 7 to 8 thousand *wala shahi* troopers, till they received the grant of *jagirs*, would draw their pay at the rate of Rs. 50 per month, after the branding of their horses. These *mansabdars* and soldiers, in the hope of *jagirs*, served the government without pay for about 10 to

219. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, p. 629.
220. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II. p. 629-630.

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12 months. But the government seethed with the omnipresence of bankruptcy. The Emperor could not cope with the situation, and he, by one stroke of pen, dismissed all of them.[221]

Farrukh Siyar is also reported to have ordered to regulate the ranks of *Umara* and small *mansabdars*. An enquiry was to be instituted in all cases where ranks were upgraded against rules of procedure. Hadi Khan Kamwar states that beyond consoling the hearts of the people, these orders yielded no tangible results[222]. According to Mirza Muhammad, clerks in the offices of *Diwan*, *Bakhshi* and *Khansaman* took possession of *mansabs* and *jagirs*[223]. The strict rules and regulations were neglected in the time of Bahadur Shah ; Jahandar Shah put to an end principles and conventions of the administration, and Farrukh Siyar came under the influence of selfish and narrow-minded favourites[224].

Apart from the opposition of those who had seized *mansabs* and *jagirs* by manipulation, the greatest stumbling block in the way of implementing any reform schemes was the inner conflict between rival groups. This endless strife grievously disrupted the functioning of the revenue ministry. A 'itsam Khan, *Diwan-i-Khalisah* was eager to keep the *Emperor* satisfied ; while Rai Rayan, *Diwan-i-Tan*, would not do anything that could damage the interests of 'Abdullah Khan. In an atmosphere of distrust and ill-feeling, the two *Diwans* were unable to discharge their duties efficiently. Especially A'itsam Khan was hard pressed by the ever-increasing domands of *mansabdars* for *jagirs*. Constant interference of Ratan Chand in his office work rendered his position precarious, leaving him no chance or authority either to enforce imperial decrees or adhere to rules and fegulations of the department. Consequently, the two *Diwans* tendered their resignations[225].

It was then suggested that 'Inayatullah Khan should take charge of the whole revenue department. But he was reluctant to get himself involved in the power struggle that was going on between the Emperor and 'Abdullah Khan. However, Ikhlas Khan prevailed upon him to accept the job. It was settled that 'Inayatullah Khan would not recommend any case for appointment or reward of *jagirs* without the previous consent of the *wazir*. At the same time Ratan Chand would be constrained not to interfere in the affairs of *Khalisah*.[226]

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221. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, p. 769.
222. *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghtaiya*, f. 341b.
223. *'Ibrat Namah*, Mirza Muhammad, f. 70b.
224. *'Ibrat Namah*, Kamraj, f. 54b.
225. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part. II, p. 773.
226. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, p. 774

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'Inayatullah Khan soon found that normal conditions could not be restored in the revenue ministry without bringing about drastic reforms. His plan of reform provided that *jizīya* should be reimposed on Hindus for they had achieved economic effluence in the recent years. His second proposal was that the *mansabs* obtained by Hindus and others through illegal means should be either decreased or taken away. There arose a strom of protest from the side of Hindus, and they made a common resolve to defeat the plan of the new *Diwan*. 'Abdullah Khan, who had skilfully won them over to his side by promotions and favours, was also averse to this change. He supported the cause of Hindus in their resistance to attempts made against their substantial economic interests.[227]

'Inayatullah Khan also discovered that large amount of public money had been misappropriated by Ratan Chand. He demanded that accounts should be subjected to audit. But auditing of accounts was most distasteful to the *wazir*. Divisive forces were at work in the government. Friction now widened between the *Diwan* and the *wazir* ; and both of them backed out of their early commitments. A protege of Ratan Chand in the *Khalisah* office was imprisoned by 'Inayatullah Khan on charges of embezzling the government money. He did not release the culprit in spite of requests repeatedly made by Raja Ratan Chand. In a short time, the man effected his escape and took refuge with Ratan Chand. The matter was reported to the Emperor who sanctioned the forcible capture of the fugitive. 'Abdullah Khan helped his *diwan* in this matter, too. The Emperor then ordered the dismissal of Ratan Chand. But the *wazir* defied his orders with impunity.[228] He declared that Ratan Chand was his personal secretary, the Emperor had no concern with him or his affairs.[229]

Another development which deepened ths agrarian crisis, was the tremendous extension of *Ijarah* to *Khalisah mahals*. The practice of farming out the revenues of their *jagirs* was already in vogue among the *jagirdars*. But giving away the *Khalisah mahals* on farming was strictly forbidden in the reign of Aurangzeb. 'Abdullah Khan started this innovation which proved detrimental to the *Khalisah* revenues, the mainstay of the Emperor's income, and to the interests of hereditary middlemen in the *parganas*. The *wazir* entrusted the work of collecting revenue to the highest bidders instead of officials appointed directly by the government. Whenever he appointd an *'Amil*, a contract was written, and the stipulated amount was realized from his banker. After giving the undertaking, the farmer increased the

227. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, p. 775.
228. *Muntakhab-u'l Lubab*, Part II, p. 775-776.
229. *Shah Namah-i-Munawwar-u'l-Kalam*, p. 42.

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assessment in order to obtain the margin of profit, and ruthlessly exploited the peasantry. Farrukh Siyar objected to the practive and asked that it should be abolished. The collection of revenue should be made direct from the ciltivators by the government officers. But the *wazir* did not comply with the orders.[230] *Khalisah parganas* were recklessly given on farming by Raran Chand bringing to the *wazir* lakhs of rupees.[231]

The minsiters were not concerned about the havoc that *Ijarahdari* system had wrought on state economy. They were accumulating huge sums of money by unfair means. 'Abdullah Khan did not desist from accepting bribes even after being admonished by the Emperor. One day Farrukh Siyar asked the *wazir* to distribute 6 lakhs of rupees among the poor in the mosque from royal treasury. But 'Abdullah Khan gave away this amount from his own treasure.[232] The Emperor was unable to pay off about 8 to 9 months arrears of his *walashahi* force and the men of artillery. But, 'Abdullah Khan could easily maintain an army of 20 thousand horse.[233] Criticising the role of Husain 'Ali Khan, Nizam-u'l-Mulk writes in one of his letters to Muhammad Shah. 'He had rich *jagirs* in the provinces of Northern India. *Hundees* (draft) of lakhs of rupees were continously sent to him by his agents from those areas. Royal troops and a considerable number of nobles were under his service in the Deccan. They too had *jagirs* in Northern India. In sipte of these resources at his disposal, Husain 'Ali Khan could not suppress the Marathas, and made an agreement with them."[234]

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230. *Tazkirat-u'l-Muluk*, f. 123b.

دیگر سبب کینه آن بود که هر کرا جای عامل میکردند خط انت که مانند خط تعهد بود چیزی نونسانده از ساهوکار او میگرفت ـ و این معنی باعث ویرانی آن جائے داشت فرموده که این اختراع که سبب خرابی ملک است موقوف داشته خدمات امانی مقرر کنید قبول نکرد ـ

For terms of *Khat-i-Ant*, and *Amni* see, Wilson's Glossary, p. 21b, and p. 28a.

231. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, p. 773.
232. *Tarikh-i-Hindi*, p. 448.
233. *Muntakhab-u'l-lubab*, p. 195.
234. *Munsha'at-i-Mausavi Khan*, Musavi Khan Jurat. Asafi Ms. f. 48a.

حرام نمک (سید بارها) محالات سیر حاصل در صوبه جات هندوستان تنخواه داشت و متواتر هندویات لکها از انجا میرسید و افواج

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Still another factor that made the situation more grave was the loss of possession over the *mahals* by small field holdres. The small *jagirdars* who had assigned the work of revenue collection to *faujdars* gradually lost grip over land and finally all contact with cultivators came to an end. They were harassed by three classes : the invaders and the rebels, the governors, and the local officers. The small *jagirdars* had neither personal strength not the support of local officers in collecting revenues from their *jagirs*. The Nizam wrote to Muhammad Shah, "The fact is this that *faujdars* make ample gains for themselves in the *jagirs* of persons having small ranks and position, and nothing is received by them. They, therefore, request to grant them executive authority so that they might be free from the oppression of *faujdars*[235]." A'itmad 'Ali Khan, author of *Mir'at-u'l-Haqaiq* writes : 'the position of *mansab* has reduced to such a condition that *mansab* and title have absolutely no value, and the *jagir* is not brought into possession. Disappointed and distressed at this condition, the royal servants have confined themselves to their homes. Nearly from one lakh to two lakhs of people are in this condition, and the number of royal servants is greater."[236] By the middle of the 18th century, even the big *jagirdars* lost hold on their *jagirs* in Malwa and Gujarat, where the Marathas, independent governors and local chiefs had established their rule by Agra, destroying the power of the central government. Even in the provinces of Delhi and the Punjab where Jats, Mewatis and the Sikhs were at large, the ministers and the nobles had no authority over their fiefs and received little or no revenues from them. With the essential procedure of granting *mansabs* and assigning lands having been disregarded and the hold of *mansabdars* over their possessions having disappeared, the *Jagirdari* system broke down.

پادشاهی و اکثر از اُمراها باو تعین بودند - و جاگیرها دیگر در هندوستان داشتند - معهذا از عهده نتوانست برآید - و ناچار مصاله نمود -

235. *Muntha'at-i-Musavi Khan*, f. 66a.

236. *Mirat-u'l-Haqaiq*, f. 92a.
In the reign of Bahadur Shah, *mansabdars* had the responsibility to provide fodder for the cattle. Their *jagirs* were small and often remained uncultivated. It was difficult for them to meet both ends ; bad days had fallen on them ; "for long time they had been in want of a loaf for supper." Even then, "the officials imprisoned the *vakils* of *mansabdars*, and with violence and insult demanded contributions for the food of the cattle" See for details of the conditions of *mansabdars* and the reforms made by Mun'im Khan. *Mumatkhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, pp. 602-603.

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Muhammad Shah was reduced to perpetual financial straits. The pressing issue that confronted him was how to get money, which could meet the growing needs of administration and of his colourful court. He begain to accept *peshkash*, a dignified term for bribery for the sale of offices.[237] Corruption at its worst permeated from top to bottom. Merit system gave way to bribery, the root of all illegality. For the purpose to reform the administration Nizam-u'l-Mulk put forward the following suggestions :—

1. Seniority of service should be made the main criteria for giving higher ranks,
2. The *mansabs* of the incompetent officers should be reduced,
3. Ranks and rewards should be given to capable persons,
4. The *Khailsah mahals* already parcelled out should be resumed,
5. The big *jagirs* should be given to powerful nobles,
6. And the small *mansabdars* should acquire only those areas where force for collection of revenue was not needed.[238]

Had these suggestions been accepted by the Emperor and carried out there was some hope that *jagirdari* system would have been saved from the crisis it faced, and the civil administration restored to law and order. Nizam-u'l-Mulk was opposed by the corrupt clique of Koki Jiu and the entire class of upstarts recently raise to nobility. They discovered a common danger in these measures to their privileges, and, therefore, made a common stand to oust the reformer from the court. The *Wazir* made no attempt to organize his resources to fight this class in order to achieve his objective. Any conflict with the Emperor could bring him to a similar situation which had ultimately ruined the cuase of the Saiyid brothers. After his departure the incompetent *mansabdars* and royal servants gained an upper hand, and completely dominated the Emperor.

Yahya Khan gives a graphic account of the conditions in the central administration after Nizam-u'l-Mulk left Delhi. "The affairs of the kingdom came to such a pass that authority to appoint and dismiss officers, change and transfer of *jagirs* of small and big nobles, increase and decrease in the *mansabs*, payment of salaries of the troops and the royal servants, rested with the *peshkars* and clever and corrupt clerks who took bribery ; for the *Wazir*, *Diwan-of-Khalisah*, and the *bakhshis* all indulged in luxury and indolence, and considered to perform such state duties below their dignity. The *mansabdars* were oppressed cruelly and royal servants treated with con-

237. *Tarikh-i-Fathiyah*, f. 16a.

238. *Tarikh-i-Fathiyah*, f. 17a.

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tempt and indignity ; the nobles (*Shurfa*) and the helpless became destitute and worried. The descendants of old nobles (*Umara*) were reduced to beggary. The ineffectiveness of troops, the ruin of the kingdom, revolts of refactory elements, disobedience of *Zamindars*, respect and favour towards bufoons and vulgars, reached a great extent".[239] "These malpractices caused widespread anarchy breaking down bonds of authority, rules and regulations of the government. Acute factionalism grew and disruptive elements gained mastery every where in the realm. Rajas and *zamindars*, big and small, who had been kept under control by the previous rulers of the Mughul dynasty, now asserted and raised the banner of revolt and strife in every corner of the land".[240]

During this period new social groups gained ascendancy, while the overwhelming majority of the old nobility lost its pre-eminence in the administrative and economic organizations of the government. The swift rise of a new class to power sharpened the divisive thrust in society, creating problems of unemployment and social adjustment. The later Mughals granted a major share in the public services to their trusted followers who had supported them either in wars of succession or contributed to strengthening their position on the throne. This large number of adherents was further added to by a long train of favourites who could play a definite role after accession in power politics. These men, now raised to the statuts of nobility, were, by and large, of low descent, having no background of military training or administrative experience. They also lacked the special qualities of manners and court etiquette which were required of governments servants in those days. The hereditary branch of nobility, proud of traditions of culture, competence and faithful service, treated the newcomers with derision.

A considerable number of persons from villages and towns secured jobs in the early years of Farrukh Siyar's reign. Numerous others who had accompanied him from Bihar and Bengal were also allowed to participate in the administrative institutions of the Mughal government'.[241] Another section of people, who were enrolled as *mansabdars*, came from

239. *Tazkirat-u'l-Muluk* f. 132b.

240. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh-Siyar-wa-Julus-i-Muhammad Shah* [pp. 137, 138.

241. *'Ibrat Namah*, Kamraj, f. 54a.

و بیشتر مردم قصبات و دیهات در بعهد سعادت مهد زیاده از اندازهٔ امیری گردید -

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eastern districts like Lucknow and Malihabad.[242] With the inclusion of these groups in the central government, administrative discipline and morale deteriorated. When Farrukh Siyar asked Muhammad Amin Khan to crush 'Abdullah Khan with the help of a royal force, he replied that generally low and mean persons formed the ranks of *mansabdars*, and were, therefore, incapable to put up a stout fight against the *wazir*.[243]

The Saiyids of Barha attained a dominant position in the new set-up of things at the centre. They divided the wealth and offices of the kingdom among themselves. 'Abdullah Khan employed only Saiyids from Barha in his army and government institutions ; the percentage of other was very nominal.[244] He did not like that such social groups Iranis and Turanis, should claim a share in the administrative activities of the government.[245] However, for reasons of political expediency, he accommodated some of the Mughal soldiers who had been thrown out of employment by Farrukh Siyar. An increasing number of Hindus took hold of offices, and enjoyed authority in the departments. They indulged in bribery and earned money by devious means. The clerks, working in various ministries at the centre, acquired possession of *mansabs* and *jagirs*.[246] The inhabitants of Kashmir also secured jobs and crowded the Mughal court.[247]

Besides these elements representing new social and regional forms, professional flatterers, musicians, dancers and bufoons related to Lal Kunwar[248] and Koki Jiu[249]

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242. *Shah Namah-i-Munawwar-u'l-Kalam*, p. 4. The names of some of the *mansabdars* from these areas, given by Shiv Das, are these :—Mir Musharraf of Lucknow, 5,000/-5,000 Dilwar 'Ali Khan of Lucknow, 2,500/2,200; Shaikh Sanaullah of Lucknow, 2,500/-2,200; and Khalil Khan of Malihabadi, 2,000/1,000., *Shah Nama-i-Deccan*, p. 97.

شدند اهل پورب زمین سرفراز بیکبارۂ از منصب عز و ناز
ز ناقدر دانی شدند از عذاب همه خاندان‌ها سابق خواب
ز ایرانیان کس بدر بادشاه نماندند بر خدمت و قدر و جاه

243. *'Ibrat Namah*, Mirza Muhammad, f. 32b.
244. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, pp. 771, 793.
245. *Tarikh-i-'Ali*, f. 48b.
246. *'Ibrat Namah*, Mirza Muhammad, f. 70a.
247. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab*, Part II, p. 776.
248. *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, p. 449.
249. She had four brothers : (a) 'Ali Muhammad Khan was a *mansabadr* of 5,000/-5,000, and *faujdar* of the suburbs of Delhi, (2) 'Ali Ahmad Khan, a *mansabdar* of 5,000/-5,000, held the post of *'Arzi-i-Mukarar*, (3) 'Ali Asghar Khan with the same rank was *faujdar* of the Doab in the Punjab, (4) 'Ali Amjad Khan had no service but held a vast *iagir*. *Tarikh-i-Shahadati-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah* pp. 87-89.

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were promoted to positions of power and pelf. Their influx in the government overshadowed members of old families *and* cast them into background. Being stripped of their ranks and possessions, they lived in obscurity and isolation.[250] The descendants of Sha'ista Khan and Ja'afar Khan were reduced to such poverty that they did not even keep a horse to ride.[251] The acute problem of unemployment confronting the representatives of old strata of nobility was the prime concern of Nizam-u'l-Mulk when he assumed the office of *wizarat* after the death of Muhammad Amin Khan.[252] The nobles who had served the government

250. *Kulliyat-i-Fa'iz*, Nawab Sadr-ud-din Khan Fa'iz, ff. 28a, 37a.

نیست در دارالخلافه قدر استعداد و قعل
عزت قوال و رقص است اندر نوکری
رفته اکنون اعتبار خاندان‌هائے قدیم
صاحب سامان و ثروت گشته هر خینه گری
نازم بسفله پروری چرخ بے تمیز
اهل کمال را نبود هیچ احترام
در بند جای ماندن مرد نجیب شد
هر سفله بدهر شده صاحب احتشام

251. *'Ibrat Namah*, Mirza Muhammad, f. 70b

ارباب خاندانی‌هائے قدیم بخاک برابر شدند ـ چنانچه اولاد شائسته خان و جعفر خان اسپ سواری نداشتند ـ

252. *Ahwal-al-Khawaqin*, f. 182.

که هر روز در آمد و رفت در بخانه از چهار جانب رستم رسیدگان هجوم می آوردند ـ شخصی میگفت که من از اولاد مهابت خان هستم و شخصی می گفت من از نبیره‌ها علی مردان خان ـ غرضیکه همین عنوان صدها مستغاثی میگشتد و طلب جاگیر میکردند ـ

On his way to and from his residence Nizam-u'l-Mulk often heard complaints of jobless persons belonging to old nobility. One would cry, "I am a descendant of Mahabat Khan, "while another would say, "I am one of the grandsons of 'Ali Mardan Khan".

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in the days of 'Alamgir' were either killed in wars of succession or died a natural death. The vacant political stage was now occupied by untrained and undisciplined officers. Most of them, unfit for a rank of 500, were raised to *mansabs* of 5,000 and 7,000.[253] They could not bring the assigned *mahals* under their control and draw income from the revenues. Incapable to perform their duties, they, in a short time, became a burden on public exchequer and curse to the society. They spoiled the atmosphere of the imperial court and brought an everlasting infamy to the Mughal name by the example and consequences of their misdeeds.[254] Impetuosity and avarice characterised their attitude in dealing with political and social affairs. These upstarts indulged in street riots' flinging to four winds the accepted standards of civil behaviour.[255]

These discordant materials and self-seeking elements now composed the bulk of the governing class, and the leadership of public affairs fell into their hands. Their want in creative vigour and lack of statesmanship accelerated the pace of decline in the Mughal bureaucracy on which propped the entire structure of the Empire. It was obvious that a ruling community which included such incompetent and avaricious individuals in its rank and file could not face a growing challenge from enemies of the government. They could not stand to the storms of revolts and invasions, and defend a heritage their ancestors had bequeathed to them.

253. *Ahwal-u'l-Khawaqih*, f. 181b

254. *Jahandar Namah*, f. 38 f; Kamraj ff· 47a, 46a.

قوم ارزال و اجلاف بر نجباء و اثراف حکمرانی گزیدند ـ و کلانوتان مردم آزار شرفا را در بازار گرفتار کرده به برداشتن خشت و سنگ بتعدی و برنگ میکشیدند ـ

255. Examples of such cases can be multiplied : For detailes of misconduct of Zuhra, a vegetable-seller, 'Ali Ahmad Khan and 'Ali Amjad Khan, brothers of Koki Jiu, Munawwar Khan, brother of Roshan-ud-daulah, 'Abdur Rahim Khan, son of Shah Abdul Ghafur and other musicians and bufoons, related to Lal Kunwar, *Siyar-u'l-Munta'akhkhirin*, Part II, p. 386 ; *Tarikh-i-Shahadait-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, pp. 87, 89, 101, 120, 121 *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, p. 623.

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Chapter IV

RIVAL FACTIONS AT THE COURT

After Nizam-u'l Mulk's departure from the capital, Koki's influence was uppermost and unchallenged ; and her clique became most potent and absolute master at the imperial court.[256] The Emperor's excessive indulgence to Koki Jiu and her profligate associates, who now revelled in all the license of sovereign power, exceeded the bonds of public and private virtue. She was authorised to impress the documents with the royal seal and extract money from all sources for the Emperor.[257] His only regret was that he could not make her *wazir* because of her female sex.[258] Her four brothers were raised to high ranks ; their total income from *jagirs* amounted to 25 lakhs of rupees.[259] Her another trusty companion, Shah 'Abdul Ghafur, also pillaged the public purse without fear or shame to his claims of divinity with which he covered his caprice of gold and worldly honour. His income from *jagirs* and *imalk* was twenty-five thou-

256. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, pp. 137. 137.

257. *Tarikh-i-Shahadai-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 87.

258. One day Muhammad Shah is reported to have expressed this regret in the cour. Allah Wardi Khan, a courtier, suggested that Roshan-ud-daulah's beard should be taken off and stuck to her face. *Shah Namah-i-Deccan*. pp. 140-141.

که یک روز گفت شاهجهان به جمله امیران والا شان
که کوکی باین عقل و تدبیر فن که هست ازفلاطون فزون بے سخن
دریغ است که اورا خداوند کار که زن آفریدش درین روزگار
اگو مرد بود این شیر زن نبودی کسے مثلش اندر زمن
اله وردی خان بذل افتخار نمود عرض در خدمت شهر یار
که آسان است تدبیر این در جهان اگر شه بخواهد شود مرد آن
بگیرد شه از روشن الدوله ریش دگر خصیه دگراین صدق کیش
نماید بکوکی عطا بے گمان که تا او شود مرد اندر جهان
شه ازین نطیفه شگفت آنقدر که زد خنده چندان که شد بے خبر

259. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, pp. 87, 89.

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sand rupees daily, apart from his equal share in bribes with Koki Jiu.[260] He used to say that money was power which could control clouds and check the rains.[261] Hs secured for his son, 'Abdul Rahim Khan, a *mansab* of 6,000/6,000 and for himself a rare exemption from customary prostration in the court. The handsome youth was stupid, debauch and cruel, who violated every law of morality and decency, and became chronic element of public nuisance. His house was nightly the scene of boisterous revels, that were protracted until long after sunshine. In the day time he was sometimes seen attired in female dress, and on other occasions clad in armour from top to bottom, walking and riding in the streets with his licentious followers, ready to cross sword with any one who ventured to hinder them in their vulgar acts.[262]

Despiced by the populace and abhored by the devout, the father and son fell in the dark shade of unpopularity. The Rearose a combination of men who trembled each moment for their lives and property. Their warrantable fears found vent in conspiracy to encompass the fall of these upstarts. Khan-i-Dauran, in league with Sa'adat Khan, by his usual methods of propaganda and plot, poisoned the mind of the Emperor against Shah 'Abdul Ghafur. It was told that the Shah was intriguing with Nizam-u'l-Mulk to overthrow him and install another Prince on the throne. The Shah displayed his haughty and egoistic demeanour by using harsh language in a conversation with the Emperor.[263]

By this time Koki Jiu quietly quitted the royal palace after handing over the charge of her wealth to Malika Dauran with whom she had quarrelled. Her fall was a sad blow to the Shah's fortunes ; he became nervous, and madness overtook him.[264] Once he referred the matter to Muhammad Shah and rebuked and cursed him; and in disgust, without permission left the court.[265] Meanwhile a complaint was made by Muhammad Fazil and Motilal that the Shah had embezzled public money in his capacity as *darogah* of the Mint.[266] The conspirators seized the opportunity by forelock and pressed the Emperor that the culprit should

260. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 120.

در لباس ظاهری شیخ بزرگ در طریق باطنی بدتر ز گرگ

261. *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, pp. 628, 60.
262. *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, p. 623,
263. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 127.
264. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah* p. 128.
265. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 128
266. *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, p. 625.

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be punished after proper investigation. At the same time they gave out that the Shah was going to be appointed governor of Sindh. On charges of dishonesty and gross misconduct,[267] Muhammad Shah dismissed him from office, despoiled of his ill-gotten riches and banished along with his family to the fortress of Rohtas in 1733.[268] The Shah thus knocked out of the ring, Roshan-ud-daulah fell an easy prey to the machinations of Khan-i-Dauran. He was charged of usurping two crores of rupees, and, though he paid a part of it, disgrace was never washed off.[269]

Thus after holding mastery in the Emperor's council for 13 years the corrupt clique was extripated by the reasons of their own folly and sordidness. This, to all seeming, cleared the ground for Khan-i-Dauran to control all affairs of the government. Some of the leading nobles were away from the court. Nizam-u'l-Mulk was absorbed in efforts to save his territories from Maratha incursions, Sa'adat Khan was involved in campaigns against refractory Rajas in Oudh, and Muhammad Khan Bangash engrossed in quelling the disturbances raised by the Bundelas. But Khan-i-Dauran found in Qamuruddin Khan, the *Wazir*, an implacable rival who would contest his growing hold. But for his opposition Khan-i-Dauran would have occupied the office of *Wizarat* after the death of Muhammad Amin Khan. Qamruddin Khan was the acknowledge leader of the Mughals in Delhi and related to Nizam-u'l-Mulk. By virtue of the influence he commanded over a section of the ruling class and his unflinching loyalty to the crown, Muhammad Shah liked him and reposed confidence in him. He was the only important noble left against whom Khan-i-Dauran could not use his trump card that he was contriving to dethrone the Emperor. Qamruddin Khan formed his own group which included Muhammad Khan Bangash, an Afghan, Sa'adat Khan, an Irani Mughal and Raja Abhai Singh, the Rajput chief. The nobles of diverse ethnic orgin threw themselves into a partnership to work adversely against Khan-i-Dauran.

Their temporary alignment in political affairs reflected a type of attitude conditioned by paramount need of promoting individual interests as well as by espousing a principle by which they aspired to tackle problems the Empire was facing. This generally did not form the basis of racial or regional combination. To apply the term Mughul to the entire group, or assume that it was purely a racial entity would be preposterous. Ashub says

267. *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, pp. 625-634.
268. *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, p. 633.
269. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, pp. 98, 99; *Shah Namah-Deccan*, p. 234.

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that Khan-i-Dauran hated the Mughals, especially the Turanis ; he only employed Indians, Hindus and Muslims, *i.e.*, the Rajputs, the Afghans and others, and gave open support to the Hindu Rajas and *zamindars* even when they revolted against the government[270]. The reasons for this tendency seems to have been his deep-seated animosity towards Qamruddin Khan and Nizam-u'l-Mulk and the anxiety to organize a group opposed to that led by the *Wazir*. He had no natural aversion against the Mughals as such, for he cooperated closely with Mir Jumla against the Saiyid brothers who actually patronised these elements he now wanted to coalesce. Political events show that Khan-i-Dauran was more concerned to discredit the imperial generals like Sa'adat Khan and Muhammad Khan Bangash, and win to his side the Jat and Bundela chiefs and *zamindars* rather than subserve the essential interests of the Empire. His policy was shaped primarily to strengthen his own position ; his postures in political affairs did not manifest his faith in the principles of a forward and aggressive policy towards forces of disruption. The contemporary writers tend to divide the nobility on the basis of race, and it appears that ethnic oddities of the nobles coloured their outlook in the realm of politics. Such an impression gleaned from these writings is erroneous in determining political role the nobles played in these decades[271]. To

270. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 132.

271. J. N. Sarkar in *Later Mughals* (Part II, p. 313) says : "The Delhi Court under later Mughals was divided between the Turanis (or Central Asian) and Hindustani Parties—both Muhammadans, while the Hindu Rajas sided with the latter." This statement however, is not supported by facts. In fact, the Hindu Rajas sided both the factions, the so-called Turani and Indian parties, Besides, the learned historian does not take notice of Khan-i-Dauran as the leader of the Indian party ; him he dismisses as "court flatterer, without any administration capacity." Without Khan-i Dauran it is difficult to establish the entity and measures the strength of the Indian party. Further, he holds that nobles like Nizam-u'l-Mulk, Qamaruddin Khan and Sa'adat Khan "could feel no patriotism for India, they had nothing at stak in this country." (p. 313). This remark implies that they were foreigners. But these nobles, except Sa'adat Khan, were born in India, settled down here, made their own fortunes, and indentified their destiny with the land. Their mutual jealousies, rather than their lack of patriotism, prevented them from taking a united stand against Nadir Shah's invasion. It is true that notions of patriotism and nationalism, as we understand in modern times, were unknown to them. But obviously they had no other state to serve and no other land to migrate. There was too much for the Mughal nobility to stake in India than in Iran or Turan. Raja Jai Singh and other Rajput chieftians also did not join the imperial troops at the battle of Karnal when urged by the Emperor and requested by Khan-i-Dauran, who was their ally in the faction feuds. (*Vir Vinod*, Vol. II, Part III, p. 1154). Even a *farman* was sent in this critical hour of the country's security to Peshwa Baji Rao, but he failed to respond to the appeal. (*Peshwa Baji Rao and Maratha Expansion*, V.G. Dighe, pp. 151-152). Khan-i-Dauran whose ancestors had also come from outside India, sacrificed his life in fighting against the Persian troops.

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conclude that Khan-i-Dauran was more Indianised in his way of life than Qamruddin Khan or Sa'adat Khan and therefore he stressed the necessity of compromise with the disruptive elements of the Empire seems to be incorrect.

These classified divergences of oligarical monopolist interests in the State functions only indicate the place of their origin and traces the beginning of their racial existence. Peoples of different ethnic groups, originating centuries before in lands of Persia, Afghanistan and regions of Trans-Oxina had migrated in successive waves and settled down in India. After a gradual process of fusion, a new integration of different communities emerged, and produced the wonderful flowering of Indian culture incorporating all these diverse components in the total web of national life. The Afghans, Persians, Turanis and Indians got merged in a common culture and beolnged to one single political unit. The racial stratification that characterises the composition of the governing class are volatile ; they always do not furnish the basis and a criterion for the froming of distinct political interests in the Mughal court during the period under review. Ambition for individual glory rather than racial strains shaped the political behaviour of these leaders. Sometimes loyalty to a person or a family determined their attitude towards the crown and influenced their relations with each other. What a group stood for was embodied for the rank and file in the personality of the leader rather than the policies he advocated. It is true that members of the same race tended to join the leader of their own race, but considerable number of various other races and creeds also obtained employment under him. Further, to examine these groupings and divisions among nobles from religious point of view is only to weave an airy fabric. The ancestors of Khan-i-Dauran had come from Badkhshan as the ancestors of Nizamu'l Mulk, and Qamruddin Khan from Samarqand. All these three persons were born in India, Sa'adat Khan Burhan-u'l-Mulk had migrated from Nishapore. Muhammad Khan Bangash belonged to Kaghazai Karta clan of the Bangash country in the eastern area of Afghanistan and was born in Mau-Rashidabad (present Qaimganj, a village in Farrukhabad district.[272]

The Saiyids of Barha were Indian born Muslims. They patronised Indian elements like Hindus, Saiyids of Barha, Afghans and Shaikhs by employing them in government offices. They sought to maintain cordiality

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It was Qamruddin Khan who commanded the imperial troops against Ahmad Shah in the battlefield of Sirhind (March 11 1748). The *Wazir* was wounded and later died there. (*Tazkirah Anand Ram Mukhlis*, p. 124).

272. *Tarikh-i-Farrukhabad*, Mir Wali-u'l-Lah, Aligarh Ms. pp. 12-13.

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with the Mughal leaders, but to a great extent the majority of Iranis and Turani were not allowed to enjoy their legitimate share in the government. The Afghans in the Deccan under the leadership of Daud Khan fought a severe battle against Husain 'Ali Khan. These Afghans were as much Indian Muslims as the Saiyids of Barha. Mir Jumla and Ahmad Beg were Turani Mughals ; but Khan-i-Dauran, Murad Kashmiri and Raja Jai Singh were Indians. Nevertheless, all of them were hostile to the Saiyid brothers, and supported the cause of Farrukh Siyar. Raja Jai Singh, particularly remained loyal to the Emperor at a critical moment when few nobles could dare oppose the Saiyids. In the reign of Muhammad Shah, Sa'adat Khan Burhan-u'l-Mulk, a Saiyid from Nishapur, joined hands with Muhammad Amin Khan in plots against Husain 'Ali Khan. And in the battle of Hasanpur, Sa'adat Khan, Muhammad Khan Bangash, an Afghan by origin and Indian by birth, Jag Ram, diwan of Raja Jai Singh, Raja Gopal Singh Bhadauriya and Raja Bahadur Rathor fought on the side of Muhammad Shah against Saiyid 'Abdullah Khan Qutubul Mulk. Raja Chabella Ram, a Nagar Brahman, revolted against the Saiyid brothers, and after his death (November, 1719) his nephew Girdhar Bahadur carried the standard of resurrection to the last till a compromise was made with him.[273] After the fall of the Saiyid brothers, the Saiyids of Barha, and their other partisians suffered a setback. The Mughals, Iranis and Turanis, royal favourites, the followers of Muhammad Amin Khan, Nizam-u'l-Mulk, Sa'adat Khan, Raja Girdhar Bahadur and Raja Jai Singh secured posts, high and low, in the government. The other section of the employees advanced on the ladder of office by the Saiyid brothers and still retaining their services, and those raised to status during the supremacy of Koki Jiu turned for leadership towards Khan-i-Dauran who, again to buttress his position, gave jobs to persons of non-Mughal extraction. The group, resulted from this process, may be roughly called the faction of the *Mir Bakhshi*.

Nevertheless, racial animosities were sharp and deep among the Muslim nobles and middle classes. The Mughals, Iranis and Turanis collectively were against Hindustani Muslims of different categories. The underlying pattern of racial cleavage was revealed in social behaviour and conflicting economic interests. Their leaders laid bare their daily widening rift before the public. The shoe seller's riot, started on private issue, ended in hand to hand combat between the followers of these two groups.[274] A

273. *Muntakhab-u'l-Lubab* Part II, pp. 843-846.
274. See for details—*Later Mughals*, Part II. pp. 257-262.

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trifle sufficed to irritate their feelings and rush them into fighting. One day in the presence of Muhammad Shah and other nobles, there started a bitter conversation between Sa'adat Khan and Muzaffar Khan.[275] the *Mir Atsh*, and the brother of Khan-i-Dauran. Sa'-adat Khan, at that moment, was flying *morchul* over the Emperor. Intensely irritated, Muzaffar Khan put up his hand on the handle of his sword, which he always carried. He half unsheathed the sword as if threatening to strike Sa'adat Khan. Dignified and serene, Sa'adat Khan responded these gestures by laughing and making fun of him. He waved about the handle of *morchful* in order to frighten him. He, then, moved and touching the head, back and buttocks of Muzaffar Khan with the handle of *morchul*, said "well, at this stage you should play with this *morchul* instead of the sword." Muzaffar Khan remained sitting, motionless and tight-lipped ; and the Emperor laughed over this ugly scene in his court.

But Muzaffar Khan resolved to wash out his disgrace in the blood of Sa'adat Khan. Muzaffar Khan reported the matter to his brother, Khan-i-Dauran, who consoled him, promising that something would be done to avenge the insult. They summoned all their troops and sent for Rajah Jai Singh to assist them in that encounter. The Rajah came out with his Rajput forces from Jaipura, a locality in Delhi. Sa'adat Khan, who had no army with him asked his *bakhshi* to enroll 50 thousand horse on the payment of one month's salary in advance. When Qamruddin Khan heard of this development, he sent five thousand horse including Mughul youths from Mughulpura, another locality in Delhi, to the succour of Sa'dadt Khan. The *Wazir* also sent a message in these words. "The honour of the Mughuls is one. Iranis and Turanis are one. Whomever are my comrades, they are as your friends ; and whomever are my servants, they are as your servants. Whatever you order them, they shall carry with their heart and soul, and I am myself at your disposal." Sa'adat Khan became grateful to the *Wazir*. After a tumult in the city continuing for more than a week, the Emperor ordered Muzaffar Khan to proceed to Narnol, and Sa'adat Khan to his own pro-

275. He was a *mansabdar* of 7,000/7,000 horse and had *jagirs* in proportion to his *mansab*. He served as *faujdar* of Narnol and Subedar of Ajmer. When Haider Quli Khan died, on the recommendation of Khan-i-Dauran, Muhammad Shah made him *Mir Atash*. He was arrogant and his countenance always betrayed signs of anger and irritation. Ashub. p. 140. Later on, he was removed from the office of *Mir Atash*, and Hafiz Khidamatgar Khan was appointed to it. After the dismissal of the Hafiz, one Sa'aduddin Khan Jahan Shahi, a *mansubdar* of 5,000/5,000 secured this post. His *mansab* was increased to 6,000/6,000 . *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 148.

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vince.[276] This episode clearly shows that Iranis and Turanis could combine against the so-called Hindustani elements of the ruling class. It was only after the invasion of Nadir Shah that Iranis organized themselves into a separate group under the leadership of Amir Khan and Safdar Jang.

276. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, pp. 143-146

شرم مغلیت واحد است ـ و ایرانی و تورانی یکی است ـ آن‌ها چنانکه رفقائی من اند رفیقان صاحب اند ـ و چنانچه نوکران من اند نوکران صاحب اند ـ بهرچه فرمایند از جان و دل حاضر اند ـ و من هم بجان و دل رفیق شما ام ـ

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Chapter V

KHAN-I-DAURAN'S POLICY TOWARDS THE MARATHAS AND THE BUNDELAS

The crushing defeat suffered by the imperialists at the hands of Chimaji on November 29, 1728, and the failure of Bhawani Ram to handle properly the menacing situation in Malwa demoralized the government.[277] The offensive strength of Mughal arms was consumed and material basis of the government was threatened with exhaustion. The Maratha torando rapidly increased in volume and force, and clouds looked dark on the horizon. Nizam-u'l-Mulk had set an example of indedpendent rule to others by establishing his authority in the Deccan. Forces of disintegration were at work every where. The economic organization of the ruling class was in a state of collapse. The Mughal leadership seemed impaled on the horns of a dilema. To bend to the will of aggressors meant loss of *jagirs*, power and position in Malwa and Gujarat. But in a prolonged struggle there were portents of ultimate triumph of the enemy. The changing perspectives of Mughal-Maratha relationship required a positive policy which could admit the Marathas into the imperial system and at the same time maintain the security and well-being of the old ruling class. Muhammad Shah was not a genius like Akbar to perform a big role in the building of a new order. His military abilities were limited ; and he lacked necessary experience in statesmanship. He could not handle the affairs of a great Empire in a great crisis.

When unity was needed most, the party factions at the court fought each other almost interminably and unabashedly. Mutual rivalries reflected different conceptions of the rule which the ministers wanted to play in dealing with a militant movement. Khan-i-Dauran stressed the urgency of negotiations with the Marathas. He argued that armed conflict would only cause wide-spread disaster and be of no avail in bringing a lasting peace to the Empire. In upholding principles of reconciliations Khan-i-Dauran was influenced by the views of Raja Jai Singh whose friendship he wanted to cultivate. He believed that an affinity with Raja Jai Singh would prove a tower of strength to him in group politics against the *Wazir*

277. *S. P. D.* XII, 17, 23, 25.
For details of the battle of Amjera in which Girdhar Bahadur and Daya Bahadur were killed, *Malwa in Transition*, pp. 162-167.

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The Raja insisted on peaceful settlement with the invaders by giving them large share in the advantages that the Empire could offer. Qamruddin Khan took the extreme opposite end of the situation. He pleaded to continue warfare and denounced all attempts aimed at compromise. Sa'adat Khan agreed with the *Wazir* in organizing military power to resist the Marathas.[278]

A final analysis of prevailing conditions and deep knowledge of challenges that lay ahead drove the Raja to adopt a bold policy of making an alliance with the Marathas. He thought this agreement might enable him to carve out an independent kingdom stretching from the Jamuna to the Narmada.[279] He could, without difficulty, protect the frontiers of his kingdom by giving *chauth* to the Maratha generals. His alliance would further enable him to bear upon the Emperor all the pressure of his formidable allies and thereby secure more concessions for himself. He feared Maratha designs on his principality and possessions in Rajputana. Motivated by instincts of safety, the Raja acquiesced in the rising spirit of Maratha expansion. He also wished to act as a bridge between the crown and the Marathas, seething with vigorous life and stirred to power and adventure.[280]

Raja Jai Singh found in Khan-i-Dauran a fit person to push his interests in the court and preach his gospel of appeasement in dealing with the Marathas. He convinced Khan-i-Dauran that the Maratha aggression

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278. *S. P. D.* 29, XIV ; 31, 39, 47.

279. Raja Jai Singh had gained substantial political weight in the imperial affairs during the reigns of Farrukh Siyar and Muhammad Shah. He had a good record of faithful service to the Mughal crown. On October 15, 1713, he obtained governorship of Malwa. He, in cooperation with Chhatrasal Bundela, acted as warden of morches by preventing Marathas from crossing the Narmada in 1714. In April 1715, he inflicted a crushing defeat on the Maratha arms, which won for him popularity among the people. He sent a force of 4 thousand under his diwan, Jag Ram to the help of Muhammad Shah in the battle of Hasanpur. As a reward for his allegiance, the titles of Saramad Raj Hai-i-Hindustan Raja Rajendra Dhiraj Siwai Jai Singh, besides robes of honour and valuable articles were conferred upon him. His request for the abolition of *Jiziyah* was also accepted in November, 1720. In 1772, he was appointed governor of Agra after the removal of S'aadat Khan. The Raja undertook to lead an army against the sons of Churaman Jat and captured Thun on November 18, 1822. He possessed vast *jagirs* in Malwa and Ajmer. Finding the central government weak and helpless, he like other governors, began to, entertain ambitions for establishing an independent kingdom. *Munahkab-u'l-Lubab* Part II, p. 920, *Shah Namah-i-Munawwar-u'l-Kalam*, p. 132 ; *Akhbbrt*, Additional Persian, Vol. II, pp. 13, 16, 41, dated November, 1728, *Akhbarat*, Hindi, Vol. II, p. 27 dated October 8, 1720 VI. III, Part V, dated October 27 1722, November 27, 1722, p. 15-16 ; *Akhbarat*, Dated December 12, 31, 1713 ; dated April 5, May 8, June 1 1715—letters, March 12, April 15, 18, 21, 25, 29, May 8, 10, 1715.

280. *S.P.D.* XV. 23, 33, 39 ; *Peshwa Baji Rao I and Maratha Expansion*, V. G. Dighe Bombay 1944, X. 122.

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could not be resisted by force ; it was better to buy them off and leave the work of restoring tranquility and order into his hands. Khan-i-Dauran persuaded Muhammad Shah to appoint Jai Singh the governor of Malwa and utilise his services for cordial adjustment with the victors. In November 1729, the Raja became the governor and received Rs. 13 lakhs for the maintenance of his army.[281] Just after taking charge of the office, Jai Singh recommended that Raja Shahu, already an imperial *mansabdar*, should be granted a *jagir* worth of Rs. 10 lakhs on the conditions that the Maratha incursions should never take place and an auxiliary contingent of his troops should serve the *subedar* of Malwa. The Emperor agreed to these proposals and instructed the Raja to open negotiations.[282]

Raja Jai Singh sent his envoy, Dip Singh, to the court of Raja Shahu to discuss the terms of peace. Dip Singh promised a subsidy of Rs. 11 lakhs from Malwa and Rs. 15 lakhs from Gujarat a year in lieu of *chauth*, if Narmada was not crossed by the Marathas. The Emperor first accepted these terms but later changed his mind, probably under the influence of the *Wazir* and others of his group.[283] It was decided to remove Raja Jai Singh, the originator of peace plan, and redouble efforts to meet the danger. Consequently, Raja Jai Singh was replaced by Muhammad Khan Bangash in September 1730.[284]

Muhammad Khan Bangash also could not crush the foe and consequently lost his job. He incurred the displeasure of the Emperor by aligning himself with the Nizam. Khan-i-Dauran was quick to play on the fears of the Emperor that Muhammad Khan, in league with Nizamu'l Mulk, was devising to dethrone him. Muhammad Khan also usurped the *jagirs* of nobles who were influential at the court. This once again gave an opportunity to Khan-i-Dauran to discredit the man of the *Wazir*, and plead the case of Raja Jai Singh, the only hope to get over the crisis. This time the Emperor leaned to the side of the *Mir Bakhshi*.[285]

On September 28, 1732 Jai Singh was again appointed for the third time the governor of Malwa.[286] But the Raja made peace after fighting an engagement with Holkar by promising to pay Rs. 6 alkhs in cash and concede 28 *parganas* in lieu of *chauth*.[287] After this suffender he left for

281. *Malwan in Transition* pp. 177-178.
282. *Jaipur Record*, Additional, Persian, p. 120.
283. *S.P.D.* X, 66, 67, 31, 71, 74, 73.
284. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 178.
285. *'Aziz-u'l-Qulub*, Bhagwan Das, Aligarh, Ms. *'Arzdashts*, Nos. 7, 9, 5, 18, f. 8, 9. 10, letters to Nizam-u'l-Mulk and Khan-i-Dauran, Nos. 10, 12, 12b, 13, ff. 33-41.
286. *'Aziz-u'l-Qulub*, f. 53a.
287. *S.P.D.* XIV, 1, 2; XV, 6.

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Jaipur and assumed cold neutrality in Mughal-Maratha struggle. The Marathas, at his instigation, invaded Malwa and established their military posts[288]. This time enormous resources of the government were put at the disposal of Raja Jai Singh to resist the invasions of the enemy. The Raja was to maintain a huge force of 24,000 horse and foot in equal number. Two-third of the total amount of land revenue were sanctioned for the maintenance of these troops. He also received Rs. 13 lakhs in grant and Rs. 7 lakhs in loan.[289] No other governor was ever equipped with so immense material in men and money to repulse the Marathas beyond the Narmada. But he was sailed with winds of personal ambition by abandoning the interests of the Empire which he was to safeguard in his capacity as its senior official.

From the account of Persian chronicles it appears that the Raja and his patron, Khan-i-Dauran became targets of pointed arrows of criticism by the public which repudiated their policy of appeasement and attributed the failure to repel the Maratha invasions to pure negligence.[290] In the words of Waried, "for 12 years the Raja had been governor of Agra and for 4 or 5 years governor of Malwa. From the gates of Delhi to the banks of Narmada he was in supreme authority. But in spite of all the disorders round him, the Raja, supported by the court influence of Khan-i-Dauran, sat calmly and did nothing. He possessed an army of 30,000 horse and still larger number of matchlockmen. Several times in previous years the Raja had received from Muhammad Shah large sums, as much as thirty lakhs or twenty lakhs, it is said, for payment to the Marathas. Half was paid to them and half taken up by the Raja himself. After two or three years of this arrangement the Marathas began to invade and collect dues in Malwa and every time they grew more greedy and avaricious.[291]

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288. *S.P.D.* XIII, 10; XIV, 47.
289. *Jaipur Records*, Vol. III. pp. 48-51, Aya Mal's letter, dated, September 6, 1732
290. *Shah Namah-i-Deccan*, pp. 244.

رقم میکنم بعد ازین سرگذشت بلاها که نازل درین ملک گشت
که در هند ره یافت خیل عظیم ز بی فکری این امیر عظیم
که این امیر از جهان راجها کرم کرد براجه پر دغا
چون آن میر دریا دل با صفا با و داد اجین و هم آگره را
همان کافر از غیرت کافری چو دید از شهنشاه بی جوهری
طلب کرد کفار را از دکن که کردند دین را مگر بیخ کن

291. *Mir'at-i-waridat*, pp. 680-681.

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Raja Jai Singh remained passive spectator of the calamities that overtook the province in the subsequent years. Muhammad Shah could not dismiss him lest Khan-i-Dauran should become displeased over this drastic action.[292] But the Emperor was anxious to save Malwa, prosperous in agriculture, rich in industry and a link between the North and the South. In the coming season, 1733-34, he urged Khan-i-Dauran to bear arms to recover the imperial territories from the alien hands. The *Bakhshi*, unable to endure the ordeal, spent three or four months in persuading some one else to discharge his duty. At last, in February 1734, he sent for his borther Muzaffar Khan, governor of Ajmer, and despatched him against the Marathas. Muzaffar Khan could leave Delhi only on March 20, 1734, and marched upto Sironj. But without coming to close quarters with the Marathas, who had already crossed the Narmada on the coming of the rainy season, he returned to Delhi on J7ne 11, 1734.[293]

The Marathas again started their incursions into Malwa just after the rains of 1734. The Emperor ordered both the *Wazir* and the *Mir Bakhshi* to lead the imperial armies against the enemy. At the head of 25,000 horse Qamruddin Khan took leave as early as November 1734 ; and Khan-i-Dauran, supported by 50,000 force also started towards Malwa. The *Bakhshi* was joined by Raja Jai Singh, Abhai Singh and Durjan Sal in this expedition. The lukwarm and disunited hosts of the imperial generals were soon surrounded by the light Maratha cavalry. Khan-i-Dauran, overwhelmed by the enemy' sneak attacks, yielded to the demand of *Chauth*. At the instance of Raja Jai Singh, he offered Rs. 22 lakhs for *chauth* of

292. *Tarikh-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 179.

بوساطت و وکالت امیرالامرا خاندوران بہادر صمصام الدولہ
بمہراجہ دھراج جے سنگھہ سوائے مشہور صوبہ داری مالوہ مقرر
شد ـ و این معنی بعلت ہم جنس کفر موجب تقویت باجی راؤ
..... بسازش جے سنگھہ قدم جرات پیش گذاشتہ از دکن
قصد تاخت و تاراج ہندوستان کردہ و در مادہ بفتنہ و فساد
سر سورش برداشت ـ

293. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 170. Ashub says that it was on the suggestion of Raja Jai Singh that Khan-i-Dauran sent his brothers to Malwa

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Malwa and induced them to return to the South. The *wazir*, without accomplishing any thing also returned on May 9, 1735.[294]

"With every defeat and with every attempt for conciliation on the part of the imperialists, the Maratha demands rose higher and higher, and every such rise in their demands increased the reaction against the Marathas".[295] The dove of peace was frightened away ; and the anti-Maratha elements triumphed at the court. Muhammad Shah, weary and confused, pursued a shifty course ; sometime following the advice of Khan-i-Dauran, and, on another occasion, counting on the hope and promise held out by the anti-Maratha party. A defensive line could possibly be made at Narmada and bulwarks of protection be erected in Malwa, if Raja Jai Singh would have cooperated with the imperialists, and Muhammad Shah, giving up his life of ease, would have led them. But, neither the pressure of events awakened the Emperor from slumber nor did the nobles shed their factionalism and rally loyally round him.

A section of public opinion was unmistakably annoyed at the attitude of Khan-i-Dauran in dealing with the Maratha problem. The people were alive to perils inherent in a movement of military expansion. They observed with uneasiness a long series of reverses the government suffered and were deeply concerned over the growing impoverishment caused by the loss of *jagirs* and jobs. They brooked no compromise and resented greatly the weak-kneed policy of the pacifists.

In the beginning of recent campaign led by Khan-i-Dauran a general call was made to colours with the assurance that they were going to be enrolled on permanent footing. During days of economic distress such a call to muster was a boon to the soldiers. The number of jobs had declined considerably and the soldiers were starving ; in the words of a writer they became physically weak with no strength left in their bodies to fight.[296] They however in the hope of permanent service, mortgaged ornaments of their wives and daughters to Hindu bankers who utilizing the opportunity demanded abnormal interest.

Having acquired the money through these means, they purchased horses, got them branded, and moved on march to meet the enemy in the field of battle.[297] To their surprise and chagrin, they were given no chance to display their warlike ardour by the leader under whom they had gathered. The soldiers discovered no spoils for their pillage, and no laurels

294. *S.P.D.*, XIV, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27 ; *S.P.D.*, XXX, p. 320, *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, pp. 186-188, 190-192.
295. *Malwa in Transition*, p. 209.
296. *Shah Namah-i-Deccan*, p. 245.
297. *Shah Namah-i-Deccan*, p. 245.

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of victory to win. Back home, they were dismissed with their salaries unpaid. Disappointed and out of employment they diffused a spirit of discontentment with the government in general and the leader of the expedition in particlar among the larger sections of the population.

Their emotions of anger were aroused by the submission of Khan-i-Dauran to the enemy. They expressed their resentment in reproaching and lampooning the *Mir Bakhshi*. The poets composed satires in Persian and Hindi which soon got wide publicity in the cities of Delhi and Agra. The couplets were on the lips of the people. In the market places, the *Naqqal* (mimicks) recited them, made jokes and created fun. The scandal against Khan-i-Dauran spread so far and wide that the Emperor heard it through some source. He ordered that one of the *Naqqals* indulging in this scandal-mongering should be seized, his face blackened, put on the ass and exposed in the public. Faulad Khan, the Kotwal, an Abysinian by origin, accordingly got one *Naqqal* arrested. The *Naqqal* said "Khan Saheb, do not blacken my face.' The Kotwal asked the reason. The *Naqqal* replied "People will not be able to distinguish between you and me." Faulad Khan laughed at and later on sent him to be publicly exposed in the manner ordered by the Emperor. In the streets through which the *Naqqal* was led, the announcer proclaimed . "Any one who lampooned Khan-i-Dauran shall meet this fate." And the *Naqqal* retorted, "Any one who paid *Chauth* to the Marathas and respected them shall face this condition and punishment, *i.e.*, he shall be scandalised."[298]

Apart from disunity among nobles and inbecility of the Emperor, the military system of the Mughals suffered from various major defects. Their weapons and methods of war became frost-grown and out-moded. They had put their reliance to ill proportions in artillery and armoured cavalry. The artillery was local in action and ponderous in movement. It was further rendered stationary by huge tail of camp which looked like a city with its markets, tents, stores, baggage ; all kinds of people, men and women, old and young, combatants and non-combatants, besides elephants, cattle and beasts of burden, accompanied the Mughal army. The Maratha cavalry, on the other hand, was swift and elusive like a wind. They suddenly erupted on Mughal camp and launched damaging sneak attacks on their posts. Without seeking a fight to a finish, they would outflank the immovable armoured troops, plundered the equipage and broke apart. Before the Mughals could get time for recovery, the Marathas, "like water parted by the oar", closed and fell on them.

298. *Tazkirat-u'l-Muluk*, ff. 138, 139.

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A the turn of the 18th century musketry made a rapid progress and gained prominent place in the methods of warfare. Swift running cavalry of matchlockmen was superior to the army equipped with heavy artillery and armour-clad cavalry. During this whole period of decline, no change was thought out, and no improved system introduced even after so many humiliating reverses at the hands of the Marathas. The Mughal-Maratha struggle presented a long-drawn clash between two systems—the one frost-grown and worn-out, the other new and full of vtality. The deplorable discord among ministers, non-cooperation of Rajput chieftains, incompetence of the Emperor, and other suicidal tendencies of which Ashub, Warid, Qasim Aurangabadi, A'itmad 'Ali Khan and others talk so bitterly in their works, were outward manifestations of a deep-rooted malady that was eating into the vitals of the system on which the Mughal Empire rested.

Once the Marathas discovered desperate straits of the Mughal government, they became more greedy and presumptuous in their demands for a settlement. Their extraordinary conditions, coercive tactics, and breaking of commitments at every change in the course of events complicated the situation and belied the hopes of peace-makers. Further, Khan-i-Dauran's measure for compromise was not the result of his deep thinking; he was motivated by the concern for an inordinate increase in power of his rivals in case the alternative of peace was sought. A militant movement for *mulkgiri* could be resisted by concerted action and by pouring resources and talent into war machinery. Sa'adat Khan wanted to have control over Malwa, Agra and Ajmer ;[299] while Nizam-u'l-Mulk demanded huge amount of money and large number of troops.[300] Likewise, Muhammad Khan Bangash needed government support in men and money.[301] Acceptance of these terms meant an abrupt change in their status which was bound to upset the balance of power between the nobles and undermine the influence of Khan-i-Dauran at the court.

Besides, the whole question of compromise was further confused by its economic aspect. The Maratha war-lords were mainly interested in exacting tributes from the *zamindars* and *jagirdars* in the subjugaeted territories. Baji Rao I was hard-pressed by his bankers, and he constantly urged the Maratha agents to send money from these areas in form of cash or *hundis*.[302] Any compromise with the forces of aggression was beyond the endurance of *mansabdars* and *jagirdars* who were passing through anguish and strain at the loss of their possessions. Muhammad Shah could

299. *S.P.D.*, XV, 29.
300. *Mumsha'at-i-Musavi Khan*, f. 48-53.
301. *'Aziz-u'l-Qulub*, 'Arzdasht, No. 18, f. 17.
302. *S.P.D.*, XIII, 18, 20, 22, 24; XV, 4, 8, 11, 12.

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not withstand the storm of pressure of anti-Maratha group which represented these vested ineterests. The growing impact of Maratha invasions over Rajputana at last disillusioned Raja Jai Singh in his faith in neutrality. The fall of Mughal power in Malwa perilously exposed the Rajputs to Maratha hordes who did not distinguish between foe and friend in their acts of pillage and rapine. Alarmed at the terrible menace of Maratha expansion the Rajput princes threw themselves into a union for the defence of their common cause. Raja Jai Singh called a meeting of Maharana Jagat Singh, Abhai Singh, Bakhat Singh of Nagor, Zorawar Singh of Bikaner, Durjan Sal of Kota, Dalel Singh of Bundi, Gopal Pal of Karoli, Raj Singh of Kishangarh, all big and small Rajas, at Hurda near Agaunch, a village in Marwar, on July 17, 1734 to work out a joint scheme against the Maratha invaders. It was agreed in the conference that al the participants would help each other in their difficulties. They would not employ unfaithful persons ; and all the Rajas would assemble at Rampura with their contigents ; and after rains launch a campaign to drive the Marathas out of Rajputana. If any one of them could not come out in person, he would send his own son or brother.[303] But their own mutual jealousies constituted a great impediment in the execution of this plan.

Muhammad Khan Bangash was appointed, on December 25, 1720, the governor of Allahabad. In recognition of his distinguished services in the battle of Hasanpur, the Afghan chief received a robe of honour, the title of Ghazanfar Jang, and two new *parganas*, Bhojpur and Shahabad, in addition to former *jagirs* consisted of eight *parganas* in Bundelkhand granted by Farrukh Siyar.[305] His *mansab* was raised from 4,000 to 7,000, horse.[304] As his *jagirs* lay in Bundelkhand, he came into direct conflict with Chhatrasal Bundela[306] who had usurped a large portion of imperial territories. Muhammad Khan posed a potential threat to his area of

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303. *Akhbarat*, Hindi collection, Part, V, p. 54, dated July 17, 1734. *Virvinod*, pp. 1220-21.

304. *Tarikh-i-Farrukhabad*, p. 26.

305 *Farrukh Siyar Namah*, f. 80b.

306. Chhatrasal, son of Champet, was a soldier of fortune. Following the example of his father and inspired by Shivaji, he raised the standard of revolt in the reign of 'Alamgir, and persisted in that rebellious conduct till his death. He defeated several government officials sent against him. He, however, in the 40th year of his reign, joined the imperial service, but after four yeas abandoned it and left Deccan for home. On the accession of Bahadur Shah, he waited on the Emperor when he was marching to the Deccan against Kam Bakhsh (1708). During the reign of Farrukh Siyar he was raised to high favours. He defeated the Marathas in cooperation with Raja Jai Singh in 1714 and on May 3, 1718 ; three of his sons and several grandsons attended the court and received rewards. For details, *Ma'asir-u'l-Umara*, Part II, p. 510.

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influence. Self-interest as well as the need to establish imperial authority dragged down the Afghan chief into clash of arms with Chhatrasal who would not give up his hard-won gains without resistance.

Muhammad Khan opened offensive with vigour and resourcefulness. He, in a short time, captured Ilajali and Moheba. In June, 1728, the Bangash chief laid siege of Jaitpur, the last stronghold of the Bundelas. Throughout the rainy season the investment continued with relentless pressure. Reduced to straits, Chhatrasal surrendered the place (December 1728) and submitted with his family to the imperial general.'[307] Muhammad Khan kept in his camp the vanquished foe for a period of three to four months waiting for instructions from the court. The narrow-minded courtiers grew jealous of this new feather in the cap of the Bangash warrior. They secretly instigated the worn-out rebel to continue hostilities. Chhatrasal, emboldened by the suggestion, sent appeal for help to the Poona Court.[308] The Peshwa readily agreed to support the Bundelas, as if he was looking for the opportunity. At the head of 25,000 horse, Baji Rao set out from Poona on November 27, 1728, and passing through Berar, reached Moheba on March 10.[309] Forthwith the Maratha troops surrounded the Bangash camp.[310] Most of the Afghan army had left the place; even Qa'im Khan was not present at that time. Muhammad Khan took shelter in the fort of Jaitput, and from here he wrote to the Emperor for succour. The Emperor ordered the *Mir Bakhshi*, Khan-i-Dauran, to proceed to the spot where the imperial cause was at stake.[311]

The advance tents of the *Mir Bakhshi* were sent outside the city with great pomp and show. But Khan-i-Dauran would not move a step further to hasten to the help of the embattled general. In the words of Warid, "Full of intrigue, deceit and excuses, he every evening put off his start to the morning and every morning put it off to the evening." He poisoned the Emperor's mind by saying that Muhammad Khan entertained designs of treason like his Afghan ancestors. It was, therefore, wise to withdraw his hand from giving help to a man of doubtful loyalty. Not contented with it, Khan-i-Dauran wrote to Chattarasal that the despised foe was at his mercy and he would only miss his chance if he did not slay him. His head shall ensure dignity and reward from him (Chhatrasal).[312]

307. *Tarikh-i-Farrukhabad*, pp. 37-38, *'Aziz-u'l Qulub*, 'Arzdasht, No. 2, ff. 5-8.
308. *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, p. 587.
309. *S.P.D.*, XIII, 12, 22, 23, XXX, p. 288.
310. *S.P.D.*, XIII, 45.
311. *Mir'at-i-Waridat*, p. 588.
312. *Mirat-i-Waridat*, pp. 288 89.

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As a result, no reinforcement reached Muhammad Khan. Luckily for him, an epidemic broke out in Maratha camp. Baji Rao at once raised the siege, left Jaitput on 23rd May and reached Poona on July 1th. The siege, however, continued for another three months. Muhammad Khan at last agreed not to attack the Bundels again and satisfied with the tribute they formerly paid.[313]

313. S.P.D. XXX, p. 289 ;
Peshwa Baji Rao and Maratha Expansion, p. 108.

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CHAPTER VI

THE INVASION OF NADIR SHAH

Controversy over reasons of his invasion :

The 19 years that intervened between the accession of Muhammad Shah (1719) and the invasion of Nadir Shah (1738) was a period of continuous warfare with the Marathas. The Mughals threw their whole weight against the Marathas in Malwa. In 1738, the climax was reached and Baji Rao, by defeating Nizam-u'l Mulk, forced him to cede the province to the Poona authorities.[314] Law and order was put to an end in the two major dominions, Gujarat and Malwa, by the Marathas. The imperial prestige was considerably impaired. The task of revenue realisation for the government officers and *jagirdars* became extremely difficult. The government treasury was impoverished. The governors of other provinces, hitherto free from the inroads of the invaders, assumed independence. They were sending little or no tribute to the government. Only the governor of Bengal[315] was financing the public exchequer, and obviously this meagre amount could not meet the demands of the army and the civil services.

The Mughal government was still in the throes of a great internal struggle when rumblings of a new menace rose ominously on the North Western frontier. Tahmasp Quli Khan Afshar[316] appeared on the scene in Persia and threw off the shackles on foreign domination. He "defeated

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314. On January 7, 1738, Nizam-u'l-Mulk accepted the following terms : (1) "Grant of the whole Malwa to the Peshwa, (2) grant of complete sovereignty of the territories between the Narmada and the Chambal, (3) a promise by the Nizam to obtain confirmation of this peace from the Emperor, (4) a promise to use his best endeavour to get a sum of 50 lakhs from the Emperor to pay for Baji Rao's expenses." *Baji Rao and Maratha Expansion*, p. 149.

315. For details, vide, *Murshid Quli Khan and His Times*, 'Abdul Karim, Dacca, 1963, Chapters, II, III.

316 See for details about his early life and activities : *Bayan-i-Waqa'i*, also known as Nadir Namah or *Tarikh-i-Nadri*, 'Abdul Karim Kashmiri ; *Tarikh-i-Jahankusha'i-Nadri*, Mirza Muhammad Mahdi Astarabadi, Bombay, 1875 ; *Chahar Gulzari-Shuja'i*, Harcharan Das, B.M. Ms ; *Tazkirat-u'l-Ahwal*, Shaikh Muhammad 'Ali Hazein ; *The History of Persia from the most early period to the Present Time*, Sir John Malcolm, London, 1815 ; *History of Nadir Shah*, James Fraser, London 1742, *History of Persia*, Sir P. M. Sykes, Vol. II, London, 1921 ; *Nadir Shah*, L. Lockhart, London, 1938.

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the Afghans and Turks, subdued the Lazgis and other rebels, and recovered, except for Qandhar all the territory which had been lost" to the Persian Empire.[317] Having thus won laurels in many campaigns, which established his prowess as a military leader, Tahmasp Quli Khan deposed the Safawi Emperor Tahmasp II (1722-1731) and crowned himself on March 8, 1736, with the title of Nadir Shah, as Emperor of Persia'

Nadir Shah set out with a formidable force to invade Qandahar, the last stronghold of the Afghans, and, notwithstanding a stout resistance, conquered it on March 12, 1738, after a year of relentless investment. This striking success further added lusture to his widespread military renown. The Persians vindicated national honour, and Nadir Shah became their hero. The splendid victories achieved within few years, the undivided loyalty of a well-organised army, and the consciousness of his genius as a military leader, all kindled in him a spark of ambition to emulate the examples of Alexander and Timur in order to be a world-conqueror.

But he could not play that supreme role without striking at the Indian Empire and possessing the treasures that lay in its vaults. With the spoils from India he could strengthen his military resources to overthrow other kingdoms and stabilise the economy of Persia. It seemed logical that once in possession of Qandahar, the gateway to Kabul, he was bound to push ahead with his operations into Afghanistan, and thence to sweep over the vast territories of the Mughals. The weakness of the Mughal monarchy itself proved a stimulant to his ambition of conquering India. Thus, the Mughal government was confronted with a real danger.

Historians by no means agree as regards to the factors which motivated Nadir Shah to invade India. Some attribute it to the non-observance of the accepted standards of diplomatic niceties on the part of Muhammad Shah, who failed to felicitate Shah Tahmaps II on the occasion of his restoration.[318] There are writers who lay stress on the Mughal Emperor's failure to drive out the Afghans beyond the Indian border as he had promised in his letters.[319] And yet another set of chroniclers contend that the invitation of Sa'adat Khan and Nizam-u'l-Mulk to Nadir Shah was responsible for the invasion.[320] The first two types of writers who accuse the Indian Emperor

317. *Nadir Shah*, Lockhart, p. 96.

318. *Siyar-u'l-Muta'akhkhirin*, p. 479; *Tazkirat-u'l-Ahwal*, p. 263.

319. *Siyar-u'l-Muta'akhkhirin*, p. 479; *Bayan-i-Waq'i*, f. 10b. *Jahan Kusha-i-Nadri*, p. 223; *Tazkirat-u'l-Ahwal*, p. 286; *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, p. 324; *Tazkirah*, Anand Ram Mukhlis, f. 118a.

320. *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran*, f. 100 a; *Tarikh-i-Hindi*, p. 559; *Jauhar-i-Samsam*, Muhammad Mushin Siddiqi, B.M.Ms. Or., 1898; *Halat-i-Nadir Shah*,

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for lack of polite disposition and breach of faith try to justify Nadir Shah's act of unprovoked aggression. They are either Persian historians or a few Indians who could not fully investigate into the real circumstances and events. The last stated category of historians are by and large Indians who appear to defend their patrons and leaders by casting aspersions on their opponents.

A controversy has emerged in respect of the motives of the invasion in which the main issue is confused. The question is how much weight should be attached to either of these causes as to defend Nadir Shah's aggression and general massacre in Delhi which bled India white, and to condemn Muhammad Shah for his delinuquency and the nobles concerned for their treason ? However, certain facts stand out which are to be examinded in the light of the available evidence. The discussion that follows here does not seek to reach a final conclusion for, in the absence of a full data, no such conclusion can be made.

Perhaps the first official report of Perso-Afghan war reached the Mughal court as early as 1729, a year after the battle of Amjhera in which Girdhar Bahadur, governor of Malwa, was killed fighting against the Marathas (November 29, 1729). One 'Alambardar Khan undertook a diplomatic mission on behalf of Shah Tahmasp to the Mughal court. Muhammad Shah was asked to close the North Western frontier to the rabble of the Afghans who might spread there and enter the country for refuge. The Shah further informed about his intentions to conquer Qandahar. The Mughal Emperor in his reply to the Shah's letter promised to do his utmost to prevent the Gilzai fugitives from crossing the Indian frontier. Instructions would accordingly be issued to officials concerned. 'Abdul Samad Khan with a force of 30 thousands was there to watch the movement of the fleeing Afghans and defend the place. Muhammad Shah praised his military achievements in the highest terms and assigned his projected campaigns on Qandahar to the wishes of the subject people who sought the Shah's protection. He expressed his goodwill on his restoration and prayed for glory to the Safawi dynasty.[3 1]

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anonymous, Asfia. Lib. Ms. ; *Tilok Das's Hindi Poem*, J.R.A.S.B., 1897, Vol. LXVI ; *The History of Nadir Shah*, Fraser, pp. 129, 133 ; *The History of Hindustan*, Alexander Dow, London, 1803, p. 412.

321 The text of Shah Tahmasp's letter is not extant. There is no reference of this transaction in any known contemporary chronicle. Nor is there any mention of *Alambardar Khan* as the Shah's envoy in the historical literature of the period. But the text of Muhammad Shah's reply to the relevant letter, which was drafted by Anand Ram Mukhlis is available. This has been edited with an introduction and notes by Shaikh Abdur Rashid, former professor of History, Aligarh Muslim University. This serves to refute the charge of Shaikh Hazin and Ghulam Husain Tabatabai against Muhammad Shah for not having kept diplomatic relations with Shah Tahmasp II. *Medieval India Quarterly*, October, 1950, Vol. I, No. 2.

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Early in 1730, Nadir Shah sent Ali Mardan Khan Shamuli from Shiraz as his envoy to the Mughal Emperor to inform him about the conquest of Isphan, the restoration of Tahmasp II to the throne and the projected conquest of Qandahar. He was asked to prevent the entry of the Afghans into his country when Qandahar was invaded and hostilities started.[322] The embassy was received with great pomp and show in the Mughal court. Sa'adat Khan, who was present in Delhi in connection with some official business, received the party and introduced them in the audience hall. When ceremony in the court was over, Sa'adat Khan took the ambassador and his party to his house in the city and entertained them. During their stay the total amount received by the Persian embassy was three lakhs of rupees in reward and one lakh for their maintenance. Sa'adat Khan also gave the ambassador three lakhs of rupees.[323] In the same year (September, 1730) Raja Jai Singh was replaced by Muhammad Khan Bangash in the governorship of Malwa where the situation was rapidly deteriorating for the Mughals. The doors were closed for any kind of peaceful adjustment with the Marathas and a new offensive was planned against them. Notwithstanding the fact that Muhammad Shah was preoccupied with this serious domestic crisis, he promised to direct the competent officers to guard the passes.[324]

Soon after the deposition of Tahmasp II (August 31, 1732) and the enthronement of his infant son under the title of Abbas III (September 2, 1732) Nadir Shah again conveyed the official news to Muhammad Shah through the envoy Muhammad 'Ali Khan of Fars. The previous request was repeated that the Indian frontier be closed to the Afghans. The letter contained the information of the Persian victory against the Afghans in Herat and other places. The projected conquest of Qandahar was again repeated. Muhammad Shah stated in reply that orders were issued to the frontier officers to bar the Afghan entry into Mughal territory, but, due to other engagements, these were not throughly carried out. The imperial troops were busy in fighting the Marathas, and could not be spared to proceed to the North-West frontier. The ambassador was received in a ceremonial way, and introduced in the Diwan-i-Khas by Roshan-u'd-

322. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah* pp. 230-48. The text of the two letters exchanged between the courts of Persia and India are given by Muhammad Bakhsh Ashub. He quotes them from *'Muhammad Shah Namah'*, a work of great value. But he does not give the name of the author ; *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, p. 324 ; *Tazkirah*, Anand Ram Mukhlis, edited by Muhammad Shafi', Anglo-Oriental College Magazine, f. 117(b). Novem. 1941.

323. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah* p. 248.

324. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah* p. 248.

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Daulah Zafar Khan. He was rewarded both in kind and cash in the same fashion at his predecessor 'Ali Muhammad Khan Shamuli had been honoured.[325]

Shaikh 'Ali Hazin informs of yet another person sent by Nadir Shah to Sa'adat Khan Burhan-u'l-Mulk. The Shah is stated to have written letters to both Muhammad Shah and Sa'adat Khan. He was overtaken by plunderers on his way to Delhi. He, however, managed to meet the Emperor and handed over to him the letter of his master. But he could not find means to return to his country.[326]

On May 11, 1737, Nadir Shah dispatched Muhammad Khan Turkoman to Delhi to announce his own coronation (March 8, 1736,) the siege of Qandahar (operations began in the last days of March 1737) and to repeat the previous appeal of closing the border to the Afghans.[327] He had strict orders to return from Delhi, after 40 days. But the envoy stayed there for a year.[328] Ashub gives two reasons for his overstay. In the first place, the government authorities could not make necessary arrangements for his ceremonial departure by giving him money and valuable gifts in a manner befitting to his mision and rank. Secondly, he fell in the corrupt luxury of the capital and wasted time in the company of dancing women. Ashub further states that he lived in Delhi for two years although he received the reply of Nadir Shah's letter.[329]

The new developments taking place in the Empire further weakened the Mughal government and increased the difficulties of Muhammad Shah. When the demands of Peshwa Baji Rao were rejected by the Em-

325. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, pp. 249-269.

326. No other writer refers to this type of information. It is significantly noted that Nadir Shah was directly negotiating with the Indian noble, Sa'adat Khan. *Tazkirat-u'l-Ahwal*, English translation, p. 285.

327. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 270.

328. *Tarikh-i-Jahankusha-i-Nadri*, p. 232.

329. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, pp. 270-72. *Bayan-i-Waqa'i*, f. 10b, 'Abdul Karim says the embassy was not given any reply because the ministers could not agree on the contents of reply and, therefore, the envoy continued to stay in Delhi. Muhammad Mahdi Astrabadi supports the view of 'Abdul Karim. Shaikh Muhammad 'Ali Hazin writes : "Sometimes they were unable to agree in their own minds on the question of writing any answer at all ; at other times they were confused and perplexed ; in case they wrote, what titles and forms of address they should use to Nadir Shah. They kept the envoy to wait the result of operations Nadir Shah was carrying out in Qandahar." *Tazkirat-i-u'l-Ahwal*, pp. 223, 286 ; *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, p. 324. He also holds as the army of India failed to obstruct the influx of the rabble of the Afghans, this embassy was not given leave to return. Anand Ram Mukhlis, in his *Tazkirah* f. 118a, states "Nadir Shah reached Qandahar, but Mhuammad Shah, it is probable, broke faith, and did not fulfil his promises, although a second messenger, named Muhammad Khan Turkoman, was sent to him ; this messenger never returned."

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peror (May-June, 1736), another attack on northern India was planned by the Poona Court. At the head of fifty thousand horse, he left Poona on November 12, 1736, crossed the Narmada, and after penetrating Malwa, entered Bhopal and received 5 lakhs of rupees from Yar Muhammad Khan. Thence he marched boldly into Bundelkhand and reduced the *zamindars* of that region.[330] The Emperor directed the *wazir* and the *Mir Bakhshi* to march against the enemy. Sa'adat Khan also hastened towards Agra in order to join them. The Peshwa sent his principal general to ravage the land across the Jumna. The Marathas swooped down on Shikohabad, exacted 1,50,000 rupees as tribute from Lal Jiu Khatri, and reduced Firozabad and A'itamadput. Their progress was, however, arrested by Burhanu'l--Mulk and his newphew, Mansur 'Ali Khan, who defeated them on March 23, 1737.[331] Baji Rao in order "to teach the Emperor a wholesome lesson", appeared at the gates of Delhi on March 28, 1737, when the imperial generals were still absent.[33] This caused great consternation and dismay in the capital. Although the Peshwa left the city suddenly, he exposed the weakness of the government. The demoralizing effect which the Peshwa's surprise attack produced on the army and the citizens of Delhi was permanent. Unable to cope with the situation, the Emperor and his ministers decided to recall Nizam-u'l-Mulk from the Deccan and entrust him with the charge of affairs. The Nizam accepted the offer. He left Burhanpur on April 17, 1737, and reached Delhi on July 12, 1737.[333]

The Afghans, routed from Isphan, Khursan, Qandahar and other regions, were wandering in search of asylum. Some of them made their way into India through difficult passes and unknown roads and came into contact with a section of the people who, were, presumably, sympathetic towards them for their sufferings. It may further be suggested that some of the fleeing columns of the Afghans might have eluded the frontier guards and entered Indian territory. The Persian officers could not pursue them beyond their own frontiers. This state of affairs caused uneasiness to Nadir Shah who repeatedly demanded that the Mughal government should take effective steps to remedy the situation.

Muhammad Shah acted with restraint. He received Nadir Shah's embassies with every mark of respect, provided them with princely comforts and gave lakhs of rupees in gifts to them. He promised to take neces-

330. *S.P.D.*, XXI, 192, XV, 93.
331. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 197. *S.P.D.* XV, 17, 22, 27, 28, 47, XXX, 198, 365-366.
332. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, pp. 198-199; *Tarikh-i-Hindi*, p. 538; *Shah Namah-i-Deccan*, p. 279.
333. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 282.

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sary action against the Shah's enemies. He never asserted his claims over Qandahar, nor did he oppose Persian attempts for its conquest. It is also clear that he gave no encouragement to the Afghan resistance in Qandahar, and no official support was provided for their entry into India. Any effort to chastise the Afghans meant the launching of a military expedition which he could not afford at a time when his difficulties were on the increase. He confessed his inability to meet the demands of Nadir Shah, due to the continued warfare with the Marathas. Even Hazin admits this simple fact. "And, in truth, the obligation of repelling them which they imposed on Muhammad Shah was beyond the capacity of his power and government."[334] Nadir Shah's insistence on the expulsion of the Afghans create doubts about his intentions.

It seems that the Persian Emperor was only using this as a pretext to prepare the ground for an attack on India. Nadir Shah was obviously aware of the limited resources of the Indian government and the serious crisis it was facing. But this situatton only encouraged him, as 'Abdul Karim writes, "to invade India and pave the way for another military success"[335]. It is difficult to ascertain the numerical strength of these men who took shelter in India. But scattered and stripped of their resources, the Afghans could no longer be a source of danger to the power of Nadir Shah. Nor was there any apprehension that the Mughal monarch, in collusion with these people, would ever attempt to disturb the *status qup* which he had already recognised.

It has been argued that Muhammad Shah did not want to risk a break with the Afghans, and kept aloof from the war that waged outside his country. But his active participation in a confiict that had no direct bearing on his fortunes was seemingly uncalled for and would have led to further complications. Judged in the light of these facts, one feels constrained to contend, that charges of breach of faith and lack of courtesy levelled against the Indian monarch provided, by no means, any justification for an unprovoked aggression. "This is highly probable, however, says Lockhart,' "that this express desire to punish the Afghans was only a pretext and that he had for sometimes harboured the design of conquering India".[336]

Khan-i-Dauran and the Defence of North-Western Provinces :

The North Western border of India occupied a position of fundamental strategic importance. The Indian rulers built up military bases

334. *Tazkirat-u'l-Ahwal*, p. 287.
335. *Bayan-i-Waqa'i*, f. 10b.
336. *Nadir Shah*, p. 123.

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in this vulnerable part to ensure security of the country and stability of their rule. The entire border was inhabited by warlike clans and tribes who were torn by mutual feuds; and whose normal condition by tradition and circumstance, was one of independence and defiance of established authority. They carried predatory raids into the rich and fertile plains. After the loss of Qandahar in 1649, the Mughal interest in the Western frontier diminished; new problems appeared to engage the attention of the government. Nevertheless, 'Amlamgir had the foresight to keep a vigilant watch on the border and crush the tribal risings of the Afridis and Yusufzais by the method of "breaking two bones by knocking together".[337] His last two governors of Kabul, Amir Khan (1667-1697), and Shah 'Alam (1699-1707) maintained law and order in that region by tact and military strength.[338] As a result of this vigorous policy the central government did not experience for a number of years either foreign invasion or large scale revolts of the hillmen.

During the first quarter of the 18th century revolutionary changes took place in Persia which disturbed the balance of power in central Asia and imperilled the security of Indian frontiers. Qandahar fell under the control of Nadir Shah and the land beyond the Indus was overrun by the Persians. Muhammad Shah remained inactive and careless ; he took no steps to counteract the threat by building up the defences in the North-Western provinces. No money was sent either to clear the dues of the garrison at Kabul or to pay the political pensions of the hillmen[339]. Nadir Shah marched unchecked upto Attock. When the danger reached its height, Muhammad Shah mobilized his forces and advanced one crore of rupees to cover the cost of war. But the imperial generals wasted one whole month in completing the arrangements of military operations. Anand Ram Mukhlis holds, "If they should have at once started for Multan, the Persian drive was sure to come to an end. The imperial army consisted of 50 thousands, together with 20 thousand horse under the command of the governor, and backed by a wise strategic plan, could fight with resolute courage and defeat the enemy."[340]

Nasir Khan[341], the governor of Kabul, had neither the tact nor the vigour to keep the garrison contented and hold the tribesmen under con-

337. *Aurangzeb*, Vol. IV. pp. 243-245.

338. *Aurangzeb*, Vol. IV, pp. 243-245.

339. *Siyar-ul-Muta'akhkhirin*, Vol. II, p. 479.

340. *Tazkirah*, f. 120b.

341. Muhammad Aman, son of Husain Beg Khan, on whom was bestowed the title of Nasir Khan by 'Alamgir for his good services, replaced Ibrahim Khan in 1710 as

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trol. He was a pious man and spent his time either in hunting or prayers. He neglected the defence of the frontier and paid no attention to the administration of the province[342]. "Hence the guards, being ill-paid, abandoned their posts, and the garrisons being utterly neglected, invited the invaders, and the report of the Minister's inattention, and of the weakness of government, being rumoured everywhere, every one, without fear of control or examine, thought only of himself without minding any consequences. The roads and passes being negelcted, every one passed and repassed unobserved; no intellengence was forwarded to court of what was happening; and neither Emperor nor minister ever asked why no intelligence of that kind ever reached their ears."[343]

Roshan-u'd-Daulah was in charge of the business of sending twelve lakhs a year to Nasir Khan to be distributed among mountaineers and the garrison at Kabul. He was accused of embezzlement by his rival Khan-i-Dauran. The Amir-u'l-Umara poisoned the Emperor's mind against him. Roshan-u'd-Daulah was asked to pay back two crores to the government. Khan-i-Dauran got the assignment to send the required money, but he, too, failed to perform his duty properly. Khan-i-Dauran was opposed to Nasir Khan, and he suggested to the Emperor that money should be stopped from being sent to Kabul. Consequently, every appeal Nasir Khan made for money to clear the dues of his soldiers was received with contempt and indifference.[344]

When pressed by the starving soldiery, Nasir Khan wrote to the central government[345] "that he himself was but a rose bush withered by the blast of autumn, while his army were no more than a faded pageant, ill-provided and without spirit; he begged that the five year's salary due to him, one year's salary might be paid; that he might satisfy his creditors and have some little money at his command"[346] Khan-i-Dauran replied to his vakil, "Do you think that I am petty simpleton that I shall be impressed by such a tale as yours? Our houses are built on the plains, we do not fear anything except what we can see with our own eyes. Your houses stand on lofty hills, and therefore you have probably sighted Mongol and Qizal-

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the governor of Afghanistan. After his death in 1717 his son was allowed to retain the post by Farrukh Siyar. Muhammad Shah confirmed him in his office in 1720, and granted him the title of his father, Nasir Khan. See for details : *Ma'asir-u'l-Umara*, Vol. III, p. 833 ; *Aurangzeb*, Vol. IV, pp. 243-245.

342. *Siyar-u'l-Muta'akhkhirin* Vol. 2. p. 479.

343. *Siyar-u'l-Muta'akhkhirin* Vol. 2, p. 479, English translation, Calcutta Vol. I, p. 300.

344. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 99.

345. *Tazkirah*, f. 118b.

346. *Tazkirah*, f. 118b

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bash armies from the roofs of your houses. Reply to your master that we are writing for money to the governor of Bengal ; and when the Bengal revenue arrives after the rainy season, the money will be quickly sent to Kabul."[347] As no money was sent to maintain the administration in the provinces, Nasir Khan having lost all hopes of preventing the Persian invasion, handed over the charge of the fort to the Qiladar, and he himself returned to Peshawar to live in comfort and pass his time in hunting and prayers.[348] The defence of the frontier was thus grieviously weakened and the strategic province was left exposed to the rapaciousness of the tribal chiefs and the ambitions of a military leader. Complete disorder prevailed in the province and the administration broke down.[349]

Nadir Shah after crowning himself the Emperor of Persia on February 26, 1736, turned his arms against Qandahar early in 1737, to destroy the power of the Afghans, the hereditary foes of Persia. If Qandahar was wrested from the Afghans, Nadir Shah could lead his armies direct into Afghanistan. Nasir Khan again wrote to the Emperor to equip the garrisson, strengthen the outposts and pay the salaries of the army as Nadir Shah's target was India after the capture of Qandahar.[350] His messengers were received with insolence and indifference ; and, he and his officers were branded as cowards. Whenever the *vakil* of Nasir Khan approached Khan-i-Dauran and gave the former's letter to him, he, seeing the agent at distance would come, take the letter into his hand, laugh, sneer and say, "Mira Saheb, what is the matter today? Your master has sent the gun of luck in motion, and forgot the favours of two hundred years, and the services of two generations in the cause of the Empire. On every pretext he wants money. He writes something on one occasion and the next on another. But the friends are ignorant and the Emperor understands nothing. How long I would continue to present the case before the Emperor. Thamasp Quli Khan is not relived of his war of destruction against enemies. How can he invade Qandahar and Herat? The old silly friends trouble the king by writing such obnoxious things."[351] He tried to convince the courtiers and the Emperor of the absence of any danger to the security of India.[352] "It was favourable circumstance to Nadir, "says Hanway, "that the Indian court had kept the mountaineers of the passes in arrears

347. *Tazkirah*, f. 119a.

348. *Siyar-u'l-Muta'akhkhirin*, Vol. II, p. 479.

349. *Siyar-u'l-Muta'akhkhirin*, Vol. II, p. 479.

350. *Siyar-u'l-Muta'akhkhirin*, Vol. II, p. 479.

351. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 275.

352. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 275.

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for their pay.[353] Had they been paid regularly and now excited to fighting by more grants of money, Nadir Shah would have found it very difficult to enter the Peshawar plains with a formidable army."[354]

The province adjacent to the frontier passes was the Punjab, governed by Zakariya Khan who had replaced his father 'Abdus Samad Khan, in 1726.[355] The governor was an active, just and vigorous administrator. Highways were protected against the depredations of the Jats and the Gujaras, outposts were guarded, and villages and towns which had been devasted by the Sikhs were reinhabited. Encouraged by the weakness of the central government he exercised absolute authority in the Punjab.[356] Being the nephew and son-in-law of Qamruddin Khan, he was opposed and hated by Khan-i-Dauran. No help in money or men was provided to the governor in his attempts to defend the province.

He, however, raised fortifications at the bank of the Ravi to resist Nadir Shah, who avoiding the direct road to Lahore, marched eastward to outflank the Indian army He crossed Lakodehar, after defeating a *zamindar* of Adinanagar who, with his contingent, was going to join the governor.[357] On the bank of the Ravi, the Persian army came up close to that of the Indian, and a battle followed in which Zakariya Khan was repulsed with great salughter; his soldiers fled away; while his son, Yahya Khan, cutting his way through the Persian ranks, left the field, and marched towards Delhi[358]. On the next day, January 21, 1739, fighting was renewed; but, the governor realized that further resistance was fruitless. He sued for peace and agreed to pay twenty lakhs of rupees as indemnity.[359] The Persian Emperor graciously accepted the money and other presents. "Zakariya Khan was rewarded with Chapkan of gold brocade, a jewelled dagger and a horse". The governorship was restored to him, and his son Hayatullah

353. *History of Afghanistan*, Malleson, p. 269.

354. *History of Afghanistan*, Malleson, p. 269.

"Though discontented with reason with the court of Delhi, the tribes of the mountains felt but little inclined to offer a welcome to Nadir Shah. He too disdained them, refused to enter into negotiations with them, and resolved to force his way in spite of them. He tried to force his way. The tribes baffled him. They cut down trees, blocked up the defiles, destroyed the roads, and, crowning the heights, annoyed him with constant fire. Now they attacked his rear, now they fell upon his flanks, again they had raised. Number of his men perished. For nearly a month the tribes stopped him."

355. For details see, *Ma'asir-u'l-Umara*, Vol. II, p. 326.

356. *History of the Punjab*, Syed Muhammad Latif, Calcutta, 1891, p. 193.

357. *Tazkirat-u'l-Ahwal*, p. 293.

358. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 73 ; *Bayan-i-Waqa'i*, f. 10a ; *Shah Nama-i-Deccan*, p. 295.

359. *Jahan Kusha-i-Nadri*, p. 231

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Khan Bahadur was granted a *mansab* of 5,000 in the Persian army. Thus Lahore was saved from the horrors of massacre and plunder.[360]

These events refute the charge made by the author of *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran* that Zakariya Khan was in league with Nizam-u'l-Mulk and Sa'adat Khan in inviting Nadir Shah and admitting him in Lahore.[361] Zakariya Khan had been advised by the invader to surrender, with the promise of favours and lavish rewards and a warning of the consequences of resistance. However, he ignored the terms of peace and resisted Nadir Shah by mustering whatever resources he had at his disposal. He was misrepresented at the court of Khan-i-Dauran and his appeals for help found no favour with him. "Thus, in the Emperor's hour of supreme need, factions, jealousy and foolish distrust prevented any real attempt being made to repel the invader from the frontier, or even to check him there long enough to enable defensive preparations to be completed at Delhi and the army of the empire marshalled in the Punjab."[362]

Nasir Khan had only asked for money to be paid to the garrison at Kabul and to the tribal chiefs who controlled the passes. He made no mention about the dispatch of a military expedition, or of the mobilization of large forces in the strategic part of the Empire. He knew the Mughal army was too deeply enmeshed in war with the Marathas and could hardly be spared to strengthen his position. His representation for money in arrears was just and the central government was duty-bound to make the customary remttances as a part of regular business even in normal times. Whether or not there was danger from Persia, the guards and the garrison expected regular payment of their salaries and pensions. The importance of this administrative routine work was only enhanced with the increasing danger of a foreign invasion. The grounds on which Khan-i-Dauran rejected the governor's request for financial help were unsound. He argued that Nadir Shah had no intentions of invading India; that Nasir Khan probably wanted the money for his personal use; and the governor magnified the danger out of proportion and troubled the mind of the Emperor. The Amrir-u'l-Umara has been criticised by writers like Ashub, Anand Ram Mukhlis, Ghulam Husain Tabatabai and others for irresponsibility and inefficiency.

It is obvious that the Mughal government did not take the danger seriously. The ministers, involved in factional struggles, were not dismayed

360. *Jahan-Kusha-i-Nadri*, p. 231.

361. *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran*, f. 100a,

Tarikh-i-Shakir Khani, f. 41b. The author being a strong supporter of Khan-i-Dauran's faction repeats this charge against Sa'adat Khan and Nizam-u'l-Mulk.

362. *Later Mughals*, p 326, Part II.

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by the developments taking place beyond the Indian border. Khan-i-Dauran, in his capaicity as commander of the Mughal armies failed to give a lead on this vital issue on which rested the future of the government. His policy towards Nasir Khan and Zakarya Khan produced an atmosphere of complacency and no preparations were made to stem the tide of the Persian military force.

The Role of Sa'adat Khan and Nizam-u'l-Mulk at the Battle of Karnal :

The anonymous author of *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran* records that Sa'adat Khan had been persuading Nadir Shah for sometime to invade India and to overthrow the Mughal government. He sent to the Persian Emperor gifts worth of lakhs and informed him of disorders in the State and discord among the ministers of Muhammad Shah. He instigated other nobles to join him in this secret move. The governor of Kabul was also drawn into the conspiracy. On these grounds, Khan-i-Dauran opposed Sa'adat Khan 's coming to Karnal. The Emperor, ignorant of the intentions and character of Sa'adat Khan and others, daily issued *farmans* urging him to hasten to the scene of war.[363]

Notwithstanding the opposition of Khan-i-Dauran, Sa'adat Khan finally reached Karnal on February 22, 1739, with a force of 20 thousand horsemen. He sent reports of his arrival almost immediately to the camp of Nadir Shah. He suggested to the enemy that next day the Persian army should start fighting with artillery and other weapons of war and plunder the equipage. The Persian forces should employ strategem, and he would himself by means of artifice and fraud strive to help them.[364]

Muhammad Shah having heard of his arrival ordered Khan-i-Dauran to receive him. Sa'adat Khan was asked to present himself forthwith at the royal camp. In the presence of the Emperor he professed his loyalty and took oath of fealty on the Holy Quran. He proclaimed that he would remain faithful and support the cause of the Mughal Crown. He further informed the Emperor about his serious illness. He also admitted that the present status he enjoyed was entirely due to the royal patronage. He now had the rank of 7 thousand horse, commanded an army of 50 thousands, and possessed an immense treasure. But the professions of fidelity he made were hypocritic and the oath he took was false.[365]

The author proceeds to state that Sa'adat Khan secured the *mansab* of 7 thousand and the *subedari* of Agra mainly because of the recommen-

363. *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran*, ff. 100a, 103a.

364. *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran*, f. 104b.

365. *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran*, f. 105b.

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dations of Khan-i-Dauran and Muhammad Amin Khan. The other promotions, increase in rank and rewards, Sa'adat Khan received during subsequent years, were the results of Khan-i-Dauran's sympathetic attitude towards him. Khan-i-Dauran wanted to create feelings of confidence and love in the heart of Sa'adat Khan. But, ungrateful and mean-minded, Sa'adat Khan did not give up hostility. Consequently, no reconciliation was effected between the two nobles. Khan-i-Dauran at one time became annoyed at his opponent's persistent ill-will, and he thought to complain to the Emperor, but, he could not get a chance.[366]

A close examination makes the above stated account unreliable. *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran* is a biographical account of Khan-i-Dauran. It is written in a highly exaggerated and colourful style ; it reads like an eulogy in praise of his achievements, his bravery, charity highmindedness, and other commendable acts. Being a staunch supporter of Khan-i-Dauran, the author criticises those who did not belong to his patron's group and were hostile to him.

The animosity between Khan-i-Dauran and Sa'adat Khan, which the author notes at several places in his work, was outstanding and deep-seated. This fact was known to all. In matters of state policy they never agreed ; they quarrelled and intrigued against each other in the court, and outside it. Sa'adat Khan had a definite cause of hatred against Khan-i-Dauran who proved an hurdle to the realization of his ambition for securing the post of *Mir Bakhshi*. The lure of the Mughal court, a source of power and centre of culture, captivated this able general. But him Khan-i-Dauran always kept at bay. Sa'adat Khan felt bitterly to see a mediocre like Khan-i-Dauran, whose brows did not glister with laurels of victory in any military campaign, in office of *Mir Bakhshi*. Khan-i-Dauran, on the other hand, regarded, his adversary an upstart, a newcomer, and unfit to be put in charge of the office of trust and authority. Muhammad Mushin Sadiq, author of *Jauhar-i-Samsam*,[367] describes Sa'adat's ambition in his own typical style. "Bahadur Jang Burhan-u'l-Mulk Khan's foiled from the first dawn of his prosperity entertained the desire of the dignity of Amir-u'l-Umara, and having waited for his opportunity a obtaining long time had kept sowing this wish in the field of his heart".

We have already noticed it was on the suggestion of Muhammad Amin Khan that Sa'adat Khan obtained his title and *mansab* of 5,000 *zat* and 3,000 *!awar*. This, however, was bestowed on him after the murder

366. *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran*, f. 104b.

367. *Jauhar Samsam*, Muhammad Muhsin Sadiq, B.M.Ms. Elliot and Dowson, Vol. VIII, p. 75.

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of Husain 'Ali Khan when Muhammad Shah held his first Darbar on October 9, 1720. Only few days had passed when the Emperor again increased his rank to 6,000 *zat* and 5,000 *sawar* (October 15, 1720). At this time he also received the *subedari* of Agra. Khan-i-Dauran had recently joined the imperialists and attained no such position in the council of the Emperor which could enable him to recommend appointments and promotions for others. All that Sa'adat Khan acquired was absolutely due to his alliance with Muhammad Amin Khan and his own personal merits. As regards his future advancement, Khan-i-Dauran could not have been an instrument to help him secure it[368]. In view of their mutual antagonism, such a conclusion seems rather improbable. It was unmistakable that Khan-i-Dauran should have lifted himself above partisan prejudices and liberally supported the case of an opponent.

The charges of sending gifts to Nadir Shah and informing him of the court affairs are not supported by other standard authorities. 'Abdul Karim Kashmiri, author of *Bayan-i-Waqa'i*, is impartial; for he does not seem to be entangled in group politics; nor does he enjoy the patronage of any Mughal noble. He criticises the nobles in general for their indolence and faction feuds, but makes no mention of these serious accusations against Sa'adat Khan. Other important contemporary writers like Muhammad Bakhsh Ashub, Anand Ram Mukhlis and Mir Muhammad Ahsan Ijad also do not confirm the statement given in the *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran*. They censure in strong terms the haste and obstinacy Sa'adat Khan displayed in throwing himself in the arena of war without plans and preparations, but they do not ascribe his rash offensive to the secret alliance he is alleged to have entered with the invaders. In the absence of a definite evidence on record that may throw light on exchange of letters between Nadir Shah and Sa'adat Khan, the relevant version of treachery under discussion tends to become biased and doubtful. The cumulative evidence appears to be rather in favour of Sa'adat Khan.

368. The author glorifies Khan-i-Dauran by saying that through his favour, during a period of 26 years, 700 persons were raised to high position. On three occasions he helped Nawab Sarbuland Khan, recommended his appointment to the *Subedari* of Gujarat, and gave him few lakhs of rupees. Liekwise he supported the case of Nawab Qamruddin Khan in securing the office of *wizarat*. Roshan-ud-Daulah acquired status and prestige due to his favourable recommendations. Nizam-u'l-Mulk received the *farman* of the governorship of the 6 *subahs* in the Deccan, for Khan-i-Dauran had espoused his cause in the court. It was further due to his generosity that a *jagir* of two *mahals* in *khalsa* land, in Bareilly and Shikohabad, worth of two lakhs of rupees, was granted to Nizam-u'l-Mulk. But facts belie this statement. The account is exaggerated and aimed at eulogising the magnanimous nature of Khan-i-Dauran in whose praise the work has been compiled. *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran*, f. 136a.

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The incident of oath-taking has been referred to by Harcharan Das, author of *Chahar Gulzar-i-Shuja'i* which was composed in the year 1784. He states that Muhammad Shah felt happy and encouraged on Sa'adat Khan's arrival in the royal camp. But as the governor originally belonged to Iran, the Emperor and some of his ministers suspected his fealty to the crown. He asked Sa'adat Khan to swear by the Holy Quran and by his head that he would remain faithful in future. Because he had a pure conscience, the governor unhesitatingly took the oath.[369]

This version of Harcharan Das also does not seem to lend positive support to the view of the author of *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran*. It only suggests that the Mughal Emperor, under the influence of Khan-i-Dauran and his followers, might have harboured mere suspicion which he probably wanted to dispel by this simple procedure. Had the Emperor firmly believed in his treasonable attempts, the oath-taking formality could hardly have taken place binding Sa'adat Khan morally to the obligations of the imperial cause. Other effective measures would have been adopted to deal with the so-called traitor and thwart his attempts to overthrow the Mughal rule in league with the foreign aggressor.

No act of betrayal of royal interests or perfidy could be ascribed to him so far as to arouse his suspicions against him. Till now he was regarded a tower of strength for the monarchy which he ever served devotedly.[370] Recently his courage and dash brought success to the Mughal arms against the Marathas. No such serious strife arose between him and the Emperor which would have resulted in open rupture. His supremacy within the frontiers of the province under control was undoubtedly absolute.

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369. *Chahar Gulzar-i-Shuja'i*, p. 162

از رسیدنش تقویت و مسرت گردید - لیکن چون برهان الملک بهادر اهل ایران بود - بنا بر بادشاه محمد شاه و از گمان حضور نسبت بهم قومیت نادرشاه داد - و ازو متوهم شده بادشاه برهان الملک فرمود که شما قسم بقران مجید و سر ما بر زبان آرید که ثانی الحال نر دوغانه بازید - او که سینه صاف بود - بموجب حکم بعل آورد -

370. Rustam Ali Khan , author of *Tarikh-i-Hindi*, p. 509, gives one instance when he flouted the sovereign authority. He states that as a result of his quarrel wih Muzaffar Khan, brother of Khan-i-Dauran, Sa'adat Khan was appointed governor of Malwa. But instead of proceeding towards Malwa, he crossed Jamuna and marched to Oudh in the 9th year of Muhammad Shah's reign.

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But he did not assume a threatening attitude calculated to the repudiation of his allegiance to the crown. He visited the Mughal court, paid his homage to the master, offered costly presents and received handsome rewards in return. He actively participated in the formation of the state policies, and expressed boldly his own views on different issues. Nevertheless, it does not construe that Sa'adat Khan had no aspirations for more power than what he possessed. The fire of ambition was ablaze in his breast. But the available evidence does not bear testimony to the allegation that for the achievement of his objective he entered into a treasonable plot with Nadir Shah.

The entire controversy has sprung up apparently because of the haste he made to drive forward and deliver an ill-planned offensive on the Persian army. He acted against the requests of the nobles and the wishes of the Emperor. The dictates of emergency also demanded a wise and prudent course of action. His rash offensive resulted in utter confusion ; it upset the strategy and put the defence of the Indian forces in jeopardy. This act raises doubts perhaps he was meditating treason and working in accordance with terms of an agreement he might have concluded with Nadir Shah. The question arises what was the pressing need for haste in the face of such an emergency. The stake was not so mortal as to spur him sacrifice his life and the security of the Indian army. Having full knowledge of the enemy's potential might in counter-stroke, the impetuous general was either a knave or naive to plunge himself headlong to seek a fight for protecting his baggage. The plunder of only 500 loaded camels was not such a heavy loss of property which should have justified him to provoke hostilities and vindicate his honour under the terrifying circumstances that attended the present armed contest.

The impatience and obstinacy Sa'adat Khan manifested under these circumstances would have mounted to treason. But two factors stand out distinctly to refute this aspect of the case. In the first place, he did not desert the Mughal camp with his whole contingent and slipped over to the opposite side. He fought boldly against the enemy with whatever resources he could muster at that moment. Secondly, the Emperor, being convinced of his sincere intentions and earnest endeavours, decided to march in person to the rescue of his general, and when prevented to venture forth by Nizam-u'l-Mulk and Khan-i-Dauran, he urged them to send reinforcement.

The events pertaining to the above stated discussion may be summed up here.

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On Monday evening (February 12, 1739) Nadir Shah was informed that Sa'adat Khan had arrived at Panipat with 30,000 men to join the Mughal Emperor.[371] To obstruct his further advancement, a strong column was sent by the Shah.[372] Sa'adat Khan, however, reached Karnal on the midnight, but his baggage was plundered by the Persians and 500 loaded camels were carried away by them.[373]

The next morning Sa'adat Khan was received in audience by the Emperor.[374] He was still busy in discussing the strategy with other ministers and generals when the news of the disaster to his straggling force were conveyed to him.[375] Highly agitated by these news, he resolved to cast his sword in the scale, despite the efforts of Nizamu'l-Mulk and Khan-i-Dauran to prevent him from such a rash move.[376] Paying no heed to their words of caution, he took a hurried leave of the Emperor who also appealed him to stay at the royal camp. However, with one thousand horse and a few hundreds foot who were in attendance on him, he came out of the imperial tents, mounted on an elephant and sent heralds to announce that he was going to fight the Persians ; and without artillery he rushed on the enemy. Later on, a force of 4,000 horse and 10,000 foot joined him'[377]

The Persian army, in order to decoy him, feigned flight ; they were chased and followed. But in doing so he went two miles away from his position. The ruse succeeded, and the impatient warrior, on whose bravery the Mughals had set much store, fell in the trap. His strength of offensive

371. *Jahankusha-i-Nadri*. p. 235 ; *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran* f. 104, a. The author gives the number of the soldiers under the command of Sa'adat Khan as 20,000.

372. *Jahankusha-i-Nadri*, p. 235.

373. *Jahankusha-i-Nadri*, p. 235 ; *Tarikh-i-Hindi*, p. 562.

374. *Tazkirah*, f. 125a.

375. *Chahar Gulzar-i-Shuja'i*, pp. 162-63. Those present in the meeting were : Nizamu'l-Mulk, Qamr-ud-Din Khan, Khan-i-Dauran, Mubarizu'l-Mulk Sarblund Khan, Amir Khan, Muzaffar Khan, Sa'adat Khan, Hafizud-Din Khan Dilwar Jang, Muhammad Saeed Khan, 'Inayat Yar Khan, Muhammad Ishaq Khan, and Sa'adud-Din Khan. *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, p. 382 ; *Shah Namah-i-Deccan*, p. 301 ; *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 97.

376. *Chahar Gulzar-i-Shuja'i*, p. 163. The author says that Nizam-u'l-Mulk, the Emperor and other nobles present at that time argued that haste would only cause disaster utter and final, to the Mughal cause. His troops were worn out with the exertion of a long journey. The plunder of 500 camels was not a big financial loss. If they won victory, entire baggage of Nadir Shah would fall into their hands. In case of defeat whatever was in their possession would be lost. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa-Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 98, *Bayan-a-Waqa'i*, f. 11a.

377. *Chahar Gulzar-i-Shuja'i*, p. 164 ; *Shah Namah-i-Deccan*, p. 306 ; *Bayan-i-Waqa'i*, f. 11b ; *Tazkirah*, f. 125b.

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exhausted and his ranks fell into confusion.[378] He sent urgent appeals for reinforcement to the Emperor. 'Abdul Karim asserts that Muhammad Shah expressed the desire to go himself to the scene of fighting. But on the persuasion of Nizam-u'l-Mulk and Khan-i-Dauran he changed his mind.[379] According to Ashub, Sa'adat Khan sent two persons to report to the Emperor but both of them were killed by the Persian soldiers[380]. Alarmed at the ruin that might overwhelm the Mughal army, the Emperor asked Nizam-u'l-Mulk to help one of the ablest generals of the Empire in his hour of danger. Nizam-u'l-Mulk stated that Khan-i-Dauran, who was nearest to Sa'adat Khan on the right wing of the battlefield, should advance to the assistance of the embattled general[381]. In response to the royal summons, the *Mir Bakhshi* set out from his position with 8,000 to 9,000 cavalry and made haphazard plunge into the arena of war[382].

Meanwhile Sa'adat Khan, despite heavy odds arrayed against him, kept on fighting desperately till he was surrounded by numerous Afshar horsemen under command of Nadir Shah. The Persian soldiers delivered tremendous stroke of their guns so rapidly that no breathing space for recovery was afforded. The followers of Sa'adat Khan became enervated to make a last stand and they fled panic-stricken[383]. According to 'Abdul Karim his elephant went out of control, and carried him into the Persian ranks, where he was made prisoner[384]. Ghulam Husain Tabatabai

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378. *Bayan-i-Waqa'i*, f. 11b.

379. *Bayan-i-Waqa'i*, f. 11b.

380. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 101.

381. *Bayan-i-Waqa'i*, f. 12a.

382. *Tazkirah*, f-125b, 126a.

383. *Tarikh-i-Shahdat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, pp. 103-104; *Tarikh-i-Fathiyah*, p. 88.

سعادت خان را که بذات خود تردد هائے بهادرانه کرده و اکثر
از رفقایش کشته و زخمی گردیده بودند و خود نیز زخمهائے منکر
داشت ۔

Ma'asir-i-Asafi, Lachmi Narain Shafiq, Osmania University Ms. p. 192.

و بے توقف نبرد آزما گردید که قضارا تیر تفنگ برتنش رسید ۔
بے هوش شده ۔ فیل در افتاد ۔

384. *Bayan-i-Waqa'i*, f. 13a; *Tarikh-i-Fathiyah*, f. 90 The author of this work writes:
اگرچه اکثر می گویند این جنگی که سعادت خان کرد جنگ

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writes "that a young Turk from Nishapur and of course, a townsman of Sa'adat Khan, having forced his passage, stood intrepidly before him, whilst the latter was shooting on all sides with his bow, and having recollected his features cried out to him : "Muhammad Amin, against whom art thou fighting and on what soldiers dost thou reckon ? Art thou mad ?" He prevailed upon Sa'adat Khan to surrender. The Mughal noble was seized and carried to the camp of Nadir Shah".[385] From the manner in which Sa'adat Khan fought and suffered defeat it is clear beyond doubt that he did not act in collusion with the foreign foe.

Harcharan Das says that Sa'adat Khan took up the sword because his passions were roused by reports of disaster to his army. He. was impatient and rash by nature and bellicose in spirit.[386] Ashub also writes that Sa'adat Khan could not sleep whole night for fear of the enemy's attack on his army and baggage he had left behind.[387] But no one acts in vaccum. Even our passions are governed by some thinking. A particular situation excites emotions of fear and hope, and the action one takes in such a situation is the result of his thinking as well as of passions. The situation in which Sa'adat Khan found himself was quite complicated. It was at the meeting of Mughal generals where his passions were stirred and his thoughts formed. The news of plunder of his baggage undoubtedly agitated him, but there should have been other forces operating underneath which inspired his thinking and led him to take that vital decision.

The details of what transpired in the council of war which Sa'adat Khan also attended are not known. But it may be inferred that along with military plans the generals might have discussed prospects of compromise with Nadir Shah. Already peace parleys between the Muhhal government and the Persian Emperor were in progress. According to Nizamuddin *Ishrat*, author of *Nadir Namah*, Nadir Shah wrote a letter to

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زرگری بود - و رفتن با سیوے اختیارے بود - اغلب که دروغ باشد - واللہ اعلم بالصواب -

385. *Siyar-u'l-Muta'akhkhirin*, Vol. II, p. 311.
386. *Chchar Gulzar-i-Sufa'i*, p. 163 ; *Tarikh-i-Shakir Khani*, f. 42b.

بسمع این خبر وحشت اثر برهان الملک بی تابانه رخصت گرفت - هرچند آصف جاه گفت که امروز روز جنگ مانیست - فردا انشاالله تعالی مخالف رازده زده میریم -

387. *Tarikh i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa-Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 98.

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Muhammad Shah requesting him to come to his camp and through negotiations make a peaceful settlement of the problem. Muhammad Shah refused to go personally and hold peace talks with him.[388] Khan-i-Dauran's statement also points out that efforts at peace-making were made by the belligerents before Sa'adat Khan fired first blasts of his offensive. Particularly, the Mughal nobles were genuinly desirous of a truce so that Nadir Shah departed without further perpetrating acts of rapine and ruin. At his death-bed Khan-i-Dauran addressed Nizam-u'l-Mulk in these words : "As to me, my business is done. Indeed we have done it ourselves.

388. *Nadir Namah*, Malik-al-Shu'ra Nizamuddin *Ishrat* Siyalkoti, Asofia Ms. No. 2081, Pers. Hist. ff. 82, 84, 85. This is a voluminous versified history of the period, especially dealing with Nadir Shah's invasion on India. But there is more poetry than history in it. Nadir Shah, in his letter, sought to induce the Mughal Emperor to lay aside arms and make peace with him. The Emperor had no experience of war ; and he should not rely on his army, destitute of strength. He should feel no reservations in meeting with an Emperor, of his rank and dignity. Nadir Shah threatened to destroy India, if Muhammad Shah failed to come to him and settle the terms of peace. Some of the lines pertaining to this issue are given here :

مرا تاج شاهی خدا داده است ز مغرب بمشرق فرستاده است
مکن پیش فرمان روا سرکشی مشوهم ترا زوی آب آتشی
که جنگ کی لشکر آید بکار جو سردار را دل بود در فرار
برین تنگ پوشان مکن اعتماد شود غنچه گل از ملاقات باد
بیابی تکلف بدرگاه ما بدل شام کن با سحرگاه ما
خاص از غضب شو با خلاص ما پس آنگه توئی خاص ما ناص ما
شهانرا ملاقات هم عار نیست مه از خدمت مهر بیزار نیست
گهر چون بگوهر مقابل شود (ترازوئی او پارهٔ دل شود)
.. ..
مکش زینار از خط نامه سر وگرنه پرد چون قطر خامه سر
همه کشور هند ویران کنم منت لقمه کام شیران کنم

Muhammad Shah replied that he enjoyed a higher ancestral dignity than the Persian king, possessed a vast empire and was the master of a large people. His exalted status forbade him to go personally to the camp of an upstart.

تو اے بی حسب مغد بی بصر نسب نامهٔ ما نخواندی مگر
ز آدام اگر بر شماری مرا پدر بر پدر آمدم پادشاه

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Now take care of your concerns. Let me tell you a few words: Beware of letting the Emperor go to visit Nadir Shah, and beware of letting Nadir Shah proceed to the city (Delhi). Better to avert that calamity from hence, and to make him go back. *Procure this by every means in your power.*"[389]

No information about money matters is contained in the diplomatic correspondence exchanged between the two emperors. But, in the light of this account and what happened afterwards, it may be surmised that Nadir Shah might have demanded money as a price of his departure. The focal point in negotiations that went on between the two governments at Karnal was probably the amount of money. This is strikingly clear from the statement of Khan-i-Dauran. Nadir Shah, after he gained victory over Indian army, could not be stopped from marching to Delhi by any means except by paying a heavy indemnity. The version of anonymous author of *Hadisah-i-Nadir Shah* tends to support this view. According to him, Nadir Shah was pressing the Mughal Emperor to send money to him. He wrote to Muhammad Shah that long wars with the Afghans had impoverished his treasury and drained resources of the country. He was in utter need of money. The Emperor of India should clear the debts owned by his ancestors to the Persian government, and pay an annual tribute which was still in arrears. besides one crore of rupees. Failing that, he would be free to take a military action against him.[390]

Nadir Shah's immediate concern was perhaps to gather as much spoils as he could, and the Mughal generals also hoped that he could be packed back if his greed for gold was gratified. At the same time they feared the frightful consequences in case of an offensive launched against the Persian army. In view of this circumstance, Nizam-u'l-Mulk remonstarted with Sa'adat Khan to put off fighting till the Mughal ministers finalised plans of an overall strategy and fully discussed the implications of peace terms of money. Sa'adat Khan viewed Nizam's attempts to buy a precarious peace with disdain. He criticised his inactivity and lack of sincerity in the performance of duties as a Mughal commander. He

389. *Siyar-u'l-Muta'akhkhirin*, pp. 310-311.
390. *Hadisah-i-Nadir Shah*, ff. 4, a, 7a.

که مبلغ خطیر از ایام پیش طریق قرض بر ذمه بزرگان شما
طلب است - و سوائے این زر سالیانه از مدت ارسال نداشتند -
بهتر آنکه این همه زرها و سوائے آن کرور روپیه دیگر برائے
این جانب بزودی و سرعت هر چه تمامتر بفرسند -

Also, *Bayan-i-Waqa'i*, Elliot and Dowson, Vol. VIII, p. 132.

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openly accused him of having bungled the matters ; the Nizam was trying to keep out of the battle. "The Nizam now adopted similar methods," declared Sa'adat Khan, "of deceit and diplomacy by which he had usurped the kingdom of the South. The Maratha problem was not settled because he took no strong action against them. He never endeavoured to fight to finish with them. Had he fought to the last end the Marathas would not have become so powerful."[391]

Whén prevented by Nizam-u'l-Mulk and others from going to the battle against the enemy unprepared and in great hurry, Sa'adat Khan replied in a pessimistic vein", I am a loser in both the cases. If I do not chastise the enemy swiftly I lose my chance, if in fighting I suffer defeat I am vanquished. Nothing except fighting suits to my present condition. Today and tomorrow, all days have been created by God. For me, today is the time to fight and be killed; tomorrow, you do whatever you plan and consider wise for yourself"[392]

The fact that Sa'adat Khan opposed Nizam-u'l-Mulk's efforts at peace making and his strategy of delay and postponement contradicts the allegation that they were co-partners in conspiracy against the king. Their secret alliance demanded close collaboration. But Nizam-u'l-Mulk failed to help him in the hour of danger to his life. If they did not carry their plans jointly and work hand-in-glove with each other, it is doubtful whether any plot was formed by them. Sa'adat Khan's rashness can not be branded as treason, although it proved equally disasterous.

Nevertheless, this analysis does not unravel the web. Perhaps there is no definite answer to the question why Sa'adat Khan got into the fight

391. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar was Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 98. Sa'adat Khan also declared that he would not take even water till he wrecked vengeance on the enemy.

تا انتقام خود از حریف نگریزم آب خوردن بر من حرام ـ

392. *Chahar Gulzar-i-Shuja'i*, pp. 163—164.

مادر هر صورت مغلوبیم ـ اگر به جواب بسرعت مخالفت نمی رسم پس مغلوب شدم و اگر جنگ کرده مغلوب گردیدم مغلوبیم ـ پس مناسب حال خود سوائے جنگ نمی بینم و فردا و امروز همه از خدا است ..... امروز کشته شدن ما است ـ فردا هر چه که تدبیر و صلاح شمایان خواهد بود بعمل خواهید آورد ـ

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and forced the Mughal army for a general engagement. The available evidence also does not unsnare the tangle. It may only be guessed that Sa'adat Khan wanted to redeem his position and outshine Khan-i-Dauran in the battlefiled. He found that supreme control of affairs had passed into the hands of his rivals, and he had no central part to play either in diplomatic dealings or in plans of military operations. He sensed with suspicion the state of unpreparedness and complacency that guided the attitude of the Mughal generals. A peaceful adjustment of the problem afforded no outlet for the accomplishment of his aims. The prevailing situation boded ill for his future. Perhaps, he hoped to improve his prospects of self-advancement by seeking a showdown and displaying his military prowess.

Nizam-u'l-Mulk deliberately kept out of the battle that waged before his eyes at Karnal. Two of the Mughal generals bore the burnt of the enemy's onslaught in which perished a considerable number of soldiers and captains. But nothing moved the veteran, an old wolf, as Ashub calls him. He rather seemed to have delighted over their discomfiture and suffering. He openly defied the royal orders by not reinforcing the embattled generals. Ashub writes that soldiers cursed him for not leading them to the front, although he was a war-hardened warrior who spent his whole life in fighting. The soldiers deprecated his indifference and laughed at him.[393]

It was this cold and passive attitude of Nizam-u'l-Mulk which awakened suspicion as regards his loyalty to the Emperor and his alliance with Nadir Shah. His opponents seized the opportunity to ascribe his aloofness from fighting to some kind of conspiracy with the invader. The wounded and the panic-stricken soldiers who were largely in the service of Sa'adat Khan and Khan-i-Dauran also thought in similar terms, and blamed Nizam-u'l-Mulk for their defeat and anguish. They spread rumours that Nizam-u'l-Mulk betrayed the cause of the Mughal government and allied himself with the foreigners. The rumours so broadcast by these elements got in no time wide circulation. The people could not discover the truth behind the false tales circulated by persons belonging to a particular faction at the court. They failed to understand the logic in the inaction of Nizam-u'l-Mulk. This kind of propaganda, so rapidly spread and so credibly trusted, was, in fact, only an outward manifestation of the inner rivalries among the nobles, ever bent upon feeding their personal grudge through any means they could adopt.

393. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 94.

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Nizam-u'l-Mulki policy was strongly condemned, and the radicals, most of them being his opponents, went so far as to accuse him of teachery. The works like *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran* and *Jauhar-i-Samsam* were written with a definite purpose to discredit Nizam-u'l-Mulk and glorify the deeds of Khan-i-Dauran, the patron of the writers. Rustum 'Ali Khan, author of *Tarikh-i-Hindi* does not categorically blame him for inviting Nadir Shah, but qualifies his statement by saying that he heard like this from others,[394] although he plainly and positively pronounces him guilty of being the root cause of the defeat inflicted by the Marathas on the Mughals at Bhopal. These writers make sweeping statements that Nizam-u'l-Mulk wrote letters to Nadir Shah but do not give details about their contents.[395] As these letters are not available in the contemporary or non-contemporary source-material, such statements can be regarded biased and incorrect, specially when they are made by members of the opposite faction.

His non-involvement in the hostilities did not spring from any concert with the Persians, but rather from motives of personal safety. He wanted to avoid fighting in case a compromise could be arranged with the enemy. He disapproved the hasty and disorderly way of fighting by Sa'adat Khan who did not agree with him on strategy plans and turned deaf ears to his proposals. Further, in case of Khan-i-Dauran to whose rescue he could not go, it may be suspected that Nizam-u'l-Mulk, on account of inveterate animosty with him, had the ill-concealed desire of taking revenge on him. Nizam-u'l-Mulk resented that the two generals upset the plans of conducting the campaign and thereby ruined the Mughal armies. He was also not happy over the way the Emperor handled the situation. Both Sa'adat Khan and Knan-i-Dauran marched in haste and confusion from their respective camps, but panic seized them when they came to close quarter with the Persian forces. There was no unity of command, and no combination in movements. They made no attempts to collect all their

394. *Tarikh-i-Hindi*, p. 559.

بقول باشاره نظام‌الملک و سعادت خان بدین سمت در حرکت آمد ـ

395. *Tarikh-i-Hindi*, p. 549.

چون طبیعت کج نظام‌الملک مایل بضد اسمش هست تن به برهم زنی امور مملکت داده دیده دانسته خود را مغلوب نما کرد ـ

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troops, marshal them in proper battle array, and equip them with artillery. They had no information about the disposition of the Persian army, or of its strength.[396]

Under these circumstances, it was, imprudent on the part of Nizam-u'l-Mulk to move out with his troops and lay down his life under the storm of the enemy's bullets. He told the messenger sent by Muhammad Shah, "Whatever the king likes, he is free to speak and make orders, but he does not understand the art of warfare. The stupid fellows went to launch campaign without order and discipline, and by their folly destroyed a force of 40,000. What has happed to them ? What calamity has overtaken them that they are so nervous as to ask for support repeatedly. The king is angry with me for not carrying out his commands. The reality is that they did not listen to my advice. For the assistance of 40 thousands there should be an army of one lakh, which I am unable to bring forth.".[397] He then asked for a cup of coffe and burst into laughter. With him stayed Qamruddin Khan, the *Wazir*, and Sa'd-ud-Din Khan, the *Mir Atash*, in the Mughal camp and observed the grim spectacle like passive spectators. Nizam-u'l-Mulk's dilema was to choose between the stigma of disloyalty and the sacrifice of his troops and his person. Being convinced of the futility of waging war with a formidable foe, he decided to save himself and his men, and earn an everlasting infamy for flouting the orders of his master at this critical time. He assumed he could not re-establish the shattered front-line, boost up the morale of a defeated army and stiffen its resistance. Self-interest and expediency thus far outweighed all other considerations.

Except his withdrawal from hostilities provoked by Sa'adat Khan at the battlefield of Karnal, no other act of treason stands out against Nizam-u'l-Mulk. Actuated by motives to save the Empire from the approaching doom, Nizam-u'l-Mulk accepted the invitation of Muhammad Shah to come to Delhi and take charge of conducting the state affairs. His friends tried to desist him from taking such a course of action. They argued that at present he possessed 6 subahs, as vast as Hindustan ; the Mughal court was the hot-bed of group politics; and a wise person like him should not plunge in that vortex of intrigues and factions. Nizam-u'l-Mulk replied that he had no ambition but to serve the Empire which was tottering to its fall, and no other aim but to seek the goodwill of the Emperor by obeying his orders.[398] On April 7, 1737, he

396. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 95.
397. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 107.
398. *Ahwal-u'l-Khawaqin*, f. 246 a.

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set out from Burhanpur, and on July 2, he met the Emperor in the privy audience-hall. He was given the title of Asaf Jah, a robe of honour, and the office of *Wakil-i-Mutlaq*.[399] In the month of October, he marched from Delhi to recapture Malwa ; on January 7, 1738, he concluded peace with Baji Rao, and returned to Delhi in April 1738.

Against this background of his seemingly good relations with the Emperor, the high esteem in which he was held andthe position of prestige and authority he enjoyed[400], it is improbable that he should have written letters to Nadir Shah who was engaged in conquering Qandahar during these years. Alexander Dow in his *History of Hindustan* holds that *Nizam-u'l-Mulk* invited Nadir Shah for he wanted to become his viceroy in India after the latter's departure. "He argued with himself that as it was not probable that the Persian would fix his residence in Hindustan, he hoped, for his services, to secure for himself the viceroyship of that empire; and that afterwards time and circumstances would point out the line of his future proceedings.[401]" This statement seems to be fantastic. Nizam-u'l-Mulk held the post of *Wakil-i-Mutlaq* which was not inferior in the exercise of power and authority to that of the deputyship under a foreign ruler. He had no apprehensions of being outsted from this highest office or dismissed from the governorship of the Deccan.

On the basis of the above inquiry it can be safely concluded that there is no written available evidence or circumstantial proof to substantiate the allegation of treason against Sa'adat Khan and Nizam-u'l-Mulk. However, if they are exonerated from charges of treason, their offence of disloyalty in serving the Emperor can by on means be extenuated. These nobles acted in a most irresponsible and indiscreet manner. In the event of a major threat to the security of the Empire they failed to agree on means of combating it. The gravity of the situation required complete unity among the ministers who, abjuring their mutual jealousies and ill-will, should

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که ما بنده بادشاهی ایم - در هر صورت رفتن حضور بهتر از
جمیع و خود است - بالفعل مارا غیر از رضا جوئے پادشاه
مقصدی و مطلبی برتر نیست -

399. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 283. *Chahar Gulzar-i-Shuja'i*, p. 162.

400. *Shah Nama-i-Deccan*, pp. 297-298.

401. *History of Hindustan*, Translated from Persian, Alexander Dow London, 1803, Vol. II, p. 412.

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have taken up effective measures to cope with it. They had a moral obligation, and could not wash their hands of all responsibility[402].

Death of Khan-i-Dauran

We have noticed that Khan-i-Dauran on orders from the Emperor set out with a force numbering between 8,000 to 9,000 horse to fight against the Persians[403]. The Amir-u'l-Umar submitted that his army was not arranged properly in the battle order and equipped with artillery; it was better to postpone fighting to the next day. But the Emperor paid no heed to his representation. He pressed him to hasten to the scene of action forthwith. Khan-i-Dauran, "who had the goodness of his master at heart and never had been guilty of disobedience, obeyed the imperial commands". He armed himself and mounted on the elephant to encounter the enemy[404]. Muhammad 'Ali Khan Ansari, author of *Tarikh-i-Mzaffari*, holds that Khan-i-Dauran felt that Sa'adat Khan, his rival, might gain the goodwill of the Emperor and the admiration of the people. Self-interest and jealousy impelled him to take the decision[405]. Ashub also states that Khan-i-Dauran wanted to save his honour and to be raised in the esteem of the populace[406]. These statements are confirmed by the writer of *Hadisah-i-Nadir Shah*[407]. Whatever might have been the real or primary cause of his joining the battle, it is an established fact that Khan-i-Dauran could not make full preparations which the needs of the occasion demanded. Mir Muhammad Ashan Ijad is of the opinion that Nizam-u'l-Mulk persuaded him to guard his own position and not move forward with headlong impetuosity like Sa'adat Khan.[408] While, according to 'Abdul Karim, Nizam-u'l-Mulk

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402. Ashub laments on the lack of unanimous agreement on strategy and undivided loyalty to the crown. If there had been amity, he writes, among the generals of the army, and energetic efforts were made to rescue Sa'adat Khan and Khan-i-Dauran, the Indian army might have won the battle. Had the Emperor been a warrior himself and not absolutely dependent on his officers, the Indian soldiers under his banner would have died to a man. They longed to get into the fight in order to maintain the honour of their profession and the prestige of their master. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, pp. 101, 102, 106, 107.

403. *Bayan-i-Waqa'i*, f. 12a.

404. *Tazkirah*, ff. 125,126.

405. *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, p. 328.

406. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 102.

407. *Hadisah-i-Nadir Shah*, f. 58a.

408. *Shah Nama-i-Deccan*, p. 306; Nizam-u'l-Mulk is reported to have addressed Khan-i-Dauran in these words :

اگر کرد برهان ملک اضطراب نباید ترا رفتن ازیں شتاب

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told the Emperor that Khan-i-Dauran commanded the right wing of the battlefield and it was proper that the *Mir Bakhshi* should march to reinforce Sa'adat Khan.[409] Nadir Shah who waited for such a day, donned coat and helmet, placed 3,000 men in ambush, sent out two bodies of gunners, each five hundred strong, and putting himself at the head of 10,000 picked Afshar horsemen rode out to fight the Mughals.[410] The first shot was fired at one O'clock, and by five in the evening the Indian front was smashed and gloom and silence prevailed there. The Indian soldiers fought bravely; their fortitude, devotion and loyalty left an imperishable stamp over the mind of Nadir Shah.[411] But the devastating fire of *jazayirchis* and *Zanburaks* wrought havoc in the ranks of the Indian army. In the midst of fierce fighting, Khan-i-Dauran was wounded severely by the two shots of gun. He fell senseless in the *howdah*; and his comrades-in-arms carried him away to the camp.[412] His brother Muzaffar Khan, his elder son Muharram Khan, 'Ali Hamid Khan Koka, Shahadad Khan Afghan from Qasur, Yadgar Khan Kashmiri, Mirza 'Aqil Beg Kambalposh (Blanket-wearer), Ratan Rai, son of Khushal Chand, peshkar of Khan-i-Dauran, Aslih 'Ali Khan Khoja, Mirza Noor Beg Deccani, Maulvi Aman-ullah Khan Kashmiri, Fateh 'Ali Khan, son of Malik Muhammad Seestani, Mir Kaloo, son of Mir Mushrif, 'Ali Asad Khan and other notable captains were killed.[413] About nine thousand Indian soldiers and at least seven thousand Persians lost their livies.[414] The carnage was unparalleled, and the destruction of war equipage, stores and baggage inestimable. The terrible disaster suffered by the Indians brought tears in the eyes of Muhammad Shah.[415]

که جنگ قزلباش گاوغا بود در گریز از طریق وغا
بود جنگ هندوستان را زعار فشردن قدم در که کارزار

409. *Bayan-i-Waqa'i*, f. 12a.
410. *Jahan Kusha-i-Nadri* p. 336.
411. *Bayan-i-Waqa'i*, f. 12, a, b.
412. *Bayan-i-Waqa'i*, f. 12 b—Ashub, p. 109. *Chahar Gulzar-i-Shuja'i'*, pp. 168, 169; *The History of Nadir Shah*, James. Fraser, pp. 157, 158.
413. *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran*, ff. 115, a, b, 118, a. *Tarikh-i-Hindi*, p. 565, *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, p. 331, *Jahan Kusha-i-Nadri*, p. 337. *The History of Nadir Shah*, James Fraser, p. 158. He refers to a letter written from Muhammad Shah's camp giving details of the battle, the number of captains and soldiers, wounded and killed on both the sides.
414. *Muharabah wa Masalaihat Muhammad Shah wa Nadir Shah*, anonymous, B.M. Ms. f. 10b.
415. *Tarikh-i-Fathiya*, f. 51.

According to a report sent by Kalushkin, the Russian ambassador in Persia, "Nadir Shah was defeated on the Karnal battle-field and was preparing to turn back

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According to Ashub, Khan-i-Dauran breathed his last on the next day, February 16, 1738. He was burried in the tomb of Shah Bu Ali Qalandar near Karnal.[416] He completed 68 years of his age. Mirza Ashraf, made captive by Nadir Shah, was later on honoured by Muhammad Shah. The Emperor conferred on him the title of Khan-i-Dauran and the post of *Mir Atish*. In the reign of 'Alamgir II, Ashraf received the title of Amir-u'l-Umara.[417]

and leave India." This report was based on a letter the ambassador had received from a participant in the campaign. It was further written in the report that "only disorders and fears inside the Mughal court prevented the Mughal army from following up their advantage and turned Nadir's discomfiture into a victory." Indo-Soviet Ties, Two Hundred Years Ago, K. A. Antonova, the paper was presented at the 26th International Congress of Orientalists held in New Delhi, January 1964 : *The Century*, A weekly Review, New Delhi, March 21, 1964.

416. *Tarikh-i-Hindi*, p. 566 ; *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 109.

417. *Ma'asir-u'l-Umara*, English, Vol. I, p. I, 777. The author gives his name as Khwaja Ahswari, while in *Tarikh-i-Muhammadi*, (p. 128), it is written Mirza Ashraf. According to the writer of *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, Khan-i-Dauran had four sons :—Ashraf Khan, Ahtasham Khan, and Muhtashim Khan ; the fourth died in young age, p. 333. Mirza Muhammad, author of *Tarikh-i-Muhammadi*, gives their names like this :— *Ahtram Khan*, Ahtasham Khan, born of Mah Begam, wife of Khan-i-Dauran, p. 112 ; Ahtram Khan was killed in the battle of Karnal, p. 103, and Ashraf Khan, p. 128.

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Chapter VII

CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY F KHAN-I-DAURAN

Khan-i-Dauran belonged to an obscure family which enjoyed none of the advantages of wealth, political influence or social esteem; its members were of average talents and ordinary calibre doing odd jobs for earning their livelihood. Yet, Khan-i-Dauran rose above his environments to political prominence, to the post of *Mir Bakhshi* and to leadership of a faction at the court.

Khan-i-Dauran exhibited no feats of valour in any battlefield, nor did he make plans to augment military and financial resources of the Empire. In martial spirit of gallantry, superb organizing skill and political acumen he was considered unequal to both Nizam-u'l-Mulk and Sa'adat Khan. Notwithstanding these defects, Khan-i-Dauran won his way to the foremost position in the Mughal government and kept his opponents at bay. He enjoyed full confidence of his master and wielded unbounded influence at the court. His ascendancy continued unshaken to the close of his life.

His rise from humble origin to power and uninterrupted stay in the office of *Mir Bakhshi* have been attributed by contemporaries to his habitual character of flattery, ability for intrigues and for making adjustments in any given situation to the benefit of his individual self. He outshone other courtiers in the faculty to applaud the follies of Muhammad Shah, pamper his desires and lull him in hour of despair.

Apart from these particular skills, the most significant factor, which helped Khan-i-Dauran gain a preponderant influence in the king's council, was the diminution in the stature of the *Wazir*. After the death of Muhammad Amin Khan, prestige of the *Wazir* slumped and his position suffered a set-back. Past misfortunes, experienced by his predecessors, seemed to have taught Muhammad Shah the necessity of controlling the growing power of the *Wazir*. This shift in the policy of Muhammad Shah tended to impair the strength of Nizam-u'l-Mulk and rendered him ineffective in handling public affairs. The Emperor lent too ready an ear to his favoured courtiers and gave no support to the *Wazir* in carrying out measures of reform. Feelings of helplessness and disappointment seized Nizam-u'l-Mulk and he left the court out of sheer disgust. Qamruddin Khan also could not recover the ground and regain the primacy lost by his illustrious uncle. In a way, the *Wazir* was matched against the *Mir Bakhshi*. Qamruddin Khan continued to exercise power in full measure in his administra-

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tive spheres; but he was considerably reduced in influence and prestige attached to his office.

With the exaltation of the *Mir Bakhshi's* status, the supremacy of the *Wazir* was permanently impaired. There followed a long and intricate rivarly for leadership between these two officers of government. In their endless personal feuds essential interests of the Empire were sacrificd. Khan-i-Dauran, taking advantage of his privileged position, set himself to obstruct all suspected designs of his opponents to increase their power. He displayed indifference and apathy towards the nobles who needed succour from the centre at critical moments. He feared lest any success against the Marathas and the *zamindars* might raise a rival in the estimation of the Emperor or provide him with place and profit. For instance, Khan-i-Dauran misrepresented the efforts of Muhammad Khan Bangash to cooperate with Nizam-u'l-Mulk against the Marathas as in reality a comspiracy against Muhammad Shah, and so secured Muhammad Khan's dismissal.

It may be argued that Khan-i-Dauran was used by the king as an instrument to preserve a balance of power between the big nobles. If any one of the nobles should become dominant, the royal authority would be in grave jeopardy. But events proved that Khan-i-Dauran exploited this policy for his own benefit at the cost of real interests of the Empire as a whole. The disastrous results of Khan-i-Dauran's misuse of Muhammad Shah's anxiety to keep in check the power of individual nobles were seen most strikingly when he facilitated by his conduct foreign invasion and penetration of the Empire. Khan-i-Dauran failed to provide monetary help to Nasir Khan, governor of Kabul, when he was menaced by Nadir Shah.

He openly defied royal orders by not marching to the assistance of Muhammad Khan Bangash when the latter was threatened with destruction by Baji Rao who had driven deep into central India in alliance with Chhatrasal Bundela. On the other hand, where his own factional allies were concerned, Khan-i-Dauran sometimes succeeded in securing for them excessive powers, though their interests and those of the court were not identical. He consistently supported Jai Singh in his ambitions to hold his grip over Malwa, and advocated a policy of compromise with the Marathas as upheld by the Raja. While Muhammad Shah seems to have followed a policy of maintaining a balance of power among the higher nobles and officers of state, with a view to guarding his own throne, the policy in actual practice led to a further weakening of imperial power. It could, by no means, prevent ultimate disintegration and even for the movement by destroying the possibility of concerted action, it laid the Empire at the mercy of the invader.

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In dealing with local subversive elements like Rajputs, Jats and Bundelas, Khan-i-Dauran pursued a policy of conciliation and peace. He pleaded their cause by pointing out that these herediatary *zamindars* were old and faithful servants of the Empire, and they should be allowed to rule their regions freely and undisturbed. Their suppression would yield no fruitful results and the empire would gain nothing out of it; rather, such a policy of intimidation would give rise to fresh problems which the government was unable to solve. Muhammad Shah agreed with the views of Khan-i-Dauran and did not put a tight check upon the powers and ambitions of these warlike chiefs. Through Khan-i-Dauran they obtained concessions in form of *jagirs*, titles and ranks[419]. Khan-i-Dauran even instigated *zamindars* to continue warfare with the governor. For instance, he wrote to Chhatrasal Bundela, "that his deadly enemy Muhammad Khan Bangash being in his power, he would throw away all chances of fortune if he did not slay him. The head of Muhammad Khan would be an acceptable gift to lay at the feet of the Emperor and secure high dignity and reward[420]."

But the chieftains used each concession in turn the stepping-stone for fresh demands and privileges by creating disorders. When reports of revolts raised by the *zamindars* were placed before the Emperor, Khan-i-Dauran would try to hush the matter and allay fears of officers concerned by expressing hope that every thing would be set aright. Consequently, their crimes generally went unpunished. This policy of appeasement, writes Ashub, cast a baneful shadow on the central administration.[421] None of these *zamindars* cooperated with government in defending the Empire from foreign invasion. The overriding needs of the country's defence should have swept away their regional loyalties and put to an end their conflict with the central government.

The career of Khan-i-Dauran may be divided into two phases, one beginning from the time he was enrolled a *mnasabdar* and ending in 1720 ; the second covers the period when he worked as *Mir Bakhshi* till the close of his life, February 16, 1738. During the reign of Farrukh Siyar, Khan-i-Dauran served government in the capacity of *bakhshi* of *wala shahi* troops. He was raised to the rank of 7,000/7,000 with the title of Samasam-ud-Daulah Khan-i-Dauran Mansur Jang; he had also flag and drums. In addition to the post of *bakhshi*, Khan-i-Dauran was given the *subedari* of two important provinces, Gujarat (1716) and Agra (1719). He acted Husain 'Ali

418. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, B. M. Ms. f. 78.
419. *Later Mughals*, Vol. II, p. 240.
420. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, f. 79.

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Khan's deputy in the court when the latter left for the Deccan on April 4, 1715. Khan-i-Dauran took sides with Farrukh Siyar in his conflict with the Saiyid brothers; but later on, having been convinced of the Emperor's cause being futile, he supported the ministers by disclosing to them secret plans aimed at their destruction. He held himself aloof from taking part in intrigues that ultimately led to the assassination of Husain 'Ali Khan.

After the battle of Hasanpur, Muhammad Shah appointed him Mir Bakhshi with the rank of 8,000/8,000 and the title of Amir-ul-Umara. But no province was put under his charge. Qamrud-din Khan was made second *bakhshi* and Rohasan-ud-Daulah Zafar Khan the third *bakhshi*. In the 4th regnal year Saifullah Khan was appointed fourth *bakshi*.[422] Khan-i-Dauran's brother, Muzaffar Khan, *mansabdar* of 8,000/8,000 was first made *mir atash*, and then governor of Ajmer. Khan-i-Dauran secured suitable emoluments in form of *madad-i-ma'ash* for his two brothers, Khwaja Muhammad Ja'afar and Khwaja Munqism. For other members of his family he fixed pensions out of the revenues of his *jagirs*.[423]

After the depatrure of Nizam-u'l-Mulk from the court, December 17, 1723, Khan-i-Dauran rose to be the most conspicuous and dominating officer. Muhammad Shah shaped and moulded his policy with regard to administrative and state matters according to Khan-i-Dauran's counsels and suggestions.[421] As *Mir Bakhshi*, Khan-i-Dauran exercised enormous powers; all affairs of military administration passed through his hands. He recommended appointments and promotions of *mansabdars* of all ranks, and issued *sarkat* for the award of *jagir*. He is said to have secured *mansabs* and high positions for 7 hundred persons within a period of 26 years. On the basis of his recommendations several nobles like Jai Singh, Sarbuland Khan and Muzaffar Khan were made governors of Malwa, Gujarat and Ajmer respectively. A *farman* bearing the Amir-ul-Umara's seal and signatures was issued to Momin Khan urging him to oust the deputy of Abhai Singh and administer the province till formal appointment of governor was made.

The governors informed the *Mir Bakhshi* about details of campaigns they launched against the Marathas, *zamindars* and other rebels, and developments relating to political and economic matters. They also made representations for the payment of money to be given to soldiers, military

421. *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chahtaiya*, f. 206.

422. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, f. 79a.

423. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, f. 78b.

424. *Mir'at-i-Ahmadi*, p. 197.

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assistance and grant of *jagirs* for themselves. Further, they sent news about disorders created by *zamindars* and *jagirdars*. At the same time, he received dispatches sent by the *Waqi' Navis* from different headquarters of the Empire. The *Mir Bakhshi* replied these letters on behalf of the Emperor[426]. On many occasions Khan-i-Dauran refused to provide assistance to governors and misrepresented their requests.

Throughout his life Khan-i-Dauran stayed in the Capital performing duties associated with the office of *Mir Bakhshi*[427]. He disliked the idea of leaving the court for an active service. When ordered by the Emperor to march against the Marathas, the *Mir Bkhshi*, instead, asked the governor of Ajmer to encounter the enemy. In 1733-34, Khan-i-Dauran himself proceeded to the trouble spot in Malwa, and was accompanied by *wala shahi* force along with his own troops.At the battle of Karnal the Emperor himself was the supreme commander, and led the imperial army personally. Khan-i-Dauran, along with other officers like Nizam-u'l-Mulk, Sa'aduddin Khan, Qamruddin Khan and other advised the king on military plans and arrangements for the army. He was a connecting link between the king and *mansabdars*, but he, in presence of other big nobles, could not play a very important part.

At the capital he presented state officers, governors and *zamindars* to the king. The Emperor ordered him to receive Nizam-u'l-Mulk when he visited Delhi to assume the charge of *wizarat*. When Muhammad Amin Khan died, the Mir Bakhshi was directed to present Qamruddin Khan and other members of his family in the court[428]. Other central ministers could also be asked to introduce governors and foreign embassies to the Emperor. Mir Jumla, the Sadar, received Sarbuland Khan who came from Kabul after relinquishing the office of governorship of that province[429]. Khan-i-Dauran attended the king in private chamber and sometimes was invited to dine with His Majesty in the company of other nobles.

Khan-i-Dauran was of strong build and tall stature, a head and shoulders above the height of the ordinary man. His stalwart frame, broad shoulders and smiling face gave him an imposing and dignified presence in all the gatherings. With a commanding appearance he had affable disposition; his manners were cultured and his habits active. He was witty and shrewd, regular in prayers and careful in performing

425. *'Ajaib-u'l-Afaq*, ff. 77a, 78b, 81a.

426. For details of duties of the *Mir Bakhshi* in the Mughal system of administration. *The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire*, Ibn-i-Hasan, pp. 226, 227.

427. *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghtaiya*, f. 205a.

428. *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chaghtaiya*, f. 214a.

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religious rites. He was generous and patron of the learned. The style and form of his conversation was eloquent, lucid and plausible. He spoke in Urdu, freely using Persian idioms and couplets which added charm and beauty to his expression and delighted the hearts of those who talked with him. He was of the view that for a person born in India to speak in Persian was to put himself to ridicule. His knowledge of Persian language was limited. Once Mir Taqi *Mir* corrected him when he used a Persian phrase in his conversation with the poet . Nawab Sadruddin Khan *Fa'zi* held no high opinion about his learning. Muhammad 'Ali Khan Ansari, author of *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, writes that Khan-i-Dauran possessed poetic talents and frequently composed verses.

He participated in literary gatherings and *musha'iras* arranged at his house or at the residence of his friends. In the assemblies the famous mystic work, *Fasus al hikim*, was read, and its meanings were discussed. He also owned a big library. He fixed one rupee per day as stipend for Mir Taqi *Mir*, the famous Urdu poet of the time. Once Mullah *Sata'i*, a Kashmiri poet, reached his house early in the morning and seeing Khani-Dauran recited a Persian couplet. Khan-i-Dauran was extremely pleased and rewarded him with two thousand rupees. But the poet requested the *Mir Bakhshi* to secure a *mansab* and service in government for him. Khan-i-Dauran took *Mulla Sata'i* to the court where the latter recited a *qasida* in honour of the Emperor. The poet received a *mansab*, *jagir*, and service in the province of Kashmir. Another poet to whom Khan-i-Dauran gave one thousand rupees was Muhammad *Raf'i*.

According to the author of *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran*, there was not a single *mahal* in his *jagirs* in whose revenues some amount of money was earmarked for purposes of charity. He spent twenty thousand rupees every month on the needy and mendicants. He distributed one hundred rupees among the poor every day while going from his house to the court [38]. He commanded the respect of his soldiers whom he paid regularly and treated kindly; their welfare was always his foremost

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429. *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, p. 131.
430. *Mir Taqi Mir*, Dr. Khawja Ahmad Faruqi, Delhi, 1954, p. 81.
431. *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari* p. 333.
432. *Ma'asir-u'l-Umara*, text, Vol. I, p. 821.
433. *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran*, f, 158.
434. *Zikr-i-Mir*, edited by Dr. Maulvi Abdul Haque, Aurangabad, 1928, p. 63.
435. *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, p. 333.
436. *Khazanah-i-'Amrah* Mir Ghulam 'Ali Azad, Kanpur, 1871, p. 241.
437. *Risalah-i-Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i-Dauran* f. 93b.

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concern[438]. He patronised theologians and divines and made liberal grants for their maintenance. Through his efforts Maulana Shaikh Nuruddin Muhammad, a reputed theologian of Ahmadabad, received salary of one thousand rupees in the reign of Farrukh Siyar. Maulana Nuruddin belonged to Suharwardia Silsila ; he was a saint of overwhelming erudition and his fame spread far and wide. His two sons, Shaikh Muhammad Saleh and Shaikh Nizamuddin Muhammad visited the Imperial court[439].

438. *Tarikh-i-Muhammadi*, p. 106.

439. *Mi'rat-i-Ahmadi*, p 19 ; Supplement, text, pp. 57, 58.

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APPENDIX

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

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2. ALI MUHAMMAD KHAN, *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, edited by Syed Nawab Ali, Part II, Baroda 1927.

3. ANAND RAM "MUKHLIS", *Tazkirah*, Aligarh Ms. The work constituents our foremost authority for the invasion of Nadir Shah, written from the Indian standpoint. It covers all important aspects of the tragedy, and throws light on the social and economic conditions of the period.

4. ABDUL KARIM, *Bayan-i-Waqi'*, Aligarh Ms. It contains detailed description of the invasion of Nadir Shah, his activities in Delhi and the Punjab and the events and developments which took place in the reigns of Muhammad Shah and Ahmad Shah. The author has traced the events down to 1793.

5. ANONYMOUS, *Tarikh-i-Ahmad Shah*, Ethe 423. The narrative begins from the accession of Ahmad Shah and terminates about six months before his deposition in 1754. It is the most detailed and accurate contemporary account of the period.

6. ANONYMOUS, *Sahifa-i-iqbal*, Rieu, Supp. 54, Or. 3281. The work contains a brief account of social and political events beginning from the fall of the Saiyid brothers to the 14th regional year of Muhammad Shah. Details of Muhammad Shah's marriage ceremony, shoe seller's riot and royal reception accorded to the Persian embassy are informative and interesting.

7. ANONYMOUS *Risala-i-Muhammad Shah-wa-Khan-i-Dauran*. Rieu I 277b, Or. 180. It supplies useful details concerning the life and achievements of Khan-i-Dauran. But the account is panegyric and exaggerated.

8. ANONYMOUS, *Hadisa-i-Nadir Shah*, Asafiyah Ms. It deals mainly with the events relating to the invasion of Nadir Shah.

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9. BHIMSEN, son of Raghunath Das, *Nuskha-i-Dilkusha*, Rieu, I 271 ; Or. 23. Historical memoirs relating chiefly to military campaigns in the Deccan, from the reign of Aurangzeb to the accession of Bahadur Shah I.

10. BHAGWAN DAS, *'Aziz-ul-qulub*, Aligarh Ms. A collection of letters exchanged between Muhammad Khan Bangash and the prominent nobles and chiefs of India.

11. HARCHARAN DAS, *Chahar Gulzar-i-Shuja'i*, Rieu III, 1912, Or. 1732.

12. IRADAT KHAN, *Tarikh-i-Iradat Khan*, Aligarh Ms. The author, whose original name was Mirza Mubarak-ul-Lah, received the title of Iradat Khan in the 40 regnal year of Aurangzeb. He served the Mughal government as *faujdar* of Aurangzbad, and *qila'dar-faujdar* of Mandu. After the death of Aurangzeb he espoused the cause of 'Azam Shah, but Bahadur Shah, the new Emperor, treated him kindly. The account given in his *Tarikh* is full of information for the reigns of Bahadur Shah and Jahandar Shah. He died in 1716.

13. JAGJIVAN DAS, son of Manohar Das Gujarati, *Muntakhab-ul-Tawarikh*, Add. 26253. It is a general and brief history beginning from the reign of Mu'izz-ud-din Ghuri to the end of the second regnal year of Bahadur Shah. It contains tables of the revenues or *jama'* figures of all the *subahs* of the Empire.

14. KAMRAJ, son of Nain Singh, a resident of Phaphund, 36 miles east of Etawah in the U. P.

(*a*) *A'zam-ul-harb*, Rieu III, 937, Or. 1899. A detailed account of 'Azam Shah's reign from 15 March 1707 to 19 June 1708.

(*b*) *Ibrat Namah*, India Office, Ethe 391. A political history of Mughal India from 1707 to the end of Farrukh Siyar's reign. Both the works give first-hand information which is of the utmost value for writing the political history of the period.

15. LAL RAM, son of Rai Dulah Ram, *Tauhfat-ul-Hind*, Rieu, I, 236a, Add. 6584. The work, which is brief and general, was written in the 18th regnal year of Muhammad Shah.

16. LACHHMI NARAYAN "SHAFIQ" AURANGABADI, son of Mansa Ram, *Ma'asir-Asafi*, Osmania University Ms. It traces history of the Deccan from the beginning of the 18th century to the death of Asaf Jah I, 1748. He is also the author of *Haqiqat-ha-i-Hindustan*, an important work for the revenue tables of the six *subahas* of the Deccan, State Library of Hyderabad Ms. The work was composed in 1793.

17. MUHAMMAD MUN'IM JA'FARABADI, *Farrukh Namah*, Ethe I, 144 ; 388. It contains a detailed account of the war of succession among the sons of Bahadur Shah, the reign of Jahandar Shah and the accession of Farrukh Siyar.

18. MIR MUHAMMAD AHSAN IJAD, *Farrukh Siyar Namah*, Rieu 127a, Or. 25. The author was the pupil of Mirza Bedil. He received the *mansab* of 300/ and for sometime served as *faujdar* of Etawah. It is a complete and graphic accouut of events connected with the aaccession of Farrukh Siyar to the throne.

19. MIRZA MUHAMMAD, son of Mu'tamad Khan, *Ibrat Namah*, Bankipur Ms. He has recorded the account of events, to which he was an eye-witness without either favour or prejudice to the Saiyid brothers, Farrukh Siyar and other court nobles who were caught in the major issues of struggle for power from 1713 to 1719.

20. MUHAMMAD QASIM "IBRAT" HUSAINI of Lahore, *Ibrat Namah*, Rieu I 273 b, Add. 26235. He was in the service of Saiyid Husain Ali Khan, and, therefore the partisan of the Saiyid brothers.

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21. MIR MUHAMMAD RAZA, *Sharf Namah-i-Muhammad Shah*, Rieu III, 1002 ; Or 2003. A versified history of the successors of Aurangzeb till the early part of Muhammad Shah's reign.

22. MUHAMMAD QASIM AURANGABADI, *Ahwal-ul-Khawqin*, Rieu I, 276, Add. 26 244. He was *bakhshi* in the army of Nizam-ul-Mulk, and closely connected with the leading nobles, including the governor's relations, of the Deccan. His narrative, lengthy and prolix, is mainly devoted to the political history of the Deccan from the death of Aurangzeb down to the year 1748.

23. MUN'IM KHAN AL-HAMDANI AL-AURANGABADI, *Sawanih-i-Deccan*, Asafiyah Ms. A history of the Nizams of Hyderabad from Asaf Jah I to 1783. It contains biographical particulars of the prominent *amirs* who flourished in the Deccan during this period.

24. MIR 'ALAM, *Hadiqat-ul-'Alam* Litho. Hyderabad, 1892. A brief but interesting history, written in a simple style, of the Deccan.

25. MANSA RAM, *Ma'asir-i-Nizami*, Asafiyah Ms. A full account of the life and achievements of Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah I.

26. MUHAMMAD SALEH, *Tarikh-i-'Ali*, Bankipur Ms. It contains important information regarding the early life and career of the Saiyid brothers.

27. MUHAMMAD ALI KHAN ANSARI, *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, Aligarh Ms. A general history of the Mughal Empire from Babur to 1779. The record of events concerning the reign of Muhammad Shah is valuable.

28. MUHAMMAD FAIZ BAKHSH KAKORI, *Farah Bakhsh*, Aligarh Ms. A history of Faizabad from 1179 to 1233. It supplies valuable information regarding the origin of the Saiyid brothers.

29. MUHAMMAD HADI KHAN KAMWAR, *Tazkirat-us-Slatin-i-Chaghatai*, Bankipur Ms. The second part of the book begins with the death of Jahangir and ends with 7 regnal year of Muhammad Shah, 1724. It is authentic diary of day-to-day events and proceedings at the imperial court. For comparing and correcting dates it is extremely useful.

30. MUHAMMAD SHAF'I "WARID", *Mirat-i-Waridat*, Aligarh Ms. This important work begins with the history of Babur and terminates before the invasion of Nadir Shah. It is wanting in chronological order.

31. MIRZA MUHAMMAD BAKHSH "ASHU'B', *Tarikh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar-wa-Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*. Rieu III, 943 ; Or. 1832. The author completed his work in 1782. The work is full of valuable details about Muhammad Shah's reign.

32. MUHAMMAD MUHSIN SIDDIQUI, *Jauhar-i-Samsam*.

The author was a *walashahi* soldier, and he wrote this work under the influence of a close associate of Khan-i-Dauran. It extends from the death of Aurangzeb to the departure of Nadir Shah from India in May 1739.

33. MIRZA MUHAMMAD MEHDI, *Tarikh-Jahan Kusha-i-Nadri* or *Nadir Namah*, Bombay 1875. The author was a confidential secretary of Nadir Shah and he was present in all his military expeditions. The account mainly deals with the wars and conquests of Nadir Shah ; it is eulogistic in character and difficult in style.

34. MIR GHULAM ALI, *Imad-us-Sa'adat*, N. K. Press, Lucknow. It is mainly a history of the Mawabs of Oudh, extending from Sa'adat Khan Burhan-ul-Mulk, the first Nawab, to Sa'adat Ali. It also contains details relating to Rohilla Afghans, Jats, Sikhs and Marathas who played a conspicuous role in the history of India during the 18th century.

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35. MURTAZA HUSAIN, *Hadiqat-ul-aqalim*, Litho. N. K. Press, Lucknow. It is a very valuable general history of the 18th century India. Besides containing geographical details of towns, and trading centres in Northern India, the work supplies information concerning the Marathas, Rohillas, Bundelas and the Nawabs of Oudh.

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37. MIR WALI-UL-LAH, *Tarikh-i-Farrukhabad*, Aligarh Ms. It is basically a history of Farrukhabad under Bangash Nawabs, but it also gives an account of the history of Delhi and Oudh.

38. MUSAVI KHAN JUR'AT, *Munsha'at-i-Musavi Khan*, Asafiyah Ms. State Library of Hyderabad. A valuable collection of letters exchanged between Nizam-ul-Mulk and the leading nobles of his time. It contains some *farmans* of Muhammad Shah addressed to the Nizam.

39. MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAFI KHAN, *Muntakhab-ul-Lubab*. Bibliotheca India, Vol. II, Calcutta, 1874.

40. NURUDDIN FARUQI, *Jahandar Namah*, Ethe, 3988. It contains a detailed and eye-witness account of events about the war of succession among Bahadur Shah's sons and between Jahandar Shah and Farrukh Siyar.

41. RUSTUM ALI, *Tarikh-i-Hindi*, B.M.Ms. Or. 1628 This work which deals mainly with the reign of Muhammad Shah was composed in 1154/1741-42, 23 regnal year. The author is prejudiced towards Nizam-ul-Mulk who tried to weaken the power of his patron, Dost Muhammad Khan Rohilla of Bhopal.

42. SHAKIR KHAN, *Tarikh-i-Shakir Khan*, Add. 6585. He was the fourth son of Lutfullah Khan Sadiq, appointed governor of Delhi at the time of Nadir Shah's invasion. The work is wanting in order and precision, and it is destitute of dates. At the end it contains revenue tables, draft specimen of legal deeds and appointments, and list of officials in the government of Muhammad Shah to whose reign the work is principally devoted.

43. SHIV DAS, *Shah-namah-i-munawar-ul-Kalam*, Rieu I, 274. Or. 26. The work is mainly devoted to the reign of Farrukh Siyar ; it contains many copies of official letters and *farmans*.

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(*b*) Additional Persian Papers
(*c*) Sarkar's collection.

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62	1	Chimaji	Chinnaji
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